The role of vulnerable environments in support for homegrown terrorism: Fieldwork using the 3N model

The 3N model of radicalization proposes that violent radicalization is the result of the contribution of needs, networks, and narratives. Although research has mainly been supportive of this perspective, a substantial amount of ground remains uncovered regarding the network component of the model. Within this framework, we examine why individuals living in certain social environments tend to harbor more positive attitudes toward homegrown terrorism than others. Building on prior research, we hypothesized that individuals living in social environments known to be vulnerable (vs. less vulnerable) are more likely to experience a sense of significance loss (i.e., lack of social integration, perceived conflicts between religious groups), find solace in religious social networks (i.e., mosques), and thus adhere to radical narratives (i.e., legitimization of terrorism). A study with 365 young Muslims from different cities in Spain (Almería, Barcelona, Ceuta, and Melilla)supported these predictions. Theoretical and practical implications for the study of violent extremism are discussed.     

Boko Haram in Retrospect

This article looks at the development of the Nigerian Islamic militant group Boko Haram from an historical perspective and attempts to locate Boko Haram within an historical pattern of dissent and factionalism in Northern Nigerian Islam. It argues that the nineteenth-century jihadist legacy of Uthman dan Fodio, and its rejection of things non-Islamic, accusations of bid?a and muwālāt and the invocation of takfīr, continues to appeal to the present-day generation of Muslims. Abubakar Mahmud Gumi, who viewed himself as a reformer in the tradition of dan Fodio, and his Wahhabi-inspired anti-Sufi views, and the activism of the Izala movement, which is an outgrowth of Gumi's religious and ideological views, have perpetuated the separatist tradition. From limited reliable data, the article goes on to construct the rise of Boko Haram (itself an outgrowth of the Izala movement) and its ideology from within the ranks of the Salafi-Wahhabi trends in Northern Nigeria, arguing that Boko Haram, with its militancy against things non-Islamic, is firmly rooted and best explained within the broader Northern Nigerian context of Islamic factionalism and absolutism fostered by a romanticized jihadist legacy and disillusionment arising from failed experiments with Salafi-Wahhabi idealism.