Pigeons can discriminate locations presented in pictures

The present experiments were designed to teach pigeons to discriminate two locations represented by color photographs. Two sets of photographs were taken at two distinctive locations on a university campus. These sets represented several standpoints at each location. For the true-discrimination group, pictures from the two locations were differentially associated with reward; for the pseudodiscrimination group, half of the views from each location were arbitrarily but consistently associated with reward. The former group acquired the discrimination much more rapidly. These birds also showed good transfer to new views from the standpoints used in training and to a new standpoint at each location not used in training. In a second experiment, another group of pigeons could terminate any training trial by pecking an “advance” key. Three of 4 subjects used this option to reduce the duration of trials in which pictures from the negative location were presented. These data suggest that pigeons can integrate views shown in pictures into a “concept” of a location. The method used here may be the experimental analogue of a common, natural process by which animals learn to identify locations.     

On the limits of the matching concept in monkeys (Cebus apella).

Two cebus monkeys, with many years of experience matching a variety of static visual stimuli (forms and colors) within a standard matching-to-sample paradigm, were trained to press a left lever when a pair of displayed static stimuli were the same and to press a right lever when they were different. After learning the same/different task, the monkeys were tested for transfer to dynamic visual stimuli (flashing versus steady green disks), with which they had no previous experience. Both failed to transfer to the dynamic stimuli. A third monkey, also with massive past experience matching static visual stimuli, was tested for transfer to the dynamic stimuli within our standard matching paradigm, and it, too, failed. All 3 subjects were unable to reach a moderate acquisition criterion despite as many as 52 sessions of training with the dynamic stimuli. These results provide further evidence that, in monkeys, the matching (or identity) concept has a very limited reach; they consequently do not support the view held by some theorists that an abstract matching concept based on physical similarity is a general endowment of animals.     

Transfer of matching-to-figure samples in the pigeon

Three pigeons were trained on a modified six-key matching-to-sample procedure. The third peck on the figure-sample key (which presented a bird, hand, face, beetle, rabbit, fish, flower, or red hue, as the sample) lighted only one comparison key. Every three additional pecks on the sample lighted another comparison key, up to a maximum of five keys. Pecks on keys of matching figures produced grain. Pecks on nonmatching keys (mismatches) turned off all lights on the comparison keys and repeated the trial. Three figures were used during acquisition. The birds learned to peck each sample until the matching comparison stimulus appeared on one of three comparison stimulus keys, and then to peck that key. Later, five novel stimuli, employed as both sample and comparison stimuli, and two additional matching keys were added. Each bird showed matching transfer to the novel samples. The data suggest that the birds may have learned the concept of figure matching rather than a series of two-component chains or discrete five-key discriminations.     

比较研究-影响中美儿童计算能力差异的认知因素

本研究要确定中美儿童基本计算技能的差异是否与他们使用的解题策略和基本加工过程的速度有关。为此,对中美两国的一年级儿童进行了书面计算能力测验,以及一组计算机呈现的加法作业。中国儿童在计算能力测验上表现出3:1的操作优势。中美儿童使用的解题策略种类一样,但是,中国儿童在策略综合运用的发展程度上超过美国儿童,检索策略的加工速度也超过美国儿童。显然,策略运用和加工速度的差异促成了中国儿童在计算能力测验上的优势.     

Category discrimination by pigeons using five polymorphous features

Eight pigeons were trained to discriminate between sets of color photographs of natural scenes. The scenes differed along five two-valued dimensions (site, weather, camera distance, camera orientation, and camera height), and all combinations of the feature values were used. One value of each dimension was designated as positive, and slides containing three or more positive feature values were members of the positive stimulus set. Thus, each feature had an equal, low, correlation with reinforcement, and all features had zero correlations with each other. Seven of the 8 pigeons learned this discrimination, and their responding came under the control of all five features. Within the positive and negative stimulus sets, response rates were higher to stimuli that contained more positive feature values. Once discrimination had been achieved, reversal training was given using a subset of the slides. In this subset, only a single feature was correlated with reinforcement. All pigeons learned this reversal successfully and generalized it to additional photographs with the same feature content. After reversal, the original reinforcement contingencies were reinstated, and training was continued using all the slides except those that had been used in reversal. Reversal generalized to these slides to some extent. Analysis of the response rates to individual slides showed that, compared with prereversal training, only the feature that had been subjected to reversal contingencies showed a reversed correlation with response rate. The remaining features showed the same correlation with response rate as they had before reversal training. Thus, reversal on some members of a category following category discrimination training led to generalization to stimuli within the category that were not involved in the reversal, but not to features that were not reversed. It is therefore inappropriate to refer to the pigeons as learning a concept.     

