EPISTEMIC MALEVOLENCE

Abstract: Against the background of a great deal of structural symmetry between intellectual and moral virtue and vice, it is a surprising fact that what is arguably the central or paradigm moral vice—that is, moral malevolence or malevolence proper—has no obvious or well-known counterpart among the intellectual vices. The notion of "epistemic malevolence" makes no appearance on any standard list of intellectual vices; nor is it central to our ordinary ways of thinking about intellectual vice. In this essay, I argue that there is such a thing as epistemic malevolence and offer an account of its basic character and structure. Doing so requires a good deal of attention to malevolence simpliciter . In the final section of the essay, I offer an explanation of our relative unfamiliarity with this trait.     

Hume's Theory of Pity and Malice

This article describes, and proposes a solution to, an interpretive conundrum at the heart of Hume's theory of the passions. Hume tells us explicitly that pity and malice are indirect passions. But there is strong textual evidence suggesting that Hume takes pity and malice to be direct passions. Indeed, some of this evidence points to (1) the identification of pity with a kind of grief and malice with a kind of joy, while the rest of the evidence points to (2) the identification of pity and malice with different combinations of desire and aversion. Here, I argue that option (1) is the one that Hume would have chosen upon careful reflection.