Molecular contingencies in schedules of intermittent punishment

In two experiments, key pecking of pigeons was maintained by a variable-interval 180-s schedule of food presentation. Conjointly, a second schedule delivered response-dependent electric shock. In the first experiment, shocks were presented according to either a variable-interval or a nondifferential interval-percentile schedule. The variable-interval shock schedule differentially delivered shocks following long interresponse times. Although the nondifferential shock schedules delivered shocks less differentially with respect to interresponse times, the two shock schedules equally reduced the relative frequency of long interresponse times. The second experiment differentially shocked long or short interresponse times in different conditions, with resulting decreases in the relative frequency of the targeted interresponse times. These experiments highlight the importance of selecting the appropriate level of analysis for the interaction of behavior and environment. Orderly relations present at one level of analysis (e.g., interresponse times) may not be revealed at other levels of analysis (e.g., overall response rate).     

Les théories implicites de l’intelligence : une question de perspectives ?

IntroductionImplicit theories of intelligence are beliefs that people form regarding the malleability of intelligence. The so-called “growth” and “fixed” mindsets respectively view intelligence as a characteristic that can or cannot be changed. Psychology, as a science, also offers diverging responses. The developmental and differential traditions in the study of intelligence merely provide different answers because they do not focus on the same sources of variability nor on the same dimensions of intelligence.ObjectivesThe research question that guided the present studies was: Are people's naïve theories influenced by the same factors that drive developmental and differential psychologists to different conclusions?MethodIn Study 1, we first assessed participants’ (n = 509) reference norm orientation (i.e. whether they tend to focus on individual or social comparison), using a task in which they had to predict the school results of an hypothetical child. Then we administered a French version of Dweck's (2007) mindset scale. In study 2, we first asked participants (n = 530) to choose between two definitions of intelligence focusing either on its fluid or crystalized dimensions. Then we administered the French Mindset Scale and asked participants to justify their conclusion.ResultsBoth variables of interest (reference norm orientation and preferred definition of intelligence) had a significant effect on the participant's incremental beliefs.ConclusionThe results of the two studies as well as the qualitative analysis of participants’ arguments suggest that mindsets, like scientific theories, partly stem from the fact that the same question regarding intelligence malleability can be approached with two different perspectives.     

HOW CULTURE MADE US UNIQUELY HUMAN

This article argues that understanding human uniqueness requires recognizing that we are a cultural species whose evolution has been driven by the interaction among genes and culture for over a million years. Here, I review the basic argument, incorporate recent findings, and highlight ongoing efforts to apply this approach to more deeply understand both the universal aspects of our cognition as well as the variation across societies. This article will cover (1) the origins and evolution of our capacities for culture, (2) examples of specialized mental abilities such as those related to mechanical causality, prestige, and cooperation, and (3) recent efforts to apprehend our capacities for abstraction. I close by discussing common canards that generate confusion in mapping what makes us human.     

Ordinance influences individuals' perceptions towards prospects of social circumstance but not the status quo: An experimental field study on sexual minorities issues in Japan

Scientific evidence shows that institutional decisions can change individuals' private attitudes towards relevant issues. However, little is known about their effect on individuals' perceptions of social norms. This intriguing question has gained the attention of scholars. Nonetheless, the findings are primarily observed only in samples of the Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic countries, leading to doubts about their generalisability. This study experimentally tested residents' (N = 411) reactions to the new Tokyo ordinance prohibiting discrimination against sexual minorities enacted on October 5, 2018, and tested whether it dispelled self–other discrepancies regarding tolerance towards sexual minorities (i.e., pluralistic ignorance). The results showed that exposure to information about enactment increased future perceptions of support and understanding of sexual minorities. By contrast, private attitudes, perceptions of current social norms, and willingness to speak out did not change. Willingness to speak out was indirectly enhanced through increased perceptions of gaining future support. Furthermore, Tokyo residents overestimated other residents' negative attitudes towards sexual minorities. However, even when informed of the new ordinance, this self–other discrepancy in intolerance towards sexual minorities was not corrected. These findings suggest that institutional decisions can shape the perception of social norm change in the future beyond Western countries.     

Behavioral consequences of intergroup sensitivity

Communication of criticism between groups is important to productive societal discourse, but may serve to inflame conflict. The defensive rejection of intergroup, relative to intragroup, criticism (intergroup sensitivity effect [ISE]) may contribute to such divides. The ISE has been observed in self-report measures, but such measures are weak and biased predictors of actual (divisive) behavior. We review recent research demonstrating that the ISE does have costly behavioral consequences. We next consider the debate concerning whether the ISE reflects defense of a valued social identity or enforcement of a conversational norm. We therefore review recent evidence for an ISE among individuals lacking identification with the target of the criticism. Third, we examine how the ISE may affect a variety of behaviors relevant to societal divisions, including political reconciliation, environmental sustainability, and vaccination. Lastly, we outline future research that can clarify the underlying mechanisms of the ISE and promote conciliatory intergroup behavior.     

Argument as a formulation-decision-decision... sequence

Problems with regard to the analysis of argumentative partly discourse arise from definitorial disconformity. In this article, Informal argument is taken as the primary definition to study the basic structure of argument from a fragment of an Agatha Christie novel. Bilmes' account of the notions of Formulation (F) and Decision (D+/D-) are adapted to describe the relations of opposition which are displayed in informal argument. The minimal structure of argument is represented by the formula F/D-/D-, in which F is a speaker's personal composition of a fact, the first D- is the disconfirming uptake of it by another speaker and the second D- is the completing disconfirming uptake by the initial speaker. Some of the speaker's possibilities to initiate an argument by expressing a Formulation are explored, as well as the social and cultural norms which play a role in argument-initiation and the concepts of win and loss.     

Contrary-to-duty obligations

We investigate under what conditions contrary-to-duty (CTD) structures lacking temporal and action elements can be given a coherent reading. We argue, contrary to some recent proposals, that CTD is not an instance of defeasible reasoning, and that methods of nonmonotonic logics are inadequate since they are unable to distinguish between defeasibility and violation of primary obligations. We propose a semantic framework based on the idea that primary and CTD obligations are obligations of different kinds: a CTD obligation pertains to, or pre-supposes, a certain context in which a primary obligation is already violated. This framework is presented initially as an extension of Standard Deontic Logic (SDL), a normal modal logic of type KD, and is illustrated by application to a series of examples. The concluding section is concerned with some resemblances between CTD and defeasible reasoning. We show first that the SDL-based framework contains a flaw and must be adjusted. A discussion of possible adjustments, including an alternative treatment in terms of a preference-based semantics, reveals difficulties that are reminiscent of problems in defeasible reasoning and intensional accounts of defeasible conditionals.     

Behavioural deficiencies of aggressive 8–9 year old boys: An observational study

The nature of aggressive boys' behaviour is examined. Pre-selected matched pairs of aggressive and control boys were observed in a naturalistic setting which facilitated comparison of the way in which recorded behaviours affected their respective peer relationships. A continuous commentary describing the child's interactions with others was recorded simultaneously with the child's speech during school play. These data were transcribed and coded according to activity, social participation, neighbours, and interactions. Individual behavioural items were grouped on the basis of their functional similarity. Marked differences were found between the two groups on certain categories, giving a clear indication of specific deficiencies in the behavioural repertoire of the aggressive boys.     

The knowledge norm of assertion in dialectical context

This paper aims to show that the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA) can lead to trouble in certain dialectical contexts. Suppose a person knows that p but does not know that they know that p. They assert p in compliance with the KNA. Their interlocutor responds: ‘but do you know that p?’ It will be shown that the KNA blocks the original asserter from providing any good response to this perfectly natural follow-up question, effectively forcing them to retract p from the conversational scoreboard. This finding is not simply of theoretical interest: I will argue that the KNA would allow the retort ‘but do you know that p?’ to be weaponized in strategic communication, serving as a tool for silencing speakers without having to challenge their testimonial contributions on their own merits. Our analysis can thereby provide a new dimension to the study of epistemic injustice, as well as underscoring the importance of considering the norms governing speech acts also from the point of view of non-ideal social contexts.