Hierarchical classes: Model and data analysis

A discrete, categorical model and a corresponding data-analysis method are presented for two-way two-mode (objects × attributes) data arrays with 0, 1 entries. The model contains the following two basic components: a set-theoretical formulation of the relations among objects and attributes; a Boolean decomposition of the matrix. The set-theoretical formulation defines a subset of the possible decompositions as consistent with it. A general method for graphically representing the set-theoretical decomposition is described. The data-analysis algorithm, dubbed HICLAS, aims at recovering the underlying structure in a data matrix by minimizing the discrepancies between the data and the recovered structure. HICLAS is evaluated with a simulation study and two empirical applications.This research was supported in part by a grant from the Belgian NSF (NFWO) to Paul De Boeck and in part by NSF Grant BNS-83-01027 to Seymour Rosenberg. We thank Iven Van Mechelen for clarifying several aspects of the Boolean algebraic formulation of the model and Phipps Arabie for his comments on an earlier draft.     

A review of the animate-inanimate distinction in infancy: Implications for models of social and cognitive knowing

The ability to distinguish people from things sheds light on an important theoretical question: how is the development of social cognition related to the development of physical cognition? According to Piaget (1954), cognition is unitary and the processes used in dealing with the physical world are the same as those employed in the social world. This statement should be questioned. Although people and objects share certain fundamental properties (size, shape, etc.), only people can communicate, act independently and have feelings and intentions. Thus, people seem much more complex to deal with than things. If all cognitive development derives from the growth of a unitary system, then knowledge about animate objects should lag behind that of inanimate objects. The present paper explores this idea by examining what infants know about the attributes that distinguish people from things. It is concluded that the onset of this distinction begins early in life. Even 2-month-old infants treat people and objects differently when confounding variables of the stimuli are controlled. Rather than lagging behind, the infants' understanding of people appears precocious. The infants' recognition of the crucial distinction between the two classes suggests that a conceptual system is beginning to be formed soon after birth. This conceptual system appears different for social and non-social objects and serves as a foundation from which infants might come to understand the distinctive properties of animate and inanimate objects.     

A new objectively scored version of the Defence Mechanism Test

Kragh's Defence Mechanism Test has proved its worth in a number of applied settings but has hitherto required skilled time-consuming interpretation. Two studies are reported which validate an "objectively scored" version of the test developed using G-analysis. In the first, it was found that this version of the test could successfully predict the performance of trainee pilots. The second study examined the construct validity of this version of the test. It was found that the predictive factor from Study I re-emerged within a sample of students, where it correlated positively with scores on a test of perceptual defence and the Shrewdness (N) scale of the 16PF, and negatively with two of the identification scales of the Defence Mechanism Test. This factor was tentatively identified as one of general defensiveness. It is concluded that this form of the test deserves consideration when selecting individuals for stressful occupations.     

Stimulus class membership established via stimulus-reinforcer relations

In an arbitrary matching-to-sample procedure, two mentally retarded subjects learned conditional discriminations with two sets of stimuli. Each set included a spoken name (N1 or N2), an object (O1 or O2), and a printed symbol (S1 or S2). One subject selected conditionally (a) O1 upon N1, and O2 upon N2, and (b) S1 upon O1, and S2 upon O2. The other subject selected conditionally (a) S1 upon N1, and S2 upon N2, and (b) O1 upon S1, and O2 upon S2. For both subjects, selections of O1 and S1 produced one type of food, F1; selections of O2 and S2 produced a different type of food, F2. Both subjects also learned identity-matching performances, selecting O1, O2, S1, S2, F1, and F2 conditionally upon those stimuli as samples; F1 followed selections of O1, S1, and F1; F2 followed selections of O2, S2, and F2. Matching performances consistent with stimulus class formation involving the names, objects, symbols, and foods were demonstrated on probe trials, even though these performances had not been taught explicitly. Next, new objects, X1 and X2, were presented on identity-matching trials, producing F1 and F2, respectively. Without further training, X1 was selected conditionally upon N1, S1, and O1, and X2 was selected upon N2, S2, and O2. When the contingencies were changed so that selections of X1 and X2 were now followed by F2 and F1, respectively, X2 was selected conditionally upon N1, S1, and O1, and X1 was selected upon N2, S2, and O2. Class membership of X1 and X2 had apparently changed. This study provides evidence that reinforcers may become members of stimulus classes, and that new stimuli may become class members through relations with reinforcers.     

