Doing history that matters: Going public and activating voices as a form of historical activism

For many of us academics, doing community‐engaged research means coming to terms with the significant gaps in experience, privilege, and power, and overall access to knowledge. We are trained to learn through texts, not through direct experience. In some ways, we are even conditioned to tune out experience, or anecdote, to dilute personal subjectivities in favor of a critical analysis informed by a combination of methods and sources, and a reliance on text‐based forms of evidence. Whereas for most community members, evidence is experiential. This dynamic also underscores the tremendous power and responsibility we have as historians to shape identities and legacies through the stories we tell. In the end, I believe the risks are worth the rewards.     

Madhouse and the whole thing there

This article presents an autoethnography in the form of a short story of the experiences of a mental breakdown, and subsequent involuntary detainment, alongside the experiences of conducting PhD research outside the mainstream of the discipline of psychology. In response to criticisms of narrative approaches that they are methodologically solipsistic and present a socially atomised self, this narrative combines patient medical records with narrative recollections and reflections on the research process from a contemporary perspective. In doing so, the narrative explores and interrogates themes relevant to creative practice in psychological research, including the notion of authenticity, methodological issues of researching personal experience, the problem of subjectivity and, ultimately, the nature of madness and psychological distress, including its nonlinearity and otherness.     

Life Experience Is Not a Disease or Why Medicalizing Madness Is Counterproductive to Recovery

Abstract

The author draws on her personal experience as the family member of an individual with mental illness, on her anthropological research and on that of others to argue that medicalizing madness can be counterproductive to recovery. The medical model is sometimes used in a way that strips away the meaning of the illness experience. Analogies drawn to diseases do not help the understanding of mental illness. Psychiatry is a social practice embedded in a social milieu and that renders it less than objective. It is useful to recognize that the experiences called symptoms have meaning and may have positive and pleasurable aspects.     

TWO PSYCHOTIC PLAYWRIGHTS AT WORK: THE LATE PLAYS OF AUGUST STRINDBERG AND TENNESSEE WILLIAMS

August Strindberg and Tennessee Williams both became severely deranged during their playwriting careers. Both emerged from the most intense form of their derangement and wrote plays afterward. Strindberg, however, wrote his greatest plays after his psychosis; Williams, before his. Strindberg's psychosis spurred his creativity; that of Williams severely damaged his. This paper proposes that Strindberg mastered his psychosis and that in his late plays he dramatically symbolized psychotic processes. Williams, on the other hand, could neither access nor master his, and his late plays embody the repeated, unsymbolized acting out of his psychosis within an aesthetic context. These differences between the two playwrights become clear not through analysis of dramatic characters, but through changes that each playwright made to the dramatic medium itself.     

That Way Madness Lies: At the Intersection of Philosophy and Clinical Psychology

Abstract: I argue that philosophical practice is a clinically active and influential endeavor, with both positive (therapeutic) and negative (detrimental) psychological possibilities. Though some have explicitly taken the clinical aspects of philosophy into the therapeutic realm via the new field of philosophical counseling, I am interested in the clinical context of philosophers as philosophers, engaged in standard, philosophical pursuits. In arguing for the clinical implications of philosophical practice I consider the relation between philosophical despair and depression, the cognitive etiology of depression and other clinical disorders, selected DSM‐IV entries, attribution theory, and cognitive therapy.     

Dark clouds

This essay is in part a response to a cluster of papers from the conference in Norway. Utilising these as a springboard to expand certain ideas, some latent, some more manifest in the papers, regarding the history and the terrain concerning the mental health issues in our culture. Fundamentally, this proposes that there is an unrelenting tension between two polarities: one reactionary and authoritarian, fixated on a concern with outcomes, propped up by closed systems of thought, managerial, habitually linked to adaptation and conformity; the other more romantically seen as revolutionary, unhandcuffing madness from mental illness, facilitating more expansive, freewheeling possibilities within all our lives. Much of this pays tribute to some of the major figures in the history of ‘anti-psychiatry’ (Basaglia, Cooper and Laing), with the costs involved, and goes on to trace out the genesis and consequences of the two predominant ‘clouds’ permeating our world, the paranoid and the digital … all converging on a naturalisation of our culture of surveillance, and an insistence on control. Otherwise known as a culture of fear.     

Through a glass darkly Some reflections on psychiatric nursing

Abstract

This paper is about ways of understanding some of the behaviour and events that occur in psychiatric wards. It is argued that a psychodynamic understanding of these events would help both staff and patients see some ‘meaning in madness’.     

Sanity and madness

The author sets out a schema with some underlying principles aimed at illuminating the nature of madness, how it sabotages our freedom and the deepest reasons why patients want to be sane. He claims that this is not possible without revising Freud's pleasure principle and determinism and replacing it with desire for freedom as the dominant motivating principle.     

TERMINATION OF A FE/MALE TRANSSEXUAL PATIENT'S ANALYSIS: AN EXAMPLE OF GENERAL VALIDITY

The author describes the termination of an analysis, which, while relating to the particular case of a male-to-female transsexual patient, may be relevant to all analysts, particularly those whose patients need to integrate disavowed and split-off parts of themselves. The patient had undergone sex-change surgery at the age of 20. Having lived as a woman thereafter, she had asked for analysis some twenty years later. The author, who discussed the first three years of that analysis in an earlier paper, as well as her hesitation about undertaking it, considers that its termination after seven years illustrates not only the specific problems posed by transsexuals but also the general ones presented by 'heterogeneous patients'. To the best of her knowledge, this is the first published case history of a transsexual patient who has undergone surgery. In the author's view, the patient has acquired a new sense of internal unity based on a notion of sex differentiation in which mutual respect between the sexes has replaced confusion and mutual hate, and her quality of life has improved. On the general level, this termination shows how the reduction of paranoid-schizoid anxieties and the reintegration of split-off parts of the personality lead, as the depressive position is worked through, to a better toleration of internal contradictions, a new sense of cohesion of the self and a diminution of the fear of madness.