Analyzing sequential categorical data: Individual variation in markov chains

Markov chains are probabilistic models for sequences of categorical events, with applications throughout scientific psychology. This paper provides a method for anlayzing data consisting of event sequences and covariate observations. It is assumed that each sequence is a Markov process characterized by a distinct transition probability matrix. The objective is to use the covariate data to explain differences between individuals in the transition probability matrices characterizing their sequential data. The elements of the transition probability matrices are written as functions of a vector of latent variables, with variation in the latent variables explained through a multivariate regression on the covariates. The regression is estimated using the EM algorithm, and requires the numerical calculation of a multivariate integral. An example using simulated cognitive developmental data is presented, which shows that the estimation of individual variation in the parameters of a probability model may have substantial theoretical importance, even when individual differences are not the focus of the investigator's concerns.Research contributing to this article was supported by B.R.S. Subgrant 5-35345 from the University of Virginia. I thank the DADA Group, Bill Fabricius, Don Hartmann, William Griffin, Jack McArdle, Ivo Molenaar, Ronald Schoenberg, Simon Tavaré, and several anonymous reviewers for their discussion of these points.     

小学儿童合取概念的形成及其与元认知的关系

采用个别访谈与问卷相结合的方法．研究了小学四、五、六年级共48名儿童合取概念的形成及其元认知的发展。结果表明．小学儿童形成合取概念的能力发展既具有渐进性,又有不均衡性;其元认知知识水平和元认知监控能力的发展均呈现出稳中有变的趋势;各年级的元认知能力与形成合取概念的步数之间均存在非常显著的相关。     

飞行错觉水平评定方法的初步研究

本文从飞行错觉发生的类型和频率出发,尝试对飞行员在实际飞行中所产生的错觉水平或空间定向能力做出基本的评定。本研究采用区间模糊统计的方法,对飞行错觉的类型（倾斜错觉、俯仰错觉、方位错觉、反旋转错觉和倒飞错觉）和频率（从无、偶尔、时有、经常、总是）做了经验的赋值工作,分别计算出了这些模糊概念（除从无外）的心理量表值和模糊度。同时我们认为,飞行错觉水平是频率与类型的函数,其数学表达式为：,并将这一表达式作为评定飞行员飞行错觉水平的基本模型。     

How representations of number and numeracy predict decision paradoxes: A fuzzy-trace theory approach

Higher numeracy has been associated with decision biases in some numerical judgment-and-decision problems. According to fuzzy-trace theory, understanding such paradoxes involves broadening the concept of numeracy to include processing the gist of numbers—their categorical and ordinal relations—in addition to objective (verbatim) knowledge about numbers. We assess multiple representations of gist, as well as numeracy, and use them to better understand and predict systematic paradoxes in judgment and decision-making. In two samples (Ns = 978 and 957), we assessed categorical (some vs. none) and ordinal gist representations of numbers (higher vs. lower, as in relative magnitude judgment, estimation, approximation, and simple ratio comparison), objective numeracy, and a nonverbal, nonnumeric measure of fluid intelligence in predicting: (a) decision preferences exhibiting the Allais paradox and (b) attractiveness ratings of bets with and without a small loss in which the loss bet is rated higher than the objectively superior no-loss bet. Categorical and ordinal gist tasks predicted unique variance in paradoxical decisions and judgments, beyond objective numeracy and intelligence. Whereas objective numeracy predicted choosing or rating according to literal numerical superiority, appreciating the categorical and ordinal gist of numbers was pivotal in predicting paradoxes. These results bring important paradoxes under the same explanatory umbrella, which assumes three types of representations of numbers—categorical gist, ordinal gist, and objective (verbatim)—that vary in their strength across individuals.     

Conceiving of entities as objects and as stuff

What is the difference between conceiving of an entity as an object of some kind and conceiving of it as an amount of solid stuff? We propose that the difference lies in how one thinks about the entity's structure. Object construals require thinking of the structure as being nonarbitrary, whereas substance construals require thinking of the structure as being arbitrary. We report six experiments that provide empirical support for this proposal. Regularity of structure, repetition of structure, and the existence of structure-dependent functions, all of which provide reasons to consider the structure of an entity to be nonarbitrary, were shown to bias participants towards object construals. We also discuss how the proposed account of what it means to construe an entity as an object or as some stuff can account for a range of findings in the literature on lexical development. These include the relation between cohesiveness and ontological category, shape and ontological category, and complexity of shape and ontological category. Finally, we discuss the nature of construals and the relation of object and substance construals to the physical, design, and intentional stances.