Kant on the Inapplicability of the Categories to Things in Themselves

This paper addresses the question of what we can legitimately say about things in themselves in Kant's critical doctrine. Many Kant scholars believe that Kant allows that things in themselves can be characterized through the unschematized or ‘pure’ concepts of our understanding such as ‘substance’ or ‘causality’. However, I show that on Kant's view things in themselves do not conform to the unschematized categories (given their standard discursive meaning): the pure categories, like space and time, are merely subjective forms of finite, discursive cognition. I then examine what this interpretation might entail for central aspects of Kant's system such as his doctrine of noumenal freedom.     

Opening up Openness to Experience: A Four‐Factor Model and Relations to Creative Achievement in the Arts and Sciences

Openness to experience is the broadest personality domain of the Big Five, including a mix of traits relating to intellectual curiosity, intellectual interests, perceived intelligence, imagination, creativity, artistic and aesthetic interests, emotional and fantasy richness, and unconventionality. Likewise, creative achievement is a broad construct, comprising creativity across the arts and sciences. The aim of this study was to clarify the relationship between openness to experience and creative achievement. Toward this aim, I factor analyzed a battery of tests of cognitive ability, working memory, Intellect, Openness, affect, and intuition among a sample of English Sixth Form students (N = 146). Four factors were revealed: explicit cognitive ability, intellectual engagement, affective engagement, and aesthetic engagement. In line with dual‐process theory, each of these four factors showed differential relations with personality, impulsivity, and creative achievement. Affective engagement and aesthetic engagement were associated with creative achievement in the arts, whereas explicit cognitive ability and intellectual engagement were associated with creative achievement in the sciences. The results suggest that the Intellectual and Openness aspects of the broader openness to experience personality domain are related to different modes of information processing and predict different forms of creative achievement.     

论柏格森对现代新儒学思潮的影响

20世纪20年代,柏格森哲学曾在中国思想界人为流行,此时也恰好是现代新儒学思潮开始萌芽和兴起的时候,梁漱溟和熊十力均受到了柏格森思想的深刻影响。梁漱溟试图融合佛教唯识学和柏格森生命哲学的观点,用以阐释和发挥儒家“生”之哲学的精义,以重建儒家的理想人格。熊十力则通过反省和比照柏格森哲学的生命观与自然观,提出了他对于生命本体的独特看法,从而创立“翕辟成变”的大化流行论和“默识证会”的直觉说。     

Why the view of intellect in De Anima I 4 is not Aristotle’s own

In De Anima I 4, Aristotle describes the intellect (nous) as a sort of substance, separate and incorruptible. Myles Burnyeat and Lloyd Gerson take this as proof that, for Aristotle, the intellect is a separate eternal entity, not a power belonging to individual humans. Against this reading, I show that this passage does not express Aristotle’s own views, but dialectically examines a reputable position (endoxon) about the intellect that seems to show that it can be subject to change. The passage’s argument for the indestructibility of intellect via an analogy to perception does not fit with Aristotle’s own views. Aristotle thinks that perception operates via bodily organs, but denies this of understanding. He also requires separability from the body for indestructibility, something this analogy rules out. However, Aristotle’s Platonist interlocutors may well endorse such an argument. My dialectical interpretation best resolves the interpretative difficulties and explains its place in the larger context, Aristotle’s discussion of Platonist views on the soul. Aristotle presents a challenge to his insistence that the soul is subject to change, dialectically resolves that challenge, and then ends by reserving the right to give a different account of the intellect.     

Jung's Erotic Phenomenology: I. A New Translation

In the introduction to The Psychology of the Transference (1946), Carl Jung sketched out a theory of “erotic phenomenology” which condenses his teaching about sexuality and romantic love into a very concise summary. But the meaning of this passage is obscured in the English translation given in the Collected Works of C. G. Jung. I propose here a new translation which makes Jung’s meaning clearer, along with a commentary which explains it in the context of Freudian drive theory and German 19^th century philosophy. Invoking the concepts of instinct, mind, and Eros (both the passion and the divine figure), Jung’s theory says that male sexual desire can be cultivated or repressed in four distinct ways, each associated with a female symbolic figure or anima image: Eve, Helen, Mary and Sophia.     

The orientation of evolution and the intellect

Prediction has been central in the development of both science and society. Chaos theory, however, has given rise to the widespread belief that in all but the most stable situations prediction of the future is impossible. But this belief is contradicted by theory and findings over many years of the psychology of prediction as well as by the findings of the new field of chaos psychology and the experience of entrepreneurs in business and political leaders. At stake is a belief central to an enormous body of “law” in all scientific fields as well as to business, political, and governmental managers and leaders concerned with governance of economic and political systems in a time of global social chaos. At its core, the problem is a critical one for the development of a General Evolution Theory that can span the findings of natural science and social science to find “laws” consonant with systems requirements at both pre‐human and human evolutionary levels. This paper analyzes the problem in terms of chaos theoretical views of the limits of predictability, evidence from the fields of psychology and brain research of human predictive abilities that transcend these limits, and the practical consequence of a resolution of this conflict for science and society.     

