Relative allocation on concurrent schedules can depend on schedule parameters when behavioral parameters are constant

We develop a simple model of switching between the initial links of a concurrent-chain procedure. Behavior is determined by four parameters μ₁, μ₂, q₁, and q₂. The first two are the basic rates of switching from Schedule 1 and Schedule 2, respectively. The second two are the probabilities of leaving Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 after the corresponding terminal link has been completed. We show that for fixed values of these four parameters, the relative allocation on the initial links may change as a result of changes in initial-link schedules. The effect can be quite large if the switching rates are low. An implication is that relative allocation is not necessarily a good measure of behavior.     

Behavior regulation and learned performance: Some misapprehensions and disagreements

The behavior-regulation approach to learned performance has been the subject of misapprehension and disagreement concerning: (1) the nature and importance of behavior regulation, (2) the definition and role of behavioral set-points, (3) the relation of optimal schedule performance to behavioral set-points, and (4) the question of whether deviations from total responding or from response patterns are the primary determinant of molar responding under schedule constraint. After clarifying the nature and role of behavior regulation and set-points, this paper shows that the data used to question optimal schedule performance (Allison, 1981a) actually strongly support the general behavior-regulation approach. These data also indicate a role for response-pattern set-points in determining schedule behavior, but contradict the hypothesis that deviations from response-pattern characteristics are the primary determinant of molar schedule effects.     

孟子的心理学思想研究

该文较系统地论述了孟子的普通心理思想。主要问题是:心理学思想的基本观点,知虑心理思想,情欲心理思想,志意心理思想,智能心理思想,性习心理思想。     

Momentary maximizing in concurrent schedules with a minimum interchangeover interval

Eight pigeons were trained on concurrent variable-interval variable-interval schedules with a minimum interchangeover time programmed as a consequence of changeovers. In Experiment 1 the reinforcement schedules remained constant while the minimum interchangeover time varied from 0 to 200 s. Relative response rates and relative time deviated from relative reinforcement rates toward indifference with long minimum interchangeover times. In Experiment 2 different reinforcement ratios were scheduled in successive experimental conditions with the minimum interchangeover time constant at 0, 2, 10, or 120 s. The exponent of the generalized matching equation was close to 1.0 when the minimum interchangeover time was 0 s (the typical procedure for concurrent schedules without a changeover delay) and decreased as that duration was increased. The data support the momentary maximizing theory and contradict molar maximizing theories and the melioration theory.     

Points of View

An adequate evaluation of argumentation requires identification of the object to which the argumentation pertains: the point of view. What are the distinguishing features of this object? In the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, the object of argumentation is referred to by means of the notion ‘standpoint’. In other theories concerned with argumentation, reasoning, convincing or persuading, notions are used such as ‘thesis’, ‘conclusion’, ‘opinion’ and ‘attitude’. This paper is a survey of the characterisations of the object of argumentation given in the various theories. It discusses the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, socio-psychological research on persuasion, cognitive research on reasoning, argumentative discourse analysis, two variants of informal logic, advocacy and debate, and the theory of communicative action. Next, it explores some relations between the notions used in these theories. Finally, it outlines some starting points for further research into the problems of identification.     

A molar theory of reinforcement schedules

Behavior of subjects exposed to concurrent and individual interval and ratio schedules of reinforcement may be described in terms of a set of expressions relating the value of responses to their durations, a feedback equation relating reinforcement to response duration, and the assumption that subjects allocate their time among various responses so as to maximize value.     

Duration-reduction of avoidance sessions as negative reinforcement

Five rats were exposed to a shock-postponement procedure in which responses on each of two levers initially had equivalent effects. After an initial training sequence that ensured at least some responding on each lever, an additional consequence was made conjointly operative on the previously less-preferred lever for each animal. Each response on this lever continued to postpone shock, but also reduced the session duration by one minute. The conjoint contingencies were operative until, through session-shortening responses and the passage of time, the session was scheduled to end in two minutes; during the final two minutes the session-shortening contingency was disabled while the shock-postponement contingency continued to be operative on both levers. When responding shifted to a predominance on the session-shortening lever, the conjoint contingency was shifted to the other lever; for four of the five rats this reversal was followed by two additional reversals. Two of the rats' responding showed clear, strong, and unambiguous sensitivity to the session-shortening contingency. The responding of two others was also systematically controlled by that contingency, but the effects were less clearcut. The fifth animal showed an initial shift when session-shortening was introduced, but its subsequent behavior proved insensitive to reversals of procedure. The results clearly indicate a sensitivity of behavior to events on a time scale quite distinct from that of immediate consequences. They also support an interpretation of avoidance sessions, considered in their entirety, as events whose contingent relationship to behavior can affect that behavior—even in the absence of stimuli that delineate those relationships. Finally, these results support an interpretation of aversively based conditioning within a broader context, analogous to the “open versus closed economy” interpretation of appetitively controlled behavior.     

Do looks constitute our perceptual evidence?

Many philosophers take experience to be an essential aspect of perceptual justification. I argue against a specific variety of such an experientialist view, namely, the Looks View of perceptual justification, according to which our visual beliefs are mediately justified by beliefs about the way things look. I describe three types of cases that put pressure on the idea that perceptual justification is always related to looks‐related reasons: unsophisticated cognizers, multimodal identification, and amodal completion. I then provide a tentative diagnosis of what goes wrong in the Looks View: it ascribes a specific epistemic role to beliefs about looks that is actually fulfilled by subpersonal perceptual processes.     

Pessimism

The problem of pessimism is the secular analogue to the evidential problem of evil facing traditional theism. The traditional theist must argue two things: that the evidence shows that this is on balance a good world and that it is the best possible world. Though the secular optimist who advocates any form of secular moral theory need not argue that the current and future world will likely be the best possible world, she nonetheless must argue that were there a clean solution to the problem of current and future suffering in which all sentient life could be instantly and painlessly eliminated, we would have reasons not to employ the clean solution because the future promises to bring on balance a good world in which the evil of human and animal suffering is outweighed by whatever is good in the world. Pessimism is the view that the evidence argues against secular optimism. It is argued here that it is anything but clear that secular optimism is warranted when viewed from an impersonal point of view. The problem is then evaluated from the personal point of view in which a form of personal optimism is defended even in the face of impersonal pessimism.