Managing Old Age: The Disciplinary Web of Power, Surveillance and Normalization

Health and welfare have emerged as key vehicles used to legitimize and position the identities that older people adopt in contemporary western societies. Both health and welfare contain specific yet continually changing technologies that function to mediate relations between older people and the state. Medico-technical and care management discourses have been presented as adding choice and reducing limitations associated with adult aging. However, they also represent an increase in professional control that can be exerted on lifestyles in older age and thus, the wider social meanings associated with that part of the lifecourse. This article presents a theoretical analysis based on a critical reading of the work of Michel Foucault; identifies the interrelationship between managers and older people in terms of power, surveillance and normalization; and highlights how and why older people remain the subjects of legitimizing professional gazes.     

Contingency, Education, and the Need for Reassurance

This short paper is a response to Richard Smith’s ‘Abstraction and finitude: education, chance and democracy’. In his paper Smith contends that a rationalist agenda dominates education and democracy today, and that this agenda by rendering us insensitive to the tragic dimension of life, breeds a sense of hubris, or arrogance towards fate which is fuelled by an inordinate confidence in our knowledge. In the worlds of education and politics it has led to an obsession with management and transparency, and to students who fear to take risks. As a specific example of this, he takes up the recent fixation in universities with learning how to learn, which he says leads to an over-emphasis on skills in the curriculum, and to an ‘audit’ culture. While sympathising with much of his analysis of the latter, my counter-suggestion is that the contemporary world lacks anything but a sense of the contingency of things, to the contrary, that at the heart of its mangerialist culture and its performatist ethos lies the need for reassurance. My response focuses on the politics of the self-directed learner that lies at the heart of the lifelong learning literature, on learning how to learn, on the notion of transparency and on the transparent society, and on the politics of contingency and scepticism. Prof. Kenneth Wain teaches philosophy of education and courses in ethics and political philosophy at the University of Malta, where he is also involved in teacher education. Last year (2004) he published his most recent book The Learning Society in a Postmodern World with Peter Lang (New York). His earlier books were Philosophy of Lifelong Education (1987) Croom Helm (London), The Maltese National Curriculum: a critical Evaluation (1991) Mireva (Malta) Theories of Teaching (1992) Mireva (Malta) The Value Crisis: an Introduction to Ethics (1995) University of Malta Press. He has also published several articles in international refereed journals.     

Empowering Academics the Viskerian Way

Abstract

Academics and/or scholars increasingly feel that their academic voice (combined or individual) has been squelched by the demands of performativity in its various guises, and resultantly, that they have been caught up in a process of steady disempowerment. Rather, it should be their right to be free to use their positions in the pursuit of scholarship as their conscience and their expert knowledge of their subject dictate. Academics should be free to question for themselves the boundaries of their limitations, and not have these imposed on them by the state or government bureaucracy. In order to help empower academics to regain their academic voice and identity, this article transposes six of the philosophical ideas of Belgian philosopher Rudi Visker to the world of academia. It explores the possibilities of using these ideas as instruments for the promotion and maintenance of academic freedom.     

The ethics of creative accounting

Creative accounting, which generally involves the preparation of financial statements with the intention of misleading readers of those statements, is prima facie a form oflying, as defined by Bok.¹ This paper starts by defining and illustrating creative accounting. It examines and rejects the arguments for considering creative accounting, in spite of its deceptive intent, as not being a form of lying. It then examines the ethical issues raised by creative accounting, in the light of the literature on the ethics of lying. This literature includes the evaluation of various excuses and justifications for lying, and these are examined here in relation to creative accounting. It is concluded that even in circumstances in which creative accounting would arguably serve a worthy purpose, that purpose would be at least as well served by honest communication.