Who is Afraid of Figure of Speech?

Aristotle's illustrations of the fallacy of Figure of Speech (or Form of Expression) are none too convincing. They are tied to Aristotle's theory of categories and to peculiarities of Greek grammar that fail to hold appeal for a contemporary readership. Yet, upon closer inspection, Figure of Speech shows many points of contact with views and problems that inhabit 20th-century analytical philosophy. In the paper, some Aristotelian examples will be analyzed to gain a better understanding of this fallacy. The case of the Third Man argument and some modern cases lend plausibility to the claim that Figure of Speech is of more interest as a type of fallacy than has generally been assumed. Finally, a case is made for the view that Figure of Speech, though listed among the fallacies dependent upon language, is not properly classified as a fallacy of ambiguity. More likely, it should be looked upon as a type of non sequitur. This has important consequences for the profile of dialogue associated with this fallacy.     

Is monkey maternal abuse of offspring aggressive behavior?

This study was intended to probe the aggressive nature of monkey infant abuse by comparing the morphology of abusive behavior patterns with that of patterns allocated to both aggression and other categories of behavioral repertoires of macaques. This morphological analysis indicated that most abusive patterns should not be classified in the aggression category as they, at the motor end, differ greatly from macaque aggressive acts. In contrast, they perfectly resemble behaviors that monkeys usually display while manipulating inanimate objects. The implications of this finding for the pathogenic study of monkey infant abuse are discussed.     

The "Natural" and the "Formal"

The paper presents an argument against a metaphysical conception of logic according to which logic spells out a specific kind of mathematical structure that is somehow inherently related to our factual reasoning. In contrast, it is argued that it is always an empirical question as to whether a given mathematical structure really does captures a principle of reasoning. (More generally, it is argued that it is not meaningful to replace an empirical investigation of a thing by an investigation of its a priori analyzable structure without paying due attention to the question of whether it really is the structure of the thing in question.) It is proposed to elucidate the situation by distinguishing two essentially different realms with which our reason must deal: the realm of the natural, constituted by the things of our empirical world, and the realm of the formal, constituted by the structures that we use as prisms to view, to make sense of, and to reconstruct the world. It is suggested that this vantage point may throw light on many foundational problems of logic.     

Logical Pluralism from a Pragmatic Perspective

This paper presents a new view of logical pluralism. This pluralism takes into account how the logical connectives shift, depending on the context in which they occur. Using the Question-Under-Discussion Framework as formulated by Craige Roberts, I identify the contextual factor that is responsible for this shift. I then provide an account of the meanings of the logical connectives which can accommodate this factor. Finally, I suggest that this new pluralism has a certain Carnapian flavour. Questions about the meanings of the connectives or the best logic outside of a specified context are not legitimate questions.     

How young adults address their parents reflects their perception of parenting

A speaker's use of a title for the listener shows the speaker's deference to the listener. Previous studies suggested that the use of kinship terms in the family also shows deference to the listener. The present study focused on young adults' use of kinship terms for their parents to investigate whether their use of kinship terms reflects their perception of their parenting. The participants were 329 Japanese college students, who answered a questionnaire about their forms of address for their parents, perceived parental emotional accessibility, and perceived parental control. They also reported their satisfaction with their parent–child relationships and the frequency of parent–child communication. The results suggest that young adults who use kinship terms for their parents perceive their parents to be more emotionally accessible and communicate with their parents more than those who do not. Young adults who use kinship terms for their father are also more satisfied with their father–child relationships than those who do not. Young adults' use of kinship terms might signal not only their deference to their parents, but also their acceptance of their parent–child relationships.     

Color-object interference: Further tests of an executive control account

Young children are slower in naming the color of a meaningful picture than in naming the color of an abstract form (Stroop-like color-object interference). The current experiments tested an executive control account of this phenomenon. First, color-object interference was observed in 6- and 8-year-olds but not in 12- and 16-year-olds (Experiment 1). Second, meaningful pictures did not interfere in 5- to 7-year-olds’ manual sorting of objects on the basis of color (Experiment 2) or in their naming the number of colored objects in the display, that is, subitizing (Experiment 3). These findings provide support for the view that color-object interference results from the children’s immature inhibition of the prepotent but irrelevant task of object naming.     

视觉形状知觉在近似数量系统和计算流畅性关系中的作用

已有大量研究揭示了近似数量系统与计算流畅性的相关关系, 但缺少对二者关系原因的系统检验与论证。视觉形状知觉假设有别于传统的数量领域特异性解释, 认为对形状的快速知觉是近似数量系统与计算流畅性的共同认知机制, 即视觉形状的快速知觉能力可以解释二者之间的相关关系。近似数量系统和计算流畅性在加工过程中依赖对形状的快速知觉, 二者在加工过程中都涉及了复杂视觉刺激的快速处理。视觉形状知觉假设得到了一系列研究结果的支持, 但局限在视觉形状知觉与二者关系的探讨上, 视觉形状知觉在二者关系中作用的加工机制仍不清楚。未来研究需要结合多种研究方法和技术, 多角度深入探讨视觉形状知觉在二者关系中作用的认知与脑机制, 并将研究结果应用于数学课堂教学和计算困难的干预中。