Is it possible to experimentally determine the extension of cognition?

Various analytical tools originally developed for theories of mechanistic explanation have recently been imported into the ongoing debate on the hypothesis of (extracerebrally) extended cognition (HEC). One such tool that appears particularly relevant to that debate is Craver’s mutual manipulability account of constitution (MM), most of all because it promises to settle the debate on experimental grounds. This paper investigates whether it is possible to deliver on that promise. We first find that, far from grounding an experimental evaluation of HEC, MM is conceptually incompatible with both internalist and externalist accounts of cognition. Next, we propose a suitable modification of MM, MM*, but it turns out that MM* presupposes rather than produces clarity on the extension of cognition. Moreover, subject to MM* the inference to constitution is radically empirically underdetermined. Finally, we argue that our results can be generalized and conclude that, for principled reasons, it is impossible to experimentally determine whether cognitive processes have extracerebral constituents. Determining the extension of cognition is an inherently pragmatic matter.     

Political Psychology as Social Aesthetics

Political psychology may be legitimately developed as a "social aesthetic.&;rdquo; Its activities generate social forms, much as in the arts. While logic works within the confines of society's language, aesthetic forms work with its sensibility, in the understanding that significance lies within the unitary wholes. In this sense, political psychology cannot be separated from psychology in general. In both cases we participate in the generation of form. However, because these forms enter society in significant ways, reflexive attention must be given to what it is we create. Mechanical forms, which are common to the field and to society generally, contribute to a condition of social alienation; in contrast, the form of a game is more closely related to the spontaneous creation of community.     

This new science of ours: a more or less systematic history of consciousness and transcendence. Part I

This paper is a search for the origins and nature of human consciousness. This portion, the first part of two, takes up a signal work of Jung and one of Freud, both published in 1911 and both deriving thinking as the first embodiment of higher mental functions. Thinking and consciousness (and subsequently spirit) are elaborated in terms of the nature and vicissitudes of libido. Jung's less well understood theory regarding a quantitative libido is particularly addressed as are his non-Cartesian ways of reasoning. Also addressed is Jung's turning away in the final analysis from a frankly metaphysical and transcendent position as compared to the pre-Socratic philosophers with whom focused thinking began in the western world. Differentiation is made between mechanistic and energetic field dynamics in how reality is viewed.     

Memory for a dialectical and a nondialectical prose passage in young and older adults

Age differences in adults' processing of a dialectical or nondialectical prose passage were explored. Twenty young and 20 older adults read a dialectical or mechanistic passage and were tested for free recall and recognition after a 30-min delay (filled with vocabulary and paradigm belief scale). Older (vs. young) adults had significantly lower formistic and mechanistic scores and showed greater relative preference for relativistic and dialectical beliefs (paradigm scale). There were no age differences in amount of free recall or number of correct responses (hits) on recognition, but older adults produced more spontaneous dialectical distortions in recall of the mechanistic passage and more paradigm-congruent false alarms on recognition. There was also a move from absolute toward dialectical thinking on the paradigm scale and, among males, on the recognition measure. Dialectical scores (paradigm scale) were positively correlated, and mechanistic scores negatively correlated, with number of dialectical distortions on free recall (mechanistic passage), while dialectical scores were positively correlated with number of dialectical false alarms (dialectical passage).     

NOTES ON THE ALLEGED CONFLICT BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE

Abstract. I interpret several key events in the history of the relationship between Christianity and science and conclude that there is no reason for assuming a fundamental conflict between science and religion. Christian theologians should feel confident in using the science of our day to retell the story of God's creation of the world.     

Explanation versus accommodation: Reply to Bowers (2010)

Bowers (2010) presented a critique of the account of masked priming presented by Norris and Kinoshita (2008) based on the Bayesian Reader model of visual word recognition (Norris, 2006). In this reply, we point out that: (1) Bowers' criticisms are based on his misunderstanding of both the Bayesian or ideal-observer approach, and the theoretical claims made in Norris and Kinoshita, and (2) Bowers' alternative account of the key data presented in Norris and Kinoshita relies on a series of ad hoc assumptions that are combined in different proportions to postdict any pattern of data.     

Models and mechanisms in network neuroscience

This paper considers the way mathematical and computational models are used in network neuroscience to deliver mechanistic explanations. Two case studies are considered: Recent work on klinotaxis by Caenorhabditis elegans, and a long-standing research effort on the network basis of schizophrenia in humans. These case studies illustrate the various ways in which network, simulation, and dynamical models contribute to the aim of representing and understanding network mechanisms in the brain, and thus, of delivering mechanistic explanations. After outlining this mechanistic construal of network neuroscience, two concerns are addressed. In response to the concern that functional network models are nonexplanatory, it is argued that functional network models are in fact explanatory mechanism sketches. In response to the concern that models which emphasize a network’s organization over its composition do not explain mechanistically, it is argued that this emphasis is both appropriate and consistent with the principles of mechanistic explanation. What emerges is an improved understanding of the ways in which mathematical and computational models are deployed in network neuroscience, as well as an improved conception of mechanistic explanation in general.     

The challenge of characterizing operations in the mechanisms underlying behavior

Neuroscience and cognitive science seek to explain behavioral regularities in terms of underlying mechanisms. An important element of a mechanistic explanation is a characterization of the operations of the parts of the mechanism. The challenge in characterizing such operations is illustrated by an example from the history of physiological chemistry in which some investigators tried to characterize the internal operations in the same terms as the overall physiological system while others appealed to elemental chemistry. In order for biochemistry to become successful, researchers had to identify a new level of operations involving operations over molecular groups. Existing attempts at mechanistic explanation of behavior are in a situation comparable to earlier approaches to physiological chemistry, drawing their inspiration either from overall psychology activities or from low-level neural processes. Successful mechanistic explanations of behavior require the discovery of the appropriate component operations. Such discovery is a daunting challenge but one on which success will be beneficial to both behavioral scientists and cognitive and neuroscientists.     

HOLISTIC BIOLOGY: WHAT IT IS AND WHY IT MATTERS

Recent developments toward a more holistic biology do not eliminate reductionism and determinism, but they do suggest more complex forms of them, in which there are multiple, interacting influences, as there are in complex or chaotic systems. Though there is a place in biology for both systemic and atomistic modes of explanation, for those with a theological perspective the shift to complex explanations in biology is often welcome. It suggests a more subtle view of divine action in which God's purposes are affected through engagement with the complex systems of creation rather than by discrete interventions. It also invites us to connect the biological interdependence with the interdependence in the nature and purposes of God, and it is consonant with a mystical vision of the unity of all things.