海德格尔对康德伦理学的批判

相对于康德的其他主要著作而言,海德格尔对于康德第二批判持有一种特殊的看法。他没有直接去探讨它,这实际上隐含着对于它的一种彻底的思考和批判。由于康德伦理学的根本概念是应当,康德把接受了古希腊以来人是理性的动物这个关于人的定义,海德格尔把康德伦理学看作是西方形而上学自身发展线条的一个基本环节,是柏拉图主义理念学说发展进程中一个特殊的点。人的本质的干瘪化也是人道主义最终走向主体主义的根本原因,康德的自由意志和道德律只是这种人道主义思考的必然后果。     

‘Ought’ and Control

Ethical theorists often assume that the verb ‘ought’ means roughly ‘has an obligation’; however, this assumption is belied by the diversity of ‘flavours’ of ought-sentences in English. A natural response is that ‘ought’ is ambiguous. However, this response is incompatible with the standard treatment of ‘ought’ by theoretical semanticists, who classify ‘ought’ as a member of the family of modal verbs, which are treated uniformly as operators. To many ethical theorists, however, this popular treatment in linguistics seems to elide an important distinction between agential and non-agential ought-statements. The thought is that ‘ought’ must have at least two senses, one implicating agency and connected to obligations, and another covering other uses. In this paper, I pursue some resolution of this tension between semantic theory and ethical theory with respect to the meaning of ‘ought’. To this end, I consider what I believe to be the most linguistically sophisticated argument for the view that the word ‘ought’ is ambiguous between agential and non-agential senses. This argument, due to Mark Schroeder, is instructive but based on a false claim about the syntax of agential ought-sentences—or so I attempt to show by first situating Schroeder's argument in its proper linguistic background and then discussing some syntactic evidence that he fails to appreciate. Then, I use the failure of this argument to motivate some more general reflections on how the standard treatment of ‘ought’ by theoretical semanticists might be refined in the light of the distinction important to ethical theory between agential and non-agential ought-statements, but also on how ethical theory might benefit from more careful study of the dominant treatment of modals as operators in theoretical semantics.     

麦金太尔解决休谟伦理难题的贡献与困惑

麦金太尔《德性之后》的一个重要意义,是试图解决休谟伦理难题,即“是”与“应该”的矛盾。本文对此作一个初步的分析,力图证明麦金尔在这个方面的贡献对及存在的不足。     

The Definition of Moral Dilemmas: A Logical Confusion and a Clarification

This discussion note deals with Jurriaan de Haan's paper The Definition of Moral Dilemmas: A Logical Problem (Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4(3), 2001, pp. 267–284). In the first, critical part I will point out a confusion in the logical analysis of the paper in question. In the second, constructive part I will indicate how the analysis of moral dilemmas should proceed within the framework of a possible world semantics.     

行为事实属性与行为应该属性——孙志海批评之批评

孙志海如果研究过元伦理学,恐怕就不会质疑“行为事实属性”概念。因为元伦理学的根本问题——“应该”、“价值”能否从“是”、“事实”推导出来——显然蕴含着“行为应该如何”与“行为事实如何”概念,蕴含着“行为应该”与“行为事实”概念,蕴含着“行为应该属性”与“行为事实属性”概念。     

简析天人合德的理论意蕴

天人合一是中国哲学的根本特征之一 ,它在传统伦理思想中表现为天人合德。这一命题规定了传统道德的本体、道德价值的本原以及人的道德本性 ,是传统伦理思想最核心的理念和最根本的特征。它固然存在许多理论上的缺失 ,但又极富思辨性 ,对伦理学上的许多重大理论问题都提供了自己的解答。这对于我们今天探究这些问题 ,仍然具有启迪意义。     

Moral Dilemmas and Offence

In 1963 Roderick Chisholm proposed a category of acts called “offences” to capture what he called acts of “permissive ill-doing.” Chisholm’s proposal has proven to be controversial. Here I propose that some progress can be made in validating acts of offence by focusing upon moral dilemmas. Given the problems which have been alleged to beset moral dilemmas, this may initially seem like a puzzling strategy. However, I will call attention to a type of moral dilemma unlike what is standardly discussed in the literature and attempt to show that those who acknowledge that such dilemmas are possible are likewise obliged to acknowledge that acts of offence are possible. My suggestion, then, is that, since the former are plausible to acknowledge, so are the latter.     

From ‘Is’ to ‘Ought’ in Moral Epistemology

Many philosophers claim that no formally valid argument can have purely non-normative premises and a normative or moral conclusion that occurs essentially. Mark Nelson recently proposed a new counterexample to this Humean doctrine:All of Dahlia's beliefs are true.Dahlia believes that Bertie morally ought to marry Madeleine. Bertie morally ought to marry Madeleine.I argue that Nelson's universal premise has no normative content, that Nelson's argument is valid formally, and that Nelson's moral conclusion occurs essentially and not vacuously. Nonetheless, I show that Nelson's argument faces a more fundamental problem if it is used in moral epistemology. An argument that appeals to a moral authority, such as Dahlia, might justify some moral belief out of a contrast class that does not include extreme views like moral nihilism; but it begs the question against moral nihilism, since one cannot be adequately justified in believing the conjunction of its premises without depending on assumptions that moral nihilists would deny. Thus, arguments like Nelson's can accomplish something important in moral epistemology, but their use is strictly limited.