Existence and the existential quantifier

This paper draws a distinction between the existential quantifier and the symbol ‘∃’ used to express it, on the one hand, and existence and ‘exists’, on the other. It argues that some popular arguments in metaphysics, including arguments against vague existence and arguments against deflationary metaontology (which views ontological disputes as lacking substance), are guilty of fudging this distinction. The paper draws some lessons for metaphysical debate about existence and highlights some heretofore ignored and attractive positions in logical space.     

Rules of Existential Quantification into "Intensional Contexts"

Propositional and notional attitudes are construed as relations (-in-intension) between individuals and constructions (rather than propositrions etc,). The apparatus of transparent intensional logic (Tichy) is applied to derive two rules that make it possible to export existential quantifiers without conceiving attitudes as relations to expressions (sententialism).     

The Logic of Instance Ontology

An ontology's theory of ontic predication has implications for the concomitant predicate logic. Remarkable in its analytic power for both ontology and logic is the here developed Particularized Predicate Logic (PPL), the logic inherent in the realist version of the doctrine of unit or individuated predicates. PPL, as axiomatized and proven consistent below, is a three-sorted impredicative intensional logic with identity, having variables ranging over individuals x, intensions R, and instances of intensions Ri. The power of PPL is illustrated by its clarification of the self-referential nature of impredicative definitions and its distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate forms. With a well-motivated refinement on the axiom of comprehension, PPL is, in effect, a higher-order logic without a forced stratification of predicates into types or the use of other ad hoc restrictions. The Russell–Priest characterization of the classic self-referential paradoxes is used to show how PPL diagnosis and solves these antimonies. A direct application of PPL is made to Grelling's Paradox. Also shown is how PPL can distinguish between identity and indiscernibility.     

Quantitative Anatomy: Power Beyond the Images

Positron emission tomography (PET) is a frontiermedical technology that, in contrast to the othercomputer-assisted technologies providing anatomicalpictures, produces functional images. I argue that PETalso opens up an avenue for shifting from images (asa tool for representation of biomedical data) back toanalysis of measurements (as a tool for quantificationof physiology). Admittedly, quantification of functionrequires structural constraints. I coined the emerginginterpretational framework quantitative anatomyin an attempt to conceptualize the PET merger betweenmeasuring and imaging, the two competing meansmedicine uses to examine the human body. Anatomyjustifies interpretations that fit the existingknowledge of a larger clinical audience, whilestatistical data possess an unexplored potential tointroduce mathematical rigor in the evaluation offunction, but are still a black box for the majorityof clinicians. This epistemological change is beingcarried out by PET users in action as well as indiscourse.     

空间量化的心理表征

空间量化(spacial quantification)是空间知觉的基础, 是对特定空间性质的表达。离散量(discrete magnitude)与连续量(continuous quantity)分别反映了空间分立和连续的性质, 二者有着相似的行为效应, 在神经表达上也有部分重叠, 这些证据暗示了二者可能有共同的表征机制——模拟表征(analog magnitude representation)。数量空间映射(number–space mappings)提供了数量与空间关系的直接证据。但空间量化的研究中还有许多未解之谜, 如：空间量化的动态表征、量化机制的普遍性、参照点问题、复杂和多维空间的量化等。在具身认知(embodied cognition)的框架下, 空间量化的心理表征研究将对空间的性质做出更深刻的回答。     

认知储备的测量及其在认知老化中的应用

认知储备是指个体自适应利用神经网络对不断增加的脑损伤进行补偿的能力, 它能显著影响个体的生理功能、认知功能和行为结果。当前有关认知储备的研究主要集中在认知储备的测量及其在认知老化研究中的应用方面。现有研究尽管已在认知储备的测量及其与认知老化的关系上取得越来越多的共识, 但在诸如认知储备测量的标准化、认知储备与认知衰退率、认知储备与脑病理的关系等问题上还存在较大争议。未来研究除应进一步标准化对认知储备的测量, 进而探讨认知储备的病理机制, 还应关注认知储备对老化的干预研究。     

Modality,Quantification, and Many Vlach-Operators

Consider two standard quantified modal languages \(\textbf{\textsf{A}}\) and \(\textbf{\textsf{P}}\) whose vocabularies comprise the identity predicate and the existence predicate, each endowed with a standard S5 Kripke semantics where the models have a distinguished actual world, which differ only in that the quantifiers of \(\textbf{\textsf{A}}\) are actualist while those of \(\textbf{\textsf{P}}\) are possibilist. Is it possible to enrich these languages in the same manner, in a non-trivial way, so that the two resulting languages are equally expressive—i.e., so that for each sentence of one language there is a sentence of the other language such that given any model, the former sentence is true at the actual world of the model iff the latter is? Forbes (1989) shows that this can be done by adding to both languages a pair of sentential operators called Vlach-operators, and imposing a syntactic restriction on their occurrences in formulas. As Forbes himself recognizes, this restriction is somewhat artificial. The first result I establish in this paper is that one gets sameness of expressivity by introducing infinitely many distinct pairs of indexed Vlach-operators. I then study the effect of adding to our enriched modal languages a rigid actuality operator. Finally, I discuss another means of enriching both languages which makes them expressively equivalent, one that exploits devices introduced in Peacocke (1978). Forbes himself mentions that option but does not prove that the resulting languages are equally expressive. I do, and I also compare the Peacockian and the Vlachian methods. In due course, I introduce an alternative notion of expressivity and I compare the Peacockian and the Vlachian languages in terms of that other notion.     

Approximate quantification in young,healthy older adults’, and Alzheimer patients

Forty young adults, 40 healthy older adults, and 39 probable AD patients were asked to estimate small (e.g., 25) and large (e.g., 60) collections of dots in a choice condition and in two no-choice conditions. Participants could choose between benchmark and anchoring strategies on each collection of dots in the choice condition and were required to use either benchmark or anchoring on all configurations in the no-choice conditions (one per strategy). The benchmark strategy involves visual estimation processes whereas the anchoring strategy involves both enumeration and estimation processes. Results showed that strategy use was influenced by collection, participant, and strategy characteristics. Age-related and dementia-related differences were found in both strategy use and strategy execution. The findings have implications for our understanding of aging effects in approximate quantification, strategic variations in Alzheimer’s patients, and sources of cognitive decline during early stages of Alzheimer’s disease.