Facing the third millennium: An evolutionary crisis

We are witnessing the birth of the first global civilization on our planet earth due to the accelerative progress of science and technology. This is also accompanied by a crisis in health care, pollution and other environmental disasters, a rising wave of violence and crime, stresses due to globalization, and so on. Recently, we formulated “An Action Plan for Human Survival” (Reference 24).

This article explores in depth the challenges in bringing about a peaceful transition to a global civilization. It explores global civilization, environmental crisis and population. It reveals that the stresses generated by globalization and environmental crisis cannot be resolved by dualistic thought, or concepts, or ideals, or intellectual constructions; as these are sterile in bringing mutation in the human psyche. We see that the emergence of global consciousness is not keeping pace with the globalization, and it is feared that globalization may turn out to be abortive and ultimately self‐destructive.

The crisis is not political, or economic, or social. It is evolutionary in character. We have to explore nature's evolutionary impulse. The challenge is to resolve the “crisis of perception,” or to allow the mutation to happen in the mind‐brain system. The only technology for radical transformation or mutation of human psyche is purification or deconditioning of the human psyche. This leads to new relationship between man and man, and between man and environment. It ends all pain, sorrow and travails and ushers a new era of freedom, peace and bliss. This is the key to human survival, progress and fulfillment.     

理智德性辨

亚里士多德将灵魂的理性部分分为两个部分,一是科学的部分,一是计算的部分.灵魂的科学的部分是关于不变对象的,形成的是普遍的理论知识,亦即intellect.灵魂的计算部分是关于可变对象的,它主要是实践智慧,亦即intelligence.Intellect与intelligence有着种类的差异,不能混为一谈.但是,近现代认识论流行的教条却忽视两者的差别,正是在理智主义的传奇的影响下,人们使用intellectual virtue翻译亚里士多德所谓的与灵魂的理性部分相对应的德性.理智主义的传奇反映在伦理学中,表现为伦理学忽视实践智慧,道德被简化为理论活动.     

AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK FOR ISLAMIC COGNITIVE THEORIES

The Islamic psychology (IP) community in Europe has recently witnessed a heated debate about the credentials required to participate in the theoretical substantiation of IP and Islamically integrated psychotherapy and counseling. This debate has provided convenient circumstances for Muslim psychologists and Islamic scholars alike to rethink their roles within the flourishing movement. Specifically, the discussions hint toward the importance of adopting a collaborative research methodology for IP, in particular for basic research. The methodology of choice will need to define the necessary qualifications and responsibilities of scholars and psychologists in a collaborative research process (personal collaboration) and evince its capability to appropriately marry knowledge and data, diverging research methods, and perspectives, concepts, and theories from Islamic studies and contemporary psychology (content‐related collaboration). Here, we devise and offer a case illustration of an Islamic Psychology Basic Research Framework (coined the SALAAM Framework). This framework uses the Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies (IIS) Model of Interdisciplinary Research, developed by the IIS at the University of Amsterdam. Our first aim is to appropriate the IIS model for the IP literature by applying the model's research process phases and technique for the integration of disparate bodies of knowledge—that is, the identification of common ground—to methodological approaches in the contemporary IP literature. Our second aim is to exemplify the devised SALAAM Framework using the relatively unexplored area of Islamic cognitive theories (ICTs), which remain underdeveloped in contemporary psychological literature, primarily because of a lack of commensurability with the nomenclature of contemporary psychology. We thus provide a primer on the potential scope of ICTs. Toward the end of this article, we discuss the potential of the project of interdisciplinary construction of Islamic psychological theory, and the ability of the SALAAM Framework to establish a research program in IP that centers on cognition. We finally offer our reflections on the distinctiveness of Islamic psychologies in comparison to mainstream and Christian psychology.     

Pomponazzi Contra Averroes on the Intellect

This paper examines Pomponazzi's arguments against Averroes in his De Immortalitate Animae, focusing on the question whether thought is possible without a body. The first part of the paper will sketch the history of the problem, namely the interpretation of Aristotle's remarks about the intellect in De Anima 3.4-5, touching on Alexander, Themistius, and Averroes. The second part will focus on Pomponazzi's response to Averroes, including his use of arguments by Aquinas. It will conclude by suggesting that Pomponazzi's discussion stands as the first properly modern account of Aristotle's psychology.