排序方式: 共有8条查询结果,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1
1.
《Canadian journal of philosophy》2012,42(5):580-605
AbstractCan appealing to children’s rights help to solve the non-identity problem in cases of procreation? A number of philosophers have answered affirmatively, arguing that even if children cannot be harmed by being born into disadvantaged conditions, they may nevertheless be wronged if those conditions fail to meet a minimal standard of decency to which all children are putatively entitled. This paper defends the tenability of this view by outlining and responding to five prominent objections that have been raised against it in the contemporary literature: (1) the identifiability objection; (2) the non-existence objection; (3) the waiving of rights objection, (4) the lack of legitimate complaint objection; and (5) the unfairness objection. 相似文献
2.
Mathias Frisch 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(4):655-672
In order to motivate the thesis that there is no single concept of causation that can do justice to all of our core intuitions concerning that concept, Ned Hall has argued that there is a conflict between a counterfactual criterion of causation and the condition of causal locality. In this paper I critically examine Hall's argument within the context of a more general discussion of the role of locality constraints in a causal conception of the world. I present two strategies that defenders of counterfactual accounts of causation can pursue to respond to Hall's challenge—including the adoption of a counterfactual condition that is sufficient for causal action-at-a-distance in place of Hall's ‘process’ condition—and conclude that Hall's argument against counterfactual accounts of causation is unsuccessful. 相似文献
3.
4.
Janna Thompson 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2017,47(2-3):313-326
AbstractAccording to the relational approach we have obligations to members of future generations not because of their interests or properties but because, and only because, they are our descendants or successors. Common accounts of relational duties do not explain how we can have obligations to people who do not yet exist. In this defence of the relational approach I examine three sources of intergenerational obligations: the concern of parents for their children, including their future children; the desire of community members to pass on a heritage to their descendants; and the relationship of citizens in an intergenerational polity. 相似文献
5.
Franck Fischbach 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2014,22(6):1167-1179
This paper explores the relationship between Adorno and Schelling. It argues that Adorno resorted to Schellingian motifs (whether he acknowledged them or not, or acknowledged them only partially) to counteract the influence of Hegelian thought. In defending this thesis, I examine the various stages in the development of Adorno’s thought, beginning with two texts from the 1930s and concluding with Negative Dialectics and ‘Skoteinos’. This allows us to see that Adorno’s concern to discover a way of thinking that is capable of doing justice to the ‘non-identical’ was present throughout his philosophical career. 相似文献
6.
Brian Berkey 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2017,47(2-3):416-435
AbstractA number of philosophers have resisted impersonal explanations of our obligation to mitigate climate change, and have developed accounts according to which these obligations are explained by human rights or harm-based considerations. In this paper I argue that several of these attempts to explain our mitigation obligations without appealing to impersonal factors fail, since they either cannot account for a plausibly robust obligation to mitigate, or have implausible implications in other cases. I conclude that despite the appeal of the motivations for rejecting the appeal to impersonal factors, such factors must play a prominent role in explaining our mitigation obligations. 相似文献
7.
Guy Kahane 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(2):193-214
Although most people believe that it is morally wrong to intentionally create children who have an impairment, it is widely
held that we cannot criticize such procreative choices unless we find a solution to Parfit’s non-identity problem. I argue
that we can. Jonathan Glover has recently argued that, in certain circumstances, such choices would be self-defeating even
if morally permissible. I argue that although the scope of Glover’s argument is too limited, it nevertheless directs attention
to a moral defect in the attitudes that could motivate such procreative choices, attitudes that, properly characterized, turn
out to be person-affecting in character. I conclude by arguing that prospective parents who want to create a child with an
impairment face a dilemma. If they want to avoid the charge that their aim is morally defective, they must deny that the desired
impairment is harmful. But this would commit them to endorsing the controversial claim that it is morally permissible or even
required to turn normal children into impaired ones.
相似文献
Guy KahaneEmail: |
8.
Hane Htut Maung 《Metaphilosophy》2020,51(5):685-701
The necessity of origin suggests that a person’s identity is determined by the particular pair of gametes from which the person originated. An implication is that speculative scenarios concerning how we might otherwise have been had our gametic origins been different are dismissed as being metaphysically impossible. Given, however, that many of these speculations are intelligible and commonplace in the discourses of competent speakers, it is overhasty to dismiss them as mistakes. This paper offers a way of understanding these speculations that does not commit them to incoherence but aims to make the best sense of what they are expressing. Using the philosophical framework of two-dimensional semantics, it proposes that the speculative scenarios are best analysed as epistemic possibilities, rather than as metaphysical possibilities. It then explores some implications of this analysis for the ethical challenges associated with the non-identity problem. 相似文献
1