Instance Is the Converse of Aspect

According to the aspect theory of instantiation, a particular A instantiates a universal B if and only if an aspect of A is cross-count identical with an aspect of B. This involves the assumption that both particulars and universals have aspects, and that aspects can mediate between different ways of counting things. I will ask what is new about this account of instantiation and, more importantly, whether it is an improvement on its older relatives. It will turn out that the part of it that is new is the notion of cross-count identity among aspects. As I will show, this notion is both dubious and unnecessary. I will end by presenting a simplified aspect theory of instantiation that does not involve cross-count identity.     

LOGICAL ANALYSES OF VIPASSANĀ MEDITATION

ABSTRACT

In this paper we propose logical analyses of Vipassanā Meditation as modus ponens or universal instantiation, as based upon identification, analysis, and interpretation of the meditation as a (spiritual) thought experiment (STE like e.g. huàtóus and kōans in Chan and Zen).*

The analyses consist in completing the unfinished enthymematic argument of the Sutta-nipāta by explication of hidden major. We speculate the thought experiment inference might be brought about by a faculty like mindfulness. The thought experiment analyses link the meditation to global cross-cultural theories and arguments in philosophy as Ibn Sīnā’s Flying Man and, notably, René Descartes’s Cogito. Last, we will give some indications how Vipassanā Meditation may be explained with help of western theories of consciousness.     

Russell's Early Theory of Denoting

The ancient Greek method of analysis has a rational reconstruction in the form of the tableau method of logical proof. This reconstruction shows that the format of analysis was largely determined by the requirement that proofs could be formulated by reference to geometrical figures. In problematic analysis, it has to be assumed not only that the theorem to be proved is true, but also that it is known. This means using epistemic logic, where instantiations of variables are typically allowed only with respect to known objects. This requirement explains the preoccupation of Greek geometers with questions as to which geometrical objects are ‘given’, that is, known or ‘data’, as in the title of Euclid's eponymous book. In problematic analysis, constructions had to rely on objects that are known only hypothetically. This seems strange unless one relies on a robust idea of ‘unknown’ objects in the same sense as the unknowns of algebra. The Greeks did not have such a concept, which made their grasp of the analytic method shaky.     

Moral Philosophy and the Ontology of Relations

The essay undertakes to explore the possibilities of mutually fruitful dