The intergenerational transmission of relationship instability: A focus on emerging adult on-off relationships

This study extends prior research on the intergenerational transmission of relationship instability by examining parents' history of on-off relationships as a predictor of emerging adults' own cycling (i.e., breaking up and renewing with the same romantic partner). Data were collected at a large mid-western university from 702 emerging adults (18–25 years old). Multinomial logistic regression was used to predict the likelihood that participants had cycled in a past or current relationship. Results show that parental cycling increased the likelihood of offspring cycling in a past or current relationship relative to never cycling, and greater uncertainty about the future of the relationship was a mechanism through which such transmission occurred. Findings from this study demonstrate that parental relationship instability can even be consequential for the transient relationships within emerging adulthood, making family history a productive area to explore for practitioners working with cyclical partners and/or emerging adults.     

不确定是坏的么?不确定状态中的错误加工特点及其解释机制

错误是人类决策和行为过程中在所难免的。然而, 错误常常带来不利后果甚至危及生命(如高危作业时的失误)。如何有效监控错误并优化行为对于个体生存和发展至关重要。错误的发生受到内部心理状态影响, 个体常在不确定的情境中做出判断, 不确定状态增强还是削弱错误监控, 是一个重要科学问题, 却存在矛盾结果。在前期积累和理论分析基础上, 本项目拟从人格差异角度探索不确定容忍度的调节作用。不确定容忍度的差异意味着个体对于模糊情境的耐受性和错误的敏感性不同, 因而可能调节不确定状态中的错误加工过程。研究1采用行为实验, 揭示多种不确定情境中(如奖赏/惩罚)错误监控和错误后调整的认知特点, 考察不确定容忍度的调节作用; 研究2通过考察电生理表征、时间加工进程和神经振荡机制等进一步解释这些现象。本项目对于探明不确定状态中的错误加工规律及其人格调节机制具有重要理论价值, 对于促进个体的环境适应、目标达成等具有较好现实意义。     

Toward a new conceptualization and operationalization of risk perception within the genetic counseling domain

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it provides an historical overview of studies of risk, risk perception, and decision making under risk within the genetic counseling domain. Second, it proposes an alternative conceptualization and operationalization for the study of risk perception. The conceptualization involves probability, adversity, incompleteness, and ambiguity. Prior studies of risk perception focus on the recurrence risk and operationalize risk perception by asking for interpretations of the magnitude of the probability of the outcome. Their focus is on the probability of a particular outcome. We formulate the problem in terms of a gamble and suggest that risk perception be operationalized in terms of the riskiness of the gamble. Our focus is on the riskiness of a decision option which entails two or more outcomes.     

不确定性问题解决策略研究及存在的问题分析

通过对不确定性问题解决及认知策略方面颇有代表性的研究的回顾、分析了该领域的研究特点、现状及存在的问题。     

On the evaluation of one-sided evidence

We examine predictions and judgments of confidence based on one-sided evidence. Some subjects saw arguments for only one side of a legal dispute while other subjects (called ‘jurors’) saw arguments for both sides. Subjects predicted the number of jurors who favored the plaintiff in each case. Subjects who saw only one side made predictions that were biased in favor of that side. Furthermore, they were more confident but generally less accurate than subjects who saw both sides. The results indicate that people do not compensate sufficiently for missing information even when it is painfully obvious that the information available to them is incomplete. A simple manipulation that required subjects to evaluate the relative strength of the opponent's side greatly reduced the tendency to underweigh missing evidence.     

The effects of statistical training on choice heuristics in choice under uncertainty

Kahneman and Tversky (1984) proposed that decision makers perceive choice uncertainty in two ways: (1) as a distribution of possible outcomes or (2) as a single uncertain outcome. Using statistical training as a factor that influences these perceptions, and thus the type of decision approach individuals use, we found that individuals with different levels of experience displayed differences in the decisions they made and in the choice heuristics used to make those decisions. Statistically naive individuals were more likely to prefer loss-minimizing alternatives, use a more non-compensatory heuristic, and spend more time on loss-related information than their statistically experienced counterparts. When a distributional cue, indicating the distributional nature of choice outcomes, was presented to both experience groups, the naive group was found to use a decision approach similar to the experienced group and to make similar decisions. The results are discussed in terms of the need to include factors that alter individuals' approaches to uncertainty in future behavioral models of uncertain choice.     

