On the processing of arguments

This paper is concerned with the processing of informal arguments, that is, arguments involving probable truth. A model of informal argument processing is presented that is based upon Hample's (1977) expansion of Toulmin's (1958) model of argument structure. The model postulates that a claim activates an attitude, the two components forming a complex that in turn activates reasons. Furthermore, the model holds occurrence of the reason, or possibly the claim and the reason, activates values. Three experiments are described that provide support for the model.This research was supported by the Mellon Foundation and by the Office of Educational Research and Improvement of the Department of Education via an award for the Center for the Study of Learning to the Learning Research and Development Center. The contents of the paper are not necessarily the position of any of these organizations.     

What is philosophy as a way of life? Why philosophy as a way of life?

Despite a recent surge of interest in philosophy as a way of life, it is not clear what it might mean for philosophy to guide one's life, or how a “philosophical” way of life might differ from a life guided by religion, tradition, or some other source. We argue against John Cooper that spiritual exercises figure crucially in the idea of philosophy as a way of life—not just in the ancient world but also today, at least if the idea is to be viable. In order to make the case we attempt to clarify the nature of spiritual exercises, and to explore a number of fundamental questions, such as “What role does reason have in helping us to live well?” Here we distinguish between the discerning and motivational powers of reason, and argue that both elements have limitations as guides to living well.     

Evaluation of an indirect assessment for identifying tasks for functional analysis

Although a demand analysis is helpful for identifying potential establishing operations for the functional analysis (FA) demand condition, it may not always be practical due to time constraints. A potential alternative is the Negative Reinforcement Rating Scale (NRRS), an indirect assessment tool that may serve as a time efficient alternative to a demand analysis. The experimenter assessed the reliability and validity of the NRRS for 5 individuals with autism spectrum disorder who exhibited problem behavior. Multiple types of interrater reliability were assessed across 2 informants, and NRRS outcomes were compared to a subsequent demand analysis and FA to assess its validity. Reliability was high (M = 84%) for NRRS numerical ratings of categories but low (M = 32.9%) for specific examples provided. NRRS-identified highly aversive tasks yielded better correspondence with demand analysis outcomes than did NRRS-identified less aversive tasks.     

Teaching children with autism spectrum disorder to ask “where” questions using a speech-generating device

Children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) who have limited speech are often taught to communicate using a speech-generating device (SGD). We evaluated procedures for teaching a mand for information (i.e., Where is [item]?) using an interrupted behavior chain procedure. In Experiment 1, all participants (3 children with ASD who communicated using an SGD) acquired the target mand but transfer to a novel stimulus did not occur. In the second experiment, 2 participants were taught to approach alternative communication partners when the first partner did not provide the information. The second experiment also included procedures to test whether the responses were under the control of appropriate motivating operations (MOs). Generalization across communication partners occurred with both participants, but transfer across behavior chains with only 1 participant. The results of both experiments suggest that teaching multiple behavior chains and evaluating MO control may be necessary to establish generalized manding for information.     

Motivating operations and terms to describe them: some further refinements

Over the past decade, behavior analysts have increasingly used the term establishing operation (EO) to refer to environmental events that influence the behavioral effects of operant consequences. Nonetheless, some elements of current terminology regarding EOs may interfere with applied behavior analysts' efforts to predict, control, describe, and understand behavior. The present paper (a) describes how the current conceptualization of the EO is in need of revision, (b) suggests alternative terms, including the generic term motivating operation (MO), and (c) provides examples of MOs and their behavioral effects using articles from the applied behavior analysis literature.     

THE INFLUENCE OF MOTIVATING OPERATIONS ON GENERALIZATION PROBES OF SPECIFIC MANDS BY CHILDREN WITH AUTISM

We investigated the influence of motivating operations on the generalization of newly taught mands across settings and communication partners for 3 children with autism. Two conditions were implemented prior to generalization probes. In the first condition, participants were given access to a preferred item until they rejected the item (i.e., abolishing operation). In the second condition, the item was not available to participants prior to generalization probes (i.e., establishing operation). The effects of these conditions on the generalization of newly taught mands were evaluated in a multielement design. Results indicated differentiated responding during generalization probes in which more manding with the target mand was observed following the presession no‐access condition than in the presession access condition. These results support the consideration of motivating operations when assessing generalization of target mands to various untrained contexts.     

Role Stressors and Job Attitudes: A Mediated Model of Leader-Member Exchange

ABSTRACT

Past research has shown the importance of considering close others' interests when pursuing goals, but no research has examined potential moderators of this effect. Two studies examined how attachment style moderates the association between reasons for studying and academic outcomes. In Study 1, 119 participants reported their attachment style, the reasons why they study, and their study habits. As predicted, the association between relational reasons and studying was positive for secure individuals and negative for avoidant individuals. In Study 2, 195 participants reported their attachment style and reasons for studying, as well as their GPA and academic well-being. As predicted, the association between relational reasons and GPA was positive for secure individuals, whereas the associations between personal reasons for studying and academic well-being were positive for avoidant individuals. These results indicate the importance of considering individual differences as moderators of the association between goal motives and outcomes.     

Epistemic Norms and Democracy: a Response to Talisse

John Rawls argued that democracy must be justifiable to all citizens; otherwise, a democratic society is oppressive to some. In A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy ( 2007 ), Robert B. Talisse attempts to meet the Rawlsian challenge by drawing from Charles S. Peirce's pragmatism. This article first briefly canvasses the argument of Talisse's book and then criticizes its key premise concerning (normative) reasons for belief by offering a competing reading of Peirce's “The Fixation of Belief” ( 1877 ). It then proceeds to argue that Talisse's argument faces a dilemma: his proposal of epistemic perfectionism either is substantive and can be reasonably disagreed about or is minimal but insufficient to ground a democratic society. Consequently, it suggests that the Rawlsian challenge can only be solved by abandoning Rawls's own notion of reasonableness, and that an interesting alternative notion of reasons can be derived from Peirce's “Fixation.”     

The moral obligations of trust

Moral obligation, Darwall argues, is irreducibly second personal. So too, McMyler argues, is the reason for belief supplied by testimony and which supports trust. In this paper, I follow Darwall in arguing that the testimony is not second personal ‘all the way down’. However, I go on to argue, this shows that trust is not fully second personal, which in turn shows that moral obligation is equally not second personal ‘all the way down’.