Projection,Introjection, and Projective Identification: A Reformulation

In this essay, the author recommends a reformulation of the psychoanalytic concept of pojection. The author proposes that projective processes are not merely defensive maneuvers that interfere with perception, but rather an essential means by which human perception is rendered possible. It is the manner in which human beings test and-evaluate reality in terms of their experiential structure, and their needs for survival and nourishment. Projection is the early phase of introjection.     

A dialogue of unconsciouses. A contribution to the panel 'Jung and Ferenczi--the emergent conversation'

I want to explore the notion of 'mutual introjection, the developmental essence of an autobiographical dialogue', an idea that has recently crystallized in the continuing collaborative work of Gershon J. Molad of Israel and myself concerning the autobiographical contribution to the dialogue between analysis (Molad & Vida 2002). One of the sources of this crystallization is the experience of my consultative relationship with a Jungian colleague, who, after reading some of this collaborative work, paraphrased Jung's implication that if, in the course of treatment, the doctor is not as transformed as the patient, nothing has happened (1946). In this paper, I want to breathe some life into these theoretical-sounding words: 'mutual introjection, the developmental essence of an autobiographical dialogue'.     

Mirroring,imitation, identification: the sense of self in relation to the mother's internal world

The phenomenon of neonatal imitation, and the use of mutual imitation by mother and baby in the service of attunement, are considered in relation to psychoanalytic theories of mirroring, imitation and identification. Material from infant observation and from the treatment of two children on the autistic spectrum is discussed in terms of the suggestion that developmental imitation implies a perceived position of balance between the external baby and the mother's supposed internal occupant. This is seen as making possible introjective identification and assimilation, with the enrichment of the sense of identity, in contrast to the kind of imitation involving mimicry, in which adhesive or projective identification may be operative.     

From pilot fish to analyst: Finding a path between symbiotic and autistic defences

This paper presents the clinical case of a patient with autistic features. One of the main difficulties in his treatment was the particular rapid rhythm of his projections, introjections and re‐projections that constrained the analyst's capacity for reverie and hindered the use of effective projective identification processes. These alternating defensive constellations lead either to an expelling autistic barrier or to an engulfing symbiotic fusion. Their combination can be seen as the expression of a defence against an unintegrated and undifferentiated early experience of self that was in this way kept at bay to prevent it from invading his whole personality. Maintaining the symbiotic link, in which I kept included by staying partially fused to what was being projected and using my analytic function in a reduced way, helped to relate to what was in the patient's inside. Leaving this symbiotic link let my interpretations appear to ‘force’ their way through the autistic barrier. Yet as the process developed they allowed to show the patient how he ejected me and what was happening in his inside, behind his autistic barrier. So I found myself on the one hand accepting the symbiotic immobilization and on the other hand interpreting in a way that seemed forced to the patient, because it implied a breaking of the symbiotic position. The inordinate speed of projections and introjections could thus be interrupted, creating a space for awareness, reflection and transformation, and allowed the emergence of a connection between the patient's inside and outside. In the course of treatment I realized that this kind of dual defence system has been described by the late Argentinian analyst José Bleger. He assumes the existence of an early “agglutinated nucleus” that is held together by a psychic structure he calls the “glischro‐caric” position, in which projective identification cannot take place because there is no self/object differentiation. I have considered the rapid and fugitive use of projection and re‐introjection I met in my patient to be a manifestation of the dual defence system Bleger describes. Although he does not specifically mention this particular vicissitude of operative defences he does give hints about a rhythm in the patients’ projections and introjections.     

Affect and the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis1

In connection with controversial IJP articles by Stern et al. and Fonagy on the interpretation of the repressed and the recovery of past memories, the author maintains that the affect that is inherent in positive transference is at the heart of therapeutic action. Points of view put forward in the controversy (based on neurobiological knowledge) are related to Freudian metapsychology, as well as to their precursors whose scope was necessarily limited by a lack of access to more recent scientific discoveries. The author demonstrates metapsychological elements of therapeutic action inherent in the intersubjective relationship, especially identification, manifested in introjection and empathy. He describes cognitive development as spontaneously blossoming from the affective nucleus, and he explains the neuroscientic bases of this step forward. The classic (interpretative) psychoanalytic method makes up the cognitive superstructure necessary for the organisation of the mind that has sprung from the affective substructure. As a primary factor in psychic change, interpretation is limited in effectiveness to pathologies arising from the verbal phase, related to explicit memories, with no effect in the pre‐verbal phase where implicit memories are to be found. Interpretation the method used to the exclusion of all others for a century is only partial; when used in isolation it does not meet the demands of modern broad‐spectrum psychoanalysis, as the clinical material presented illustrates.     

The rehabilitation of primary object relations in the first year of intensive therapy with a severely deprived child

The following is an account of the first year of a therapy carried out in the public sector of a child born at the beginning of 1990 in an eastern European country and brought up in a home for abandoned children until he was placed with Italian parents at the end of 1995. I shall describe the child's initial psychological state, vigorous, but desperate, and then go on to describe the course of the first year of therapy, focusing in particular on the sessions of the from period, in which, apart from the quality and intensity of his anxiety, his need to fie this anxiety by retracing the stages of his first object experiences is clear.     

Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok—the inner crypt

This article is an introduction to the central ideas of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok. The author locates their work in the history of psychoanalytic thought. The Abraham and Torok thinking on trauma, symbol versus anasemia, introjection versus incorporation, endocryptic identification as well as woman's penis envy, are described as theoretical axes around the focal point constituted by the authors' specific concept of introjection; seen as the human mode of appropriation of the external world, which is crucial to the expansion of the ego through symbolization.     

THE PATIENT'S OBJECTS IN THE ANALYST'S MIND

In every analysis, the analyst develops an internal relationship with the patient's objects—that is, the people in the patient's life and mind. Sometimes these figures can inhabit the analyst's mind as a source of data, but at other times, the analyst may feel preoccupied with or even invaded by them. The author presents two clinical cases: one in which the seeming absence of a good object in the patient's mind made the analyst hesitate to proceed with an analysis, and another in which the patient's preoccupation with a “bad” object was shared and mirrored by the analyst's own inner preoccupation with the object. The use and experience of these two objects by the analyst are discussed with particular attention to the countertransference.