解读成语中的他人心理与互动心理：来自眼动和ERP的证据

为了探查理解单个他人心理与解读互动心理的差异机制, 在实验一和实验二中分别采用眼动和事件相关电位技术来测评个体解读中文四字成语中的单个他人心理和互动心理的加工过程。眼动实验发现, 单人成语第二个字的总阅读时间显著长于物理成语; 随后, 互动成语前三字的凝视时间显著长于单人和物理成语。脑电实验发现, 在成语呈现后500~700ms, 解读单人和互动成语诱发的额区晚期正成分(LPC)平均波幅显著大于解读物理成语; 之后在700~800ms, 解读互动成语诱发的额中区LPC平均波幅显著大于解读单人和物理成语。眼动注视模式和脑电证据共同印证了理解单个他人的心理与理解多人的互动心理存在时间和强度上的差异。相对于物理表征和单人心理的加工, 理解更为复杂的互动心理需要更长的加工时间和更强的神经活动。     

Mental states as generalizations from experience: a neuro-computational hypothesis

The opposition between behaviour- and mind-reading accounts of data on infants and non-human primates could be less dramatic than has been thought up to now. In this paper, I argue for this thesis by analysing a possible neuro-computational explanation of early mind-reading, based on a mechanism of associative generalization which is apt to implement the notion of mental states as intervening variables proposed by Andrew Whiten. This account allows capturing important continuities between behaviour-reading and mind-reading, insofar as both are supposed to be just different kinds of generalization from perceptual experience. Specifically, I will argue that the projection of inner experiences to others which is involved in early mind-reading does not imply a computational leap beyond associative generalization from perceptual experience.     

Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading

A new class of visuomotor neuron has been recently discovered in the monkey's premotor cortex: mirror neurons. These neurons respond both when a particular action is performed by the recorded monkey and when the same action, performed by another individual, is observed. Mirror neurons appear to form a cortical system matching observation and execution of goal-related motor actions. Experimental evidence suggests that a similar matching system also exists in humans. What might be the functional role of this matching system? One possible function is to enable an organism to detect certain mental states of observed conspecifics. This function might be part of, or a precursor to, a more general mind-reading ability. Two different accounts of mind-reading have been suggested. According to ‘theory theory', mental states are represented as inferred posits of a naive theory. According to ‘simulation theory', other people's mental states are represented by adopting their perspective: by tracking or matching their states with resonant states of one's own. The activity of mirror neurons, and the fact that observers undergo motor facilitation in the same muscular groups as those utilized by target agents, are findings that accord well with simulation theory but would not be predicted by theory theory.