Hegel,modal logic,and the social nature of mind

ABSTRACT

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit provides a fascinating picture of individual minds caught up in “recognitive” relations so as to constitute a realm—“spirit”—which, while necessarily embedded in nature, is not reducible to it. In this essay I suggest a contemporary path for developing Hegel's suggestive ideas in a way that broadly conforms to the demands of his own system, such that one moves from logic to a philosophy of mind. Hence I draw on Hegel's “subjective logic”, understood in the light of modern modal logic, in an attempt to model the way minds might be thought as connected by way of shared intentional contents. Here, we should not be surprised at some of the parallels that emerge between the approaches of Hegel and the modal logician Arthur Prior, as Prior had testified to the influence of his teacher, John N. Findlay, who himself had strong Hegelian leanings. In the final section, Robert Stalnaker's version of possible-world semantics is suggested as a framework within which Hegel's recognitive account of the mind might be understood.     

A review of the animate-inanimate distinction in infancy: Implications for models of social and cognitive knowing

The ability to distinguish people from things sheds light on an important theoretical question: how is the development of social cognition related to the development of physical cognition? According to Piaget (1954), cognition is unitary and the processes used in dealing with the physical world are the same as those employed in the social world. This statement should be questioned. Although people and objects share certain fundamental properties (size, shape, etc.), only people can communicate, act independently and have feelings and intentions. Thus, people seem much more complex to deal with than things. If all cognitive development derives from the growth of a unitary system, then knowledge about animate objects should lag behind that of inanimate objects. The present paper explores this idea by examining what infants know about the attributes that distinguish people from things. It is concluded that the onset of this distinction begins early in life. Even 2-month-old infants treat people and objects differently when confounding variables of the stimuli are controlled. Rather than lagging behind, the infants' understanding of people appears precocious. The infants' recognition of the crucial distinction between the two classes suggests that a conceptual system is beginning to be formed soon after birth. This conceptual system appears different for social and non-social objects and serves as a foundation from which infants might come to understand the distinctive properties of animate and inanimate objects.     

A new objectively scored version of the Defence Mechanism Test

Kragh's Defence Mechanism Test has proved its worth in a number of applied settings but has hitherto required skilled time-consuming interpretation. Two studies are reported which validate an "objectively scored" version of the test developed using G-analysis. In the first, it was found that this version of the test could successfully predict the performance of trainee pilots. The second study examined the construct validity of this version of the test. It was found that the predictive factor from Study I re-emerged within a sample of students, where it correlated positively with scores on a test of perceptual defence and the Shrewdness (N) scale of the 16PF, and negatively with two of the identification scales of the Defence Mechanism Test. This factor was tentatively identified as one of general defensiveness. It is concluded that this form of the test deserves consideration when selecting individuals for stressful occupations.     

Visual attention to own- versus other-race faces: Perspectives from learning mechanisms and task demands

Multiple factors have been proposed to contribute to the other-race effect in face recognition, including perceptual expertise and social-cognitive accounts. Here, we propose to understand the effect and its contributing factors from the perspectives of learning mechanisms that involve joint learning of visual attention strategies and internal representations for faces, which can be modulated by quality of contact with other-race individuals including emotional and motivational factors. Computational simulations of this process will enhance our understanding of interactions among factors and help resolve inconsistent results in the literature. In particular, since learning is driven by task demands, visual attention effects observed in different face-processing tasks, such as passive viewing or recognition, are likely to be task specific (although may be associated) and should be examined and compared separately. When examining visual attention strategies, the use of more data-driven and comprehensive eye movement measures, taking both spatial–temporal pattern and consistency of eye movements into account, can lead to novel discoveries in other-race face processing. The proposed framework and analysis methods may be applied to other tasks of real-life significance such as face emotion recognition, further enhancing our understanding of the relationship between learning and visual cognition.     

老龄化对F0轮廓线索在汉语言语识别去掩蔽作用的影响

动态基频(F0)轮廓有助于嘈杂环境下的言语识别,可以作为将目标语音从背景声中分离的知觉线索。本研究通过评估老年人与年轻人在言语掩蔽下聆听具有自然动态F0轮廓与对F0轮廓操作调节后的汉语语句的言语识别能力,探讨老龄化对F0轮廓线索在汉语言语识别去掩蔽作用中的影响。结果显示,在言语掩蔽下自然动态的F0轮廓比压扁或拉伸的F0轮廓更能帮助年轻人抵抗信息掩蔽识别目标言语;而老年人在言语掩蔽下却难以从动态F0轮廓线索中受益。研究结果揭示了老年人利用F0轮廓线索促进掩蔽下言语感知能力的老化特点。     

The culture of perceptual expertise and the other-race effect

In our commentary, we propose that the ORE can be viewed as a form of perceptual expertise. Like experts, we recognize own-race faces at the subordinate level as individuals and novices when recognize other-race faces at the basic level of race. Applying a perceptual expertise account, we explain the ORE in terms of its cognitive, neural, and motivational factors. We suggest that by creating a culture of “other-race” expertise, improvements in other-race face recognition can be achieved.     

Integration and cue overlap in recognition failure of recallable words

A highly systematic relation between the conditional probability of recognition given recall and the overall recognition hit rate has been demonstrated in a wide variety of experiments. A function describing this relationship was developed by Tulving & Wiseman (1975). Exceptions to this function have, in retrospect, been interpreted in terms of (a) a low integration between cue and target items, or (b) a high cue overlap between the two tests involved: recognition and recall. The experiment reported was designed to evaluate the joint and the separate contributions from integration and cue overlap for obtaining conformity with and exception from the Tulving-Wiseman function. In line with the predictions made, the results showed that these two factors in combination can account for data that fit the function and for exceptions above the function. In relative terms, the contribution from integration was somewhat more pronounced than that from cue overlap.     

Can we learn from the clinically significant face processing deficits,prosopagnosia and capgras delusion?

This review describes two clinically significant face processing deficits, prosopagnosia and Capgras delusion, and provides new knowledge about the face recognition process by a convergence of empirical findings. These empirical findings are structured around two questions that are viewed from the perspectives of the two deficits. First is the question of hemispheric specificity, which inquires into the degree of each hemisphere's contribution to the face recognition process. Second is the question of dual neural pathways, which addresses the possibility that the face recognition process proceeds along two parallel pathways in the brain. Findings from the hemispheric specificity studies reinforce the current view that right hemisphere involvement is necessary for face recognition while left hemisphere involvement is minimal. Findings from the dual neural pathways studies reinforce the plausible but yet unproven hypothesis that two neural pathways pass information from the visual association cortex in the occipital lobe toward the temporal lobes and limbic system when faces are seen and recognized. These findings, which also indicate that each of the dual neural pathways carries different, nonredundant information, could be instrumental in showing that the pathways play different roles in the manifestations of the clinically significant face processing deficits, prosopagnosia and Capgras delusion.