Psychosis,symbol, affectivity 1: etiopathogenesis and treatment through analytical psychology

This is the first of two papers concerning our study into an integrated approach to psychotic disorders, conducted at the University of Palermo’s Psychiatry Unit Polyclinic over approximately 15 years. Here we will explore and reflect upon the acute psychotic condition mainly from a theoretical and conceptual perspective, while in the second paper we will explore the clinical perspective. From the point of view of psychopathology, and in the light of C.G. Jung’s conceptualization of analytical psychology, as well as calling on contributions from other authors from the systemic-relational and post-psychoanalytic field, we will clarify the ideas developed over these last few years by our team. From a more speculative perspective we will advance new interpretive hypotheses in an attempt to thoroughly understand the nature of the psychotic condition, both on a psychodynamic relational and a neuroscientific level. The paper describes how we revised our understanding of psychosis from a brain disease to a process aimed at the rearrangement of psychic functioning, as anticipated by John Weir Perry nearly 40 years ago.     

On matters of mind and body: regarding Descartes

In this paper the author considers Descartes’ place in current thinking about the mind‐body dilemma. The premise here is that in the history of ideas, the questions posed can be as significant as the answers acquired. Descartes’ paramount question was ‘How do we determine certainty?’ and his pursuit of an answer led to cogito ergo sum. His discovery simultaneously raised the question whether mind is separate from or unified with the body. Some who currently hold that brain and subjectivity are unified contend that the philosopher ‘split’ mind from body and refer to ‘Descartes’ error’. This paper puts forward that Descartes’ detractors fail to recognise Descartes’ contribution to Western thought, which was to introduce the Enlightenment and to give a place to human subjectivity. Added to this, evidence from Descartes’ correspondence with Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia supports the conclusion that Descartes did in fact believe in the unity of mind and body although he could not reconcile this rationally with the certainty from personal experience that they were separate substances. In this Descartes was engaged in just the same dilemma as that of current thinkers and researchers, a conflict which still is yet to be resolved.     

Looking for unexpected results: the need to systematize the registration of environmental variables / Buscando resultados inesperados: la necesidad de sistematizar el registro de variables ambientales

Abstract

Why is replicating cognitive neuroscience results so difficult? Here we discuss a possible bias that could determine the systematic omission of control variables. A methodology based on the notion that cognitive processes are encapsulated undermines the adequate characterization of both the sample and its experimental context. Systematically exploring the impact of the sample and context variables implies discussing and developing standard experimentation practices. We propose actively searching for unexpected results as a starting point to do so.     

A Theological Challenge: Coordinating Biological, Social, and Religious Visions of Humanity

This paper attempts two tasks. First, it sketches how the natural sciences (including especially the biological sciences), the social sciences, and the scientific study of religion can be understood to furnish complementary, consonant perspectives on human beings and human groups. This suggests that it is possible to speak of a modern secular interpretation of humanity (MSIH) to which these perspectives contribute (though not without tensions). MSIH is not a comprehensive interpretation of human beings, if only because it adopts a posture of neutrality with regard to the reality of religious objects and the truth of theological claims about them. MSIH is certainly an impressively forceful interpretation, however, and it needs to be reckoned with by any perspective on human life that seeks to insert its truth claims into the arena of public debate. Second, the paper considers two challenges that MSIH poses to specifically theological interpretations of human beings. On the one hand, in spite of its posture of religious neutrality, MSIH is a key element in a class of wider, seemingly antireligious interpretations of humanity, including especially projectionist and illusionist critiques of religion. It is consonance with MSIH that makes these critiques such formidable competitors for traditional theological interpretations of human beings. On the other hand, and taking the religiously neutral posture of MSIH at face value, theological accounts of humanity that seek to coordinate the insights of MSIH with positive religious visions of human life must find ways to overcome or manage such dissonance as arises. The goal of synthesis is defended as important, and strategies for managing these challenges, especially in light of the pluralism of extant philosophical and theological interpretations of human beings, are advocated.     

Comments on the 2018 IAAP Conference on Archetype Theory: defending a non‐reductive biological approach

During the course of the 2018 IAAP conference, a criticism of Jung’s idea of the archetype as inherited predisposition was raised that involved examining a number of dreams and visions and assessing them through developments in genetics and neuroscience. From this comparison it was argued that archetypes cannot be inherited and could more reasonably be argued to derive from early experiences. In this essay, the author responds by showing how this conclusion is flawed due to being based on reductive errors. An alternative, non‐reductive but inherited and biological position on the archetype is defended.     

