ON MARTIN EGER'S "A TALE OF TWO CONTROVERSIES"

Abstract. Criticisms are presented against Eger's challenge to the demarcation between the natural sciences and ethics. Arguments are given both against his endorsement of the "new" philosophy of science and against his rejection of the fact-value dichotomy. However, his educational recommendations are reinforced rather than weakened by these criticisms     

Radikaler Konstruktivismus und Konstruktionismus

Both radical constructivism and constructionism are naturalized approaches to epistemology. They try to fertilize results from biology and psychology for epistemological aims. They both refuse epistemological realism as unsustainable metaphysics. This raises the problem of the range of the naturalistic approach to epistemology. Constructivism, in both forms, turns out to be untenable because it runs in an aporia: it must borrow from realism either, or it must qualify its own position as a metaphysical one. But therewith, constructivism would be blamed to be metaphysical itself.     

Empirical tests of scientific realism: A quantitative framework

The scientific realism debate in philosophy of science raises some intriguing methodological issues. Scientific realism posits a link between a scientific theory's observational and referential success. This opens the possibility of testing the thesis empirically, by searching for evidence of such a link in the record of theories put forward in the history of science. Many realist philosophers working today propose case study methodology as a way of carrying out such a test. This article argues that a qualitative method such as case study methodology is not adequate for this purpose, for two reasons: to test scientific realism is to pose an effects-of-causes question, and observational and referential success are quantities that theories possess to a greater or lesser degree. The article concludes that an empirical test of scientific realism requires a quantitative method.     

What analytic metaphysics can do for scientific metaphysics

The apparent chasm between two camps in metaphysics, analytic metaphysics and scientific metaphysics, is well recognized. I argue that the relationship between them is not necessarily a rivalry; a division of labour that resembles the relationship between pure mathematics and science is possible. As a case study, I look into the metaphysical underdetermination argument for ontic structural realism, a well-known position in scientific metaphysics, together with an argument for the position in analytic metaphysics known as ontological nihilism. I argue that we can ascribe the same schema to both arguments, which indicates that analytic metaphysics can offer an abstract model that scientific metaphysics may find useful.     

Three problems for the evolutionary debunking argument

In attempting to debunk moral realism through an appeal to evolutionary facts, debunkers face a series of problems, which we label the problems of scope, corrosiveness, and post-hoc justification. To overcome these problems, debunkers must assume certain metaphysical or epistemological positions, or otherwise pre-establish them. In doing so, they must assume or pre-establish the very conclusion they seek in advancing the argument. This means that such debunking arguments either beg the question against the moral realist or are undermined as standalone metaethical arguments.     

Voting at 16? 16–17-Year-Old Germans Vote as Correctly as Adults

Lowering the voting age from 18 to 16 years has recently been a hot topic of the political debate in many democratic countries. This study investigated whether the voting quality of 16–17-year-olds is inferior to that of the voting population. Shortly before the 2021 German federal election, two samples, representative for age and gender, indicated personal preferences about various political issues and weighted them according to importance, allowing for the calculation of individual expected values for political parties. Participants then indicated their voting choice. These choices were normatively correct when individuals voted for the party that best reflected their preferences, that is, the one maximizing the expected value. Results show that the voting decisions of 16–17-year-olds were as good as those by eligible voters. The study indicates that the exclusion of 16–17-year-old Germans in democratic elections cannot be justified by their lack of decision-making ability.     

Lifespan normative data (18–89 years) for Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices Set I

Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM) Set I is a validated and brief test of fluid intelligence, ideal for use in busy clinical settings. However, there is a dearth of normative data allowing an accurate interpretation of APM scores. To address this, we present normative data from across the adult lifespan (18–89 years) for the APM Set I. Data are presented in five age cohorts (total N = 352), including two older adult cohorts (65–79 years and 80–89 years), which allows age-standardized assessment. We also present data from a validated measure of premorbid intellectual ability, which was absent from previous standardizations of longer forms of the APM. In line with previous findings, a striking age-related decline was noted, beginning relatively early in adulthood and most marked amongst lower-scoring individuals. Older adults did not demonstrate difficulty with specific test items or make an increased proportion of specific errors. Sex was not a significant predictor of performance. The data set is of particular use in the neuropsychological assessment of older adults, given the known susceptibility of fluid intelligence to both the effects of normal ageing and acquired brain injury in older age. The results are discussed in light of theories of neurological ageing.     

Psychometric properties and factor structure of the Fear Questionnaire phobia subscale items in two normative samples

Normative data for the Fear Questionnaire (Marks & Mathews, 1979), a popular self-report instrument measuring phobic concerns, were collected from both a community and a collegiate sample. The covariation and internal consistency of the blood-injury phobia (BI), social phobia (SO), and agoraphobia (AG) subscales were assessed in each sample, and the factor structure of the items from these three subscales was examined. Results indicated that, in general, community subjects reported more phobic concerns than did collegiate subjects, and females reported greater phobic concerns than did males. Results from confirmatory factor analyses suggest that the three factors of BI, SO, and AG did not emerge from either data set. Follow-up exploratory factor analyses did identify the general factors of blood-injury phobia and agoraphobia. Normative data from the present study are compared to those obtained previously, and directions for future research are provided.