Response error and processing biases in confidence judgment

Previous studies showed that random error can explain overconfidence effects typically observed in the literature. One of these studies concluded that, after accounting for random error effects in the data, there is little support for cognitive‐processing biases in confidence elicitation. In this paper, we investigate more closely the random error explanation for overconfidence. We generated data from four models of confidence and then estimated the magnitude of random error in the data. Our results show that, in addition to the true magnitude of random error specified in the simulations, the error estimates are influenced by important cognitive‐processing biases in the confidence elicitation process. We found that random error in the response process can account for the degree of overconfidence found in calibration studies, even when that overconfidence is actually caused by other factors. Thus, the error models say little about whether cognitive biases are present in the confidence elicitation process. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Central clinical states: An examination of the Profile of Mood States and the Eight State Questionnaire

Two multidimensional mood-state inventories, the Profile of Mood States (POMS) and the Eight State Questionnaire (8SQ), were administered to 289 Australian college undergraduates. Intercorrelations for the combined 14 subscales were subjected to a higher-order factor analysis in order to elucidate the central clinical states within the mood-state sphere. Results suggested four major state dimensions pertaining to Neuroticism, Hostility/Anger, Vigor, and a combined Extroversion/Arousal-Fatigue entity. Both three- and five-factor solutions were taken out for comparative purposes. Furthermore, separate higher-order factorings of the POMS on normative samples of 350 male and 650 female psychiatric outpatients were conducted, corroborating three of the four central state dimensions, at least in the case of females. The implications of these findings for behavioral assessment are discussed.This study was supported by a Research Development Grant awarded to the author by the University of Melbourne.     

Mood and memories of parental rearing styles: A comparison of mood effects on questionnaire-cued and free recall of autobiographical memories

The relationship between memories of childhood experiences (e.g., adverse parenting) and adult depression often found raises questions of interpretation. On the one hand, both laboratory studies and clinicians' experiences suggest that subjects in a depressed mood frequently show a negative bias in perceptions and memories. Negative childhood memories in depressed persons might, therefore, be interpreted as epiphenomena of depressed mood instead of etiological factors. On the other hand, memories of childhood experiences seem remarkably stable across changes in depressed mood, especially when memories are elicited by means of standardized questionnaires. In the mood and memory literature several explanations for this stability are offered. For one thing, highly structured cues to elicit memories (such as in questionnaires) are hypothesized to be less susceptible to mood bias than unstructured memory cues (such as in free recall procedures). On the other hand, resource allocation theorists suggest that childhood memories, being well established and rehearsed, are relatively impervious to mood bias no matter how they are elicited. In this study we examined whether different methods of eliciting childhood memories (i.e., free recall and questionnaire-cued) are differentially susceptible to mood bias. To this aim, we used a mood induction procedure to induce depressed, neutral, and elated mood and assessed childhood memories both before and after the mood induction using both questionnaires and free recall to elicit memories. Results suggested that memories elicited by means of free recall as well as by means of questionnaire-cued recall were susceptible to depressed and elated mood bias. The implications for research addressing the link between childhood experiences and depression are discussed.     

Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI) computer-generated diagnoses: How do they compare to clinician judgment?

During the past several decades, computers have achieved increasing prominence in psychological assessment procedures. This is particularly true for computer-based test interpretation and diagnosis. This study reports on a study designed to compare the accuracy of computer-based diagnoses with clinician-generated diagnoses. The Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI) was administered to 151 consecutively admitted inpatients at a large private psychiatric hospital. The computer-generated diagnoses were compared with those generated by admitting psychiatrists. The results indicated that the MCMI diagnostic impressions underestimated the severity of depressive disorders when compared with clinician diagnoses on Axis I. Specifically, clinicians diagnosed major depression much more frequently than did the MCMI. In addition, clinicians diagnosed anxiety disorders much less frequently than did the MCMI.     

The factor structure of the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List-Revised (MAACL-R): Some statistical considerations

In response to Zuckerman's comments on my factor analyses of the MAACL-R, I focus on the statistical issues of the cutoff criterion for factor loadings and the evidence for the discriminant validity of the five-factor solution. Based upon the conclusions I draw in these two areas, I recommend that researchers either (a) use the two factor solution to the MAACL-R represented in the summary scores of Dysphoria and Positive Affect + Sensation Seeking or (b) include all MAACL-R scales in their studies and analyze their data to determine whether it is statistically appropriate to report results from a single scale (A, D, H, PA, or SS) rather than from the summary scores.     

An evaluation of the reliability of probability judgments across response modes and over time

Despite the importance of probability assessment methods in behavioral decision theory and decision analysis, little attention has been directed at evaluating their reliability and validity. In fact, no comprehensive study of reliability has been undertaken. Since reliability is a necessary condition for validity, this oversight is significant. The present study was motivated by that oversight. We investigated the reliability of probability measures derived from three response modes: numerical probabilities, pie diagrams, and odds. Unlike previous studies, the experiment was designed to distinguish systematic deviations in probability judgments, such as those due to experience or practice, from random deviations. It was found that subjects assessed probabilities reliably for all three assessment methods regardless of the reliability measures employed. However, a small but statistically significant decrease over time in the magnitudes of assessed probabilities was observed. This effect was linked to a decrease in subjects overconfidence during the course of the experiment.     

Mood regulation expectancies, affect intensity, dispositional coping, and depressive symptoms: A conceptual analysis and empirical reanalysis

In a recent article, Flett, Blankstein and Obertinsky (1996, Personality and Individual Differences, 20, 221–228) examined cross-sectional relations between affect intensity, generalized expectancies for negative mood regulation (NMR expectancies), coping dispositions, and depression in a sample of 153 women. However, they did not report partial correlations of affect intensity and NMR expectancies, independent of each other, with coping and depression. Such information is needed for development of models of the coping process which integrate the roles of temperament variables, such as affect intensity, and cognitive-social learning person variables, such as NMR expectancies. Reanalysis of Flett etal.'s correlation matrix revealed that affect intensity and NMR expectancies were each independently associated with distinct coping dispositions, but that only NMR expectancies were independently associated with depressive symptoms.     

Upward versus Downward Anchoring in Frequency Judgments of Social Facts

Frequency estimation of social facts in two methods of judgment elicitation was investigated. In the “narrow-range” condition, subjects answered questions in the format: “Out of 100 incidents, how many belong to category X?” In the “wide-range” condition, the frequency for the same event was assessed with respect to “Out of 10,000”. Judged frequencies in the wide-range condition were divided by 100, and were compared with the corresponding judgments in the narrow-range condition. Such comparisons were made for low-frequency and high-frequency events. Previous research has shown that, for low-frequency events, judged frequencies are proportionally greater in the narrow-range than in the wide-range condition. These results reflect cognitive processes of implicit anchoring, whereby judged frequencies lie close to small numbers within the response ranges provided. I call this process “downward anchoring,” and predicted that this tendency would be replicated in the present study. Moreover, I predicted that assessments about high-frequency events would evoke similar cognitive processes operating in the opposite direction. By such “upward anchoring,” judged frequencies would lie close to relatively larger numbers within the given response ranges. Consequently, I predicted that judged frequencies for high-frequency events would be proportionally greater in the wide-range condition than in the narrow-range condition. These predictions were confirmed.