Generalized Rough Sets (Preclusivity Fuzzy-Intuitionistic (BZ) Lattices)

The standard Pawlak approach to rough set theory, as an approximation space consisting of a universe U and an equivalence (indiscernibility) relation R U x U, can be equivalently described by the induced preclusivity ("discernibility") relation U x U \ R, which is irreflexive and symmetric.We generalize the notion of approximation space as a pair consisting of a universe U and a discernibility or preclusivity (irreflexive and symmetric) relation, not necessarily induced from an equivalence relation. In this case the "elementary" sets are not mutually disjoint, but all the theory of generalized rough sets can be developed in analogy with the standard Pawlak approach. On the power set of the universe, the algebraic structure of the quasi fuzzy-intuitionistic "classical" (BZ) lattice is introduced and the sets of all "closed" and of all "open" definable sets with the associated complete (in general nondistributive) ortholattice structures are singled out.The rough approximation of any fixed subset of the universe is the pair consisting of the best "open" approximation from the bottom and the best "closed" approximation from the top. The properties of this generalized rough approximation mapping are studied in the context of quasi-BZ lattice structures of "closed-open" ordered pairs (the "algebraic logic" of generalized rough set theory), comparing the results with the standard Pawlak approach. A particular weak form of rough representation is also studied.     

Defaults in update semantics

The aim of this paper is twofold: (i) to introduce the framework of update semantics and to explain what kind of semantic phenomena may successfully be analysed in it: (ii) to give a detailed analysis of one such phenomenon: default reasoning.     

‘Ought implies Can’ and the law

In this paper, we investigate the ‘ought implies can’ (OIC) thesis, focusing on explanations and interpretations of OIC, with a view to clarifying its uses and relevance to legal philosophy. We first review various issues concerning the semantics and pragmatics of OIC; then we consider how OIC may be incorporated in Hartian and Kelsenian theories of the law. Along the way we also propose a taxonomy of OIC-related claims.     

Arrow Logic and Infinite Counting

We consider arrow logics (i.e., propositional multi-modal logics having three -- a dyadic, a monadic, and a constant -- modal operators) augmented with various kinds of infinite counting modalities, such as 'much more', 'of good quantity', 'many times'. It is shown that the addition of these modal operators to weakly associative arrow logic results in finitely axiomatizable and decidable logics, which fail to have the finite base property.     

视、听双重记忆原序报告成绩下降的可能的原因

本文两种交替报告中的通道转移最多,但是都没有引起成绩大幅度下降。     

Crossmodal object-based attention: auditory objects affect visual processing

According to the object-based view, visual attention can be deployed to "objects" or perceptual units, regardless of spatial locations. Recently, however, the notion of object has also been extended to the auditory domain, with some authors suggesting possible interactions between visual and auditory objects. Here we show that task-irrelevant auditory objects may affect the deployment of visual attention, providing evidence that crossmodal links can also occur at an object-based level. Hence, in addition to the well documented control of visual objects over what we hear, our findings demonstrate that, in some cases, auditory objects can affect visual processing.     

The Meaning of “Existence” and the Contingency of Sense

In this paper I argue first for a revisionary ontology, that is, for an understanding of “existence” as the property of a field not to be empty. In this context, I distinguish between “metaphysics” (the theory of totality or of fundamental reality) and “ontology” (the systematic investigation into the meaning of “existence”). In the second part, I provide a sketch for a corresponding revisionary theory of the modalities in light of the new ontology proposed.     

Experience‐What is it?

The author takes a renewed look at the constitutive aspects of experience, looking at it as process rather than contents. Recently more psychoanalytic voices are discernible that argue for the complexity and multi-leveled nature of inner experience. Yet the predominant and preeminent psychoanalytic voice has traditionally emphasized the linearity and single-factored nature of experience and all that is based on it: development, object relations, psychopathology, and treatment. The author offers an understanding of experience as stemming from the operation of two contiguous, ongoing modalities of processing internal and external input, and reflecting two polarities of the subject-object experience: of separateness and instrumentality, and of oneness and ongoing being. Such a conceptual reframing of experience harbors multiple implications for understanding subjectivity and inter-subjectivity, inter-relatedness as well as single-person psychology, and the all-important role of an experiential 'goodness-of-fit' in the analytic situation and elsewhere.     

Modality-specific interference between action planning and perceptual processing

This paper reports a study which examined an interaction between action planning and processing of perceptual information in two different sensory modalities. In line with the idea that action planning consists in representing the action’s sensory outcomes, it was assumed that different types of actions should be coupled with different modalities. A visual and auditory oddball paradigm was combined with two types of actions: pointing and knocking (unrelated to the perceptual task). Results showed an interactive effect between the action type and the sensory modality of the oddballs, with impaired detection of auditory oddballs for knocking (congruent) action, as compared to a pointing (incongruent) action. These findings reveal that action planning can interact with modality-specific perceptual processing and that preparing an action presumably binds the respective perceptual features with an action plan, thereby making these features less available for other tasks.