The culture of perceptual expertise and the other-race effect

In our commentary, we propose that the ORE can be viewed as a form of perceptual expertise. Like experts, we recognize own-race faces at the subordinate level as individuals and novices when recognize other-race faces at the basic level of race. Applying a perceptual expertise account, we explain the ORE in terms of its cognitive, neural, and motivational factors. We suggest that by creating a culture of “other-race” expertise, improvements in other-race face recognition can be achieved.     

FUNCTIONAL COMMUNICATION TRAINING WITH AND WITHOUT EXTINCTION AND PUNISHMENT

Functional communication training has been reported to be a promising treatment for severe behavior problems. In this study, functional communication training alone and combined with extinction and/or punishment was evaluated for 4 clients with severe retardation, behavior problems, and communication deficits. The participants were inpatients on a hospital unit for treatment of severe behavior disorders. They received individualized interventions based on functional assessment that included reinforcement of a communication response with the same function as their destructive behavior. Results showed that for some patients, functional communication training was not sufficient to produce clinically significant reductions in destructive behavior, and the combination of training plus punishment produced the largest and most consistent reductions.     

弱智儿童感知动作技能特点的实验研究

本研究以难易程度不同的两个打洞操作作业 ,对弱智儿童和正常儿童的感知 动作技能进行了多种参数的测查。结果发现 :两类儿童在理解操作要点、操作速度、操作动作协调性以及操作正确性等各个方面都有明显的差异。同时通过比较 ,对弱智儿童感知 动作技能的特点 ,从外部肢体动作方式和内部智力动作方式两方面进行了详细的分析 ,并在此基础上对弱智儿童的感知 动作技能的教育与训练提出了建议 ,这对弱智学校改革教学、提高教学质量具有重要意义。     

The development of derived stimulus relations through training in arbitrary-matching sequences

Five-year-old children were taught three-stage sequences of arbitrary matching: A-C, B-C, A-D; A-C, B-D, B-C; or A-C, A-D, B-C. Each stage refers to a sample-comparison relation between stimuli. Unreinforced test probes revealed untrained arbitrary matches (B-D, A-D, and B-D, respectively), derivable by substitution of stimuli with a common sample or comparison function. Additional probes revealed further untrained sample-comparison relations derivable by substitution and identity, including the commuted relations D-B, D-A, and D-B, respectively. These processes may have relevance to conceptual and verbal behavior.     

CONDITIONAL DISCRIMINATION VS. MATCHING TO SAMPLE: AN EXPANSION OF THE TESTING PARADIGM

A subject's performance under a conditional-discrimination procedure defines conditional relations between stimuli: “If A1, then B1; if A2, then B2.” The procedure may also generate matching to sample. If so, the stimuli will be related not only by conditionality, but by equivalence: A1 and B1 will become equivalent members of one stimulus class, A2 and B2 of another. One paradigm for testing whether a conditional-discrimination procedure has generated equivalence relations uses three sets of stimuli, A, B, and C, three stimuli per set. Subjects learn to select Set-B and Set-C comparisons conditionally upon Set-A samples. Having been explicitly taught six sample-comparison relations, A1B1, A1C1, A2B2, A2C2, A3B3, and A3C3, subjects prove immediately capable of matching the B- and C-stimuli; six new relations emerge (B1C1, B2C2, B3C3, C1B1, C2B2, C3B3). The 12 stimulus relations, six taught and six emergent, define the existence of three three-member stimulus classes, A1B1C1, A2B2C2, and A3B3C3. This paradigm was expanded by introducing three more stimuli (Set D), and teaching eight children not only the AB and AC relations but DC relations also—selecting Set-C comparisons conditionally upon Set-D samples. Six of the children proved immediately capable of matching the B- and D-stimuli to each other. By selecting appropriate Set-B comparisons conditionally upon Set-D samples, and Set-D comparisons conditionally upon Set-B samples, they demonstrated the existence of three four-member stimulus classes, A1B1C1D1, A2B2C2D2, and A3B3C3D3. These larger classes were confirmed by the subjects' success with the prerequisite lower-level conditional relations; they were also able to select Set-D comparisons conditionally upon samples from Sets A and C, and to do the BC and CB matching that defined the original three-member classes. Adding the three DC relations therefore generated 12 more, three each in BD, DB, AD, and CD. Enlarging each class by one member brought about a disproportionate increase in the number of emergent relations. Ancillary oral naming tests suggested that the subject's application of the same name to each stimulus was neither necessary nor sufficient to establish classes of equivalent stimuli.