GENERALIZATION OF OBJECT NAMING AFTER TRAINING WITH PICTURE CARDS AND WITH OBJECTS

Generalization of four retarded children's object naming responses to stimuli in the natural environment was assessed after training with either objects or pictures of the objects. Generalization was typically greater after training with objects. In a second experiment, half of the stimuli that showed little generalization were retrained by alternating the original training object with an object that belonged to the same stimulus class as the training stimulus. The other half were simply retrained using the object. The alternating procedure resulted in substantial increases in generalization to untrained objects.     

The culture of perceptual expertise and the other-race effect

In our commentary, we propose that the ORE can be viewed as a form of perceptual expertise. Like experts, we recognize own-race faces at the subordinate level as individuals and novices when recognize other-race faces at the basic level of race. Applying a perceptual expertise account, we explain the ORE in terms of its cognitive, neural, and motivational factors. We suggest that by creating a culture of “other-race” expertise, improvements in other-race face recognition can be achieved.     

孟子的心理学思想研究

该文较系统地论述了孟子的普通心理思想。主要问题是:心理学思想的基本观点,知虑心理思想,情欲心理思想,志意心理思想,智能心理思想,性习心理思想。     

论儿童心理发展的动力及其机制

本文依据马克思主义的唯物史观和唯物辩证法原理,从儿童的实际社会生活过程出发,运用系统方法论证了儿童心理发展的动力是主客体之间的结构性矛盾,而由“主体──活动──客体”三项格式构成的反馈回路系统则是心理发生发展的动力场。本文还运用儿童心理发展的控制论模型,从活动的机能性方面探讨了同化和顺应之间的平衡化动力机制,揭示了主客体之间矛盾运动的原理和过程;平衡化机制是受社会文化历史的发展规律支配的。     

Fictions of the internal object

This paper examines internal objects in their role as theoretical constructs which analysts use to make sense of human experience. Object relations theory is based upon a vision that the personality is divided or split into parts. Clinical experience reveals that such splits are commonly expressed in the language of our analysing. However, a lexical reality is not a thing-in-itself, but a way of organizing and understanding experience. Jung's vision of the dynamics of the split self encompass a unique 'object relations theory' that is both similar and yet quite different from the object relations theories of Klein, Fairbairn, Winnicott and Thomas Ogden A clinical example is used to examine the way in which these different theoretical views explain the same clinical phenomenon. The last section of the paper is devoted to a narrational analysis of the place of internal objects in analytic theory. The split self, dynamic is seen as a narrative device - one that makes sense and provides coherence, but is neither the only view of psychic reality nor necessarily an accurate reflection of the nature of the internal world.     

Infants' sensitivity to arbitrary object-odor pairings

The ability of 4-month-old infants to learn the arbitrary relationship between an object and a distinctive odor was assessed. Infants were familiarized with two objects while one of them was paired with a cherry odor. Results indicated that only female subjects showed evidence of matching. They increased their looking to the target object in the presence of the odor but not in the absence of the odor, relative to baseline levels.     

Points of View

An adequate evaluation of argumentation requires identification of the object to which the argumentation pertains: the point of view. What are the distinguishing features of this object? In the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, the object of argumentation is referred to by means of the notion ‘standpoint’. In other theories concerned with argumentation, reasoning, convincing or persuading, notions are used such as ‘thesis’, ‘conclusion’, ‘opinion’ and ‘attitude’. This paper is a survey of the characterisations of the object of argumentation given in the various theories. It discusses the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, socio-psychological research on persuasion, cognitive research on reasoning, argumentative discourse analysis, two variants of informal logic, advocacy and debate, and the theory of communicative action. Next, it explores some relations between the notions used in these theories. Finally, it outlines some starting points for further research into the problems of identification.     

Thoughts and feelings and things: A new psychiatric epistemology

Epistemology — the study of knowledge — is a philosophical discipline with close ties to psychiatry. When epistemologists address specific questions about how knowledge is actually realized by human beings, their philosophy must be informed by empirical studies of the sort psychiatrists now take up in a variety of forms. As this paper describes, psychiatrists can likewise improve their understanding of human psychology through a deeper appreciation of philosophical analysis in epistemology.The aim of this article is to introduce a unifying framework within which the experience from different approaches to psychiatry — (1) the conceptual schemas of cognitive psychiatry, (2) the mental structures of psychoanalytic psychiatry, (3) the categorical forms of existential psychiatry, and (4) the neural pathways of biological psychiatry — can all be applied productively to the central question of epistemology. By establishing a broad understanding of the problem of knowledge, this new view of epistemology is developed within the idiom of each psychiatric approach. In addressing themselves to a unitary problem, these diverse psychiatric approaches are themselves revealed, not as competing points of view, but as complementary views of a single subject. The result is a new epistemology that can not only bring the insights of psychiatry to philosophy, but can also contribute to the care of patients when psychiatrists bring this broader view to their clinical work.     

Excessive Object Attachment in Hoarding Disorder: Examining the Role of Interpersonal Functioning

Excessive attachment towards possessions can be maladaptive because it can lead individuals to excessively acquire and save objects. Little is known about how attachment to objects develops and changes over time; however, interpersonal factors have been theorized to play a role. The current study examined whether interpersonal factors, specifically interpersonal attachment style and empathy, moderate changes in object attachment over time. A total of 145 participants with excessive acquiring and discarding difficulties rated their level of attachment to a novel object just after receiving it, and 1 week later. Participants also completed measures of interpersonal anxious attachment and interpersonal functioning. We found that changes in object attachment over time were moderated by interpersonal anxious attachment. Also, our findings suggested that individuals with hoarding problems are likely not impaired in their ability to empathize with others, but rather have difficulty displaying empathy in tense social situations and also have more empathy for fictional characters. Further, greater discomfort in tense social situations and greater empathy for fictional characters interacted to predict greater object attachment. Taken together, these findings indicate that individuals with an interpersonal anxious attachment style may be those at risk of forming greater attachments to objects over time. A learning history that includes inconsistent support from caregivers may result in individuals experiencing more empathy for fictional characters and discomfort in tense social situations, which may produce a vulnerability for becoming excessively attached to objects. Our results are in line with theories of hoarding which propose that individuals use objects to compensate for unmet interpersonal needs and suggest that treatment may need to target interpersonal functioning to reduce hoarding symptoms.     

Do looks constitute our perceptual evidence?

Many philosophers take experience to be an essential aspect of perceptual justification. I argue against a specific variety of such an experientialist view, namely, the Looks View of perceptual justification, according to which our visual beliefs are mediately justified by beliefs about the way things look. I describe three types of cases that put pressure on the idea that perceptual justification is always related to looks‐related reasons: unsophisticated cognizers, multimodal identification, and amodal completion. I then provide a tentative diagnosis of what goes wrong in the Looks View: it ascribes a specific epistemic role to beliefs about looks that is actually fulfilled by subpersonal perceptual processes.