Rationality ideals and mentality

Mackenzie, this journal, this issue, convincingly shows that in certain dialogue games (commitment games) there are procedural restrictions similar to those that I impose on rationality idealizations. But, whereas my rationality analysis is set in the context of belief games, commitment games do not postulate beliefs. Is this significant? I suggest that mackenzie thinks that it is. There follow discussions of Psychologism and Behaviourism.     

Subjects' inferential performance and the interaction of data and hypotheses in probabilistic inference tasks

In a recent paper, Knez (1991) showed an interaction of data and hypotheses in probabilistic inference tasks. The results illustrated two, earlier not obtained, significant main effects on subjects' hypothesis sampling , viz. the effect of different forms of data presentation and subjects' execution of cognitive control over their hypothesis pool throughout the series of trials. The present paper followed up these results in that the subjects' hypothesis testing , in Knez (1991) was subjected to an analysis. Hence, to see if the effects mentioned above significantly influenced the subjects' hypothesis testing, as they did for subjects' hypothesis sampling. The results showed a consistency with Knez (1991), i.e. the results emphasize the interaction of data and hypothesis in probabilistic inference tasks, as well as the subjects' execution of cognitive control over their hypothesis pool concerning both the subjects' hypothesis sampling and testing.     

Premissary relevance

Premissary relevance is a property of arguments understood as speech act complexes. It is explicable in terms of the idea of a premise's lending support to a conclusion. Premissary relevance is a function of premises belonging to a set which authoritatively warrants an inference to a conclusion. An authoritative inference warrant will have associated with it a conditional proposition which is true— that is to say, which can be justified. The study of the Aristotelian doctrine of topoi or argument schemes may contribute to the task of identifying authoritative warrants.     

The pragmatic aspects of linguistic negation: Speech act,argumentation and pragmatic inference

This paper is an attempt to give a general explanation of pragmatic aspects of linguistic negation. After a brief survey of classical accounts of negation within pragmatic theories (as speech act theory, argumentation theory and polyphonic theory), the main pragmatic uses of negation (illocutionary negation, external negation, lowering and majoring negation) are discussed within relevance theory. The question of the relevance of negative utterance is raised, and a general inferential schema (based on the so-called invited inference) is proposed and tested for the main uses of negation discussed in the paper.Translated from French by Anne Reboul and Lyne DaSylva.     

语义联系类型和强度对预期推理生成的制约作用

首先采用开放式问卷实验方法,由被试生成日常生活中的事件以及组成这些事件的各种活动和活动的参加者。然后,对这些事件熟悉性、对活动的典型性和可区分性三个维度进行主观评价,形成事件以及每个事件活动序列,并据此编制实验材料。实验主要考察活动的典型性和可区分性对于熟悉性高的事件的预期推理的影响,以及不同工作记忆能力的被试进行事件预期推理时的加工模式。实验结果表明：（１）高工艺记忆能力的被试对事件的预期量小于     

阅读理解中的预期推理

从工作记忆能力的个体差异的角度,探讨阅读描述日常生活事件的段落时预期推理过程的资源分配特点,及其与阅读焦点转移的关系。结果表明,（１）预期推理可以维持较长时间。（２）工作记忆能力强的被试进行预期推理的范围较广;而工作记忆能力较弱的被试推理范围较小。（３）工作记忆能力较弱者对每一个项目的激活量较大。（４）对于非常熟悉的事件,预期推理不受焦点转移的影响。     

Spontaneous goal versus spontaneous trait inferences: How ideology shapes attributions and explanations

Past research documented liberals’ greater tendency than conservatives to take situational determinants of others’ actions into account when forming causal attributions, and conservatives’ greater tendency to seek consistency. We hypothesize that liberals (vs. conservatives) should be more likely to make spontaneous goal inferences (SGIs). Conservatives, however, should tend to implicitly infer invariant rather than variant characteristics from others’ behaviors, drawing spontaneous trait inferences (STIs) rather than SGIs. Experiment 1 and 2 supported those hypotheses by illustrating differences in the type of implicit inferences formed by liberals and conservatives in a false recognition paradigm common to the STI literature. Experiment 3 revealed similar differences in conservatives’ and liberals’ goal and trait inferences when making open-ended causal explanations for others’ actions.     

Children's predictions of consistency in people's actions

Past research suggests that young children are often reluctant to generalize about people's behavior. Three experiments involving 102 4-5-year-olds, 84 7-8-year-olds, and 107 adults explored the conditions under which inductive inferences about people are made. There was an age-based increase in propensity to predict consistency in psychological/intentional causal relations. Children often predicted change; people would behave differently in the future than they did in the past. Younger children limited predictions of consistency to non-psychological contexts. Older children showed some appreciation of stable motivations (e.g. traits, preferences). The results are consistent with the hypothesis that children's theories of mind emphasize situational influences, with personal influences appearing in middle-childhood.     

Entailment with Near Surety of Scaled Assertions of High Conditional Probability

An assertion of high conditional probability or, more briefly, an HCP assertion is a statement of the type: The conditional probability of B given A is close to one. The goal of this paper is to construct logics of HCP assertions whose conclusions are highly likely to be correct rather than certain to be correct. Such logics would allow useful conclusions to be drawn when the premises are not strong enough to allow conclusions to be reached with certainty. This goal is achieved by taking Adams" (1966) logic, changing its intended application from conditionals to HCP assertions, and then weakening its criterion for entailment. According to the weakened entailment criterion, called the Criterion of Near Surety and which may be loosely interpreted as a Bayesian criterion, a conclusion is entailed if and only if nearly every model of the premises is a model of the conclusion. The resulting logic, called NSL, is nonmonotonic. Entailment in this logic, although not as strict as entailment in Adams" logic, is more strict than entailment in the propositional logic of material conditionals. Next, NSL was modified by requiring that each HCP assertion be scaled; this means that to each HCP assertion was associated a bound on the deviation from 1 of the conditional probability that is the subject of the assertion. Scaling of HCP assertions is useful for breaking entailment deadlocks. For example, it it is known that the conditional probabilities of C given A and of ¬ C given B are both close to one but the bound on the former"s deviation from 1 is much smaller than the latter"s, then it may be concluded that in all likelihood the conditional probability of C given A B is close to one. The resulting logic, called NSL-S, is also nonmonotonic. Despite great differences in their definitions of entailment, entailment in NSL is equivalent to Lehmann and Magidor"s rational closure and, disregarding minor differences concerning which premise sets are considered consistent, entailment in NSL-S is equivalent to entailment in Goldszmidt and Pearl"s System-Z ⁺. Bacchus, Grove, Halpern, and Koller proposed two methods of developing a predicate calculus based on the Criterion of Near Surety. In their random-structures method, which assumed a prior distribution similar to that of NSL, it appears possible to define an entailment relation equivalent to that of NSL. In their random-worlds method, which assumed a prior distribution dramatically different from that of NSL, it is known that the entailment relation is different from that of NSL.