The controversy around the concept of archetypes and the place for an emergent/developmental model

This paper addresses two key controversial questions to do with the concept of archetypes – do they operate autonomously without connection to an individual's personal life experience? Does their biological base mean they are genetically determined, innate and thus a priori inherited psychic structures? These questions are addressed through the case of a person who began life as an unwanted pregnancy, was adopted at birth and as an adult, experienced profound waking visions. An emergent/developmental model of archetype is outlined which stresses developmental start‐points through this infant's engagement via response and reaction to the affective and material world of the infant/birth mother matrix and from which emergence later occurs by way of participation in a socio‐cultural and material context. The emergentism aspect of this model rescues it from being reductionist since it allows for cultural and socialisation inputs. The model's explanatory power is vastly enlarged by combining this with the developmental component. Critically, once developmentally produced mind/brain (image schema) structures are in place, they have the capacity to generate psychological life. Imagery can then appear as if it is innately derived when that is not the case. The contemporary neuroscience which supports this model is both outlined and related back to the case example.     

Basic needs and complexes: similarities between feeling‐toned complexes,emotional schema and affective states

The aim of this paper is to examine feeling‐toned complexes from a developmental psychological perspective. From this perspective feeling‐toned complexes emerge when basic needs are not met. A very similar theory is put forward by Jeffery Young in his Schema Therapy (Young, Klosko, & Weishaar 2005). His basic needs concept, developed on the basis of empirical research, covers four basic needs which are: attachment, autonomy, and self‐worth, as well as play and spontaneity. My proposition is to deal with this conceptual view from a Jungian perspective insofar as we can integrate the four basic needs, however adding a fifth: the basic need for meaning in the theory of feeling‐toned complexes. Emotional schemas and feeling‐toned complexes are then comparable patterns. The strengths and weaknesses of Analytic Psychology compared to Jeffrey Young's schema therapy are further discussed. The foundation of the feeling‐toned complexes on unmet basic needs lends itself to including a further reference, namely Jaak Panksepp’s neuroscientific findings. Panksepp formulates seven basic affective systems which I discuss first, then I focus on what could be gained from the basic needs concept and finally I turn to the feeling‐complex in an attempt to integrate neuroscientific findings into complex theory.     

Neuroscience, the Person, and God: An Emergentist Account

Strong forms of dualism and eliminative materialism block any significant dialogue between the neurosciences and theology. The present article thus challenges the Sufficiency Thesis, according to which neuroscientific explanations will finally be sufficient to fully explain human behavior. It then explores the various ways in which neuroscientific results and theological interpretations contribute to an overall theory of the person. Supervenience theories, which hold that mental events are dependent on their physical substrata but not reducible to them, are explained. Challenging the determinism of "strong" supervenience, I defend a version of "soft" supervenience that allows for genuine mental causation. This view gives rise in turn to an emergentist theory of the person. Still, I remain a monist: there are many types of properties encountered in the world, although it is only the one nature that bears all these properties. The resulting position, emergentist monism , allows for diversity within the context of the one world. This view is open at the top for theological applications and interpretations while retaining the close link to neuroscientific study and its results. Theology offers an interpretation of the whole world based on a yet higher order of emergence, although the notion of God moves beyond the natural order as a whole. It therefore supplements the natural scientific study of the world without negating it.     

On Murray Jackson's 1961 ‘Chair,couch and countertransference’

One of the problems facing psychoanalysts of all schools is that theory has evolved at a much faster pace than practice. Whereas there has been an explosion of theory, practice has remained, at least officially, static and unchanging. It is in this sense that Murray Jackson's 1961 paper is still relevant today. Despite the rise of the new relational and intersubjective paradigms, most psychoanalysts, and not a few Jungian analysts, still seem to feel that the couch is an essential component of the analytical setting and process. If the use of the couch is usually justified by the argument that it favours regression, facilitates analytical reverie and protects the patient from the influence of the analyst, over time many important psychoanalysts have come to challenge this position. Increasingly these analysts suggest that the use of the couch may actually be incompatible with the newer theoretical models. This contention is strengthened by some of the findings coming from the neurosciences and infant research. This underlines the necessity of empirical research to verify the clinical effectiveness of these different positions, couch or face‐to‐face, but it is exactly this type of research that is lacking.     

Psychosis,symbol, affectivity 2: another perspective on the treatment of psychotic disorder

This is the second of two papers concerning our study into an integrated approach to psychotic disorders conducted at the University Psychiatry Unit of Palermo’s Polyclinic over approximately 15 years; this paper concentrates on the clinical phenomena. The study aimed to find the best possible treatment and to improve the prognosis of this patient group. We have explored the efficacy of a range of psycho-therapeutic (cognitive-behavioural, systemic-relational, psychodynamic, group and others), psycho-pharmaceutical, psychiatric rehabilitative and psycho-educational treatments, with a hermeneutic approach instead of a systematic one. The study’s conclusions, described in the paper, are that all psychotic functions start with a nuclear psychic issue connected to emotional development. We describe how the most significant symptoms of acute psychotic manifestations (delusions and misperceptions) make use of an encrypted psychological meaning that can be decoded through the patient’s symbolic language. This language is a key element in diagnosis and in the choice of treatment. The paper describes how we revised our understanding of psychosis from being a brain disease to being a process aimed at the rearrangement of psychic functioning. Our significant results are described.