Confidence and Uncertainty in Judgmental Forecasting: Differential Effects of Scenario Presentation

Multiple scenario analysis is used by many organizations for long-term planning, in part because the development of more than one scenario of the future is thought to prevent overconfidence in any one specific forecast. The present study attempts to clarify some of the questions concerning the cognitive effects of scenario presentation by distinguishing between confidence and subjective uncertainty. It examined the impact of different types of scenario information on confidence ratings, credible intervals, and features of forecast series. Subjects (N=186) read either one, two, or no scenario(s) describing potential changes in the level of a stimulus variable, then made forecasts of that variable over the next fifty years. Reading any type of scenario information increased confidence in forecasts; there was no reduction in confidence due to presentation of multiple conflicting scenarios, compared to presentation of only one scenario. Differences in number and in type of scenarios presented did, however, affect subjective uncertainty.     

Support for the Populist Radical Right: Between Uncertainty Avoidance and Risky Choice

The last several decades have witnessed a structural change in politics toward cultural and identity conflicts, accompanied by the rise of populist radical right (PRR) parties. However, we know surprisingly little about the psychological or cognitive-motivational factors underlying PRR support. We claim that uncertainty avoidance (UA)—an epistemic avoidance motivation—represents a central motive because UA resonates with the PRR platform and precedes common predictors of PRR voting. Using data from the 2017 Austrian National Election Study, we found that UA was indeed indirectly associated with a higher likelihood of PRR voting. This association is because greater UA fostered right-wing sociocultural views, whereas associations with populist attitudes or expected government competence were more ambiguous. PRR parties appear to offer “certainty,” but as extreme parties, they also remain a “risky choice.” We conclude by discussing the contribution of a cognitive-motivational account to explain PRR voting.     

Representation of subjective preferences under ambiguity

The objective of this paper is to show how potentially incomplete preferences of a decision maker (DM) on acts can be modelled formally in a subjective ambiguity perspective. We identify acts as functions from a state space Ω to bounded support (finitely additive) probabilities over a set X of prizes. Then, we characterize preferences over equibounded acts a which have a numerical representation by the family of functionals , where u is a cardinal utility on X (representing the risk attitude of the DM) and Π is a unique pointwise closed convex set of probabilities on all events in Ω (representing the ambiguity perceived by the DM). To this end, in addition to the usual independence and continuity assumptions, we add completeness and dominance for preferences restricted to constant acts; moreover, we consider two other properties (subjective monotonicity and coherence) related with the preferences of a DM who is not able, owing to his partial knowledge, to evaluate any event in Ω.     

The use of multiple reference points in risky decision making

Among psychologists and economists, prospect theory continues to be one of the most popular models of decision making. The theory's key property is reference dependence; specifically, how an individual's perception of loss or gain is dependent upon their starting point (i.e., the status quo). Although prospect theory is widely accepted, other authors have sought the inclusion of reference points besides the status quo. Initially these extensions focused on the importance of single reference points such as goals. More recently, authors have explained choice data by including multiple reference points within the value function. Multiple‐reference‐point theories generally assume that many choice situations possess an implicit or explicit goal, or point an individual will strive to obtain, and/or a minimum requirement (i.e., a “lower bound”) above which an individual will strive to stay. In two experiments, we present evidence that individuals can utilize the minimum requirement, status quo, and goal within a single risky decision task. Participants most often chose to maximize their chance of reaching reference points even when that decision was riskier, resulted in lower expected value, resulted in lower expected utility, or ran contrary to the predictions of prospect theory. Furthermore, salience and uncertainty moderated the use of goals and minimum requirements as reference points. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.