Doctors,Patients, and Nudging in the Clinical Context—Four Views on Nudging and Informed Consent

In an analysis of recent work on nudging we distinguish three positions on the relationship between nudging founded in libertarian paternalism and the protection of personal autonomy through informed consent. We argue that all three positions fail to provide adequate protection of personal autonomy in the clinical context. Acknowledging that nudging may be beneficial, we suggest a fourth position according to which nudging and informed consent are valuable in different domains of interaction.     

Unresolved questions in nudging research: Putting the psychology back in nudging

Nudging interventions are broadly defined as a rearrangement of a choice context that gently suggests a specific choice. Their increasing popularity has attracted attention and discussion from researchers, policy makers, and practitioners alike. After some applications to domains such as health, environmental issues, and retirement savings, the next step in nudging is to understand the psychological boundary conditions when applied to varied domains of daily life. It is yet unclear for example to what extent nudging interventions can be transparent without losing effectiveness, or how permanent the effects are. These unresolved questions may have contributed to heated political and scientific discussions, on for example the ethics of using nudges in the public health domain, due to the missing scientific evidence. Indeed, this popularity may have led to forget how nudging harnesses insights from decades of research in psychology to change people's behavior. The aim of this paper is to shift the focus back to the psychological premises nudges were built upon. It summarizes several outstanding questions that future research in the psychology of nudging should address. Advancing research in nudging will help to improve our understanding of applied nudging interventions and provide clarity to debates such as ethical appropriateness, effectiveness, and public approval.     

Why C-luck really is a problem for compatibilism

Some philosophers have recently argued that luck at the time of decision is a problem for compatibilists and libertarians alike. But conceptual ambiguity regarding deterministic luck at the time of decision – henceforth C-luck – has obscured recognition of the problem C-luck poses to compatibilism. This paper clarifies C-luck and distinguishes it from present luck, showing that the former arises from contingent factors at the time of decision instead of presupposed free will requirements. We then argue that empirical findings confirm the existence of C-luck thereby raising a fundamental challenge to compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility.     

Guiding drivers towards safer driving speed: Exploiting visual dominance in speed adaptation

Inappropriate speed is a main cause of accidents. Drivers are often unaware of potential risks due to inadequate speed. To prevent dangerous situations, we need to understand perceptual factors influencing human speed perception. Due to the prominent role of vision in driving, we examined the effect of visuo-spatial stimuli on speed based on the optic flow. While developing an adaptive infrastructure measure to reduce speed, we conducted two consecutive studies, a driving simulator study and a field test to investigate findings further. In both studies, we placed lights on two sides of a highway exit and either illuminated them statically or activated them in a way that they appeared to be moving towards the driver. We expected drivers to slow down more when seeing static light stimuli compared to a baseline without lights. We also expected drivers to decrease speed more in conditions with oncoming lights compared to a baseline, and to static lights, due to distorted speed perception. The first study in a static driving simulator revealed no difference between conditions. In the field test, both static lights and lights moving towards the driver led to a speed reduction compared to a baseline but did not differ from one another. Lights in general led to lower driving speed, potentially due to their warning character, but we found no difference between the light conditions, suggesting that the effect might not be based on the optic flow. Future research should investigate the relationship between driven and perceived speed more closely.     

绿色助推

我们人类当前的生活方式不是可持续的。提升可持续性的途径之一是发展更绿色的科学技术, 另一种补充性途径是改变人们的态度、习惯和行为。在本文中, 我们讨论了6种心理技术, 其宗旨是推动或助推(nudge)人们做出更环保的选择和行为。这些心理技术涵盖范围非常广泛, 有些可以远程使用, 如在通知公告中建构沟通信息, 有些则涉及对人们的决策情境做出的改变。因此, 本综述关乎到各行业从业人员, 如市场营销人员、政策制定者、消费者代表等。对于每项心理技术, 我们讨论了其认知和(或)情绪的理论性基础。此外, 我们探讨了目前文献中存在的空白, 并提出了可填补这些空白的未来研究方向。     

Ethical Criteria for Health-Promoting Nudges: A Case-by-Case Analysis

Health-promoting nudges have been put into practice by different agents, in different contexts and with different aims. This article formulates a set of criteria that enables a thorough ethical evaluation of such nudges. As such, it bridges the gap between the abstract, theoretical debates among academics and the actual behavioral interventions being implemented in practice. The criteria are derived from arguments against nudges, which allegedly disrespect nudgees, as these would impose values on nudgees and/or violate their rationality and autonomy. Instead of interpreting these objections as knock-down arguments, I take them as expressing legitimate worries that can often be addressed. I analyze six prototypical nudge cases, such as Google’s rearrangement of fridges and the use of defaults in organ donation registration. I show how the ethical criteria listed are satisfied by most—but not all—nudges in most—but not all—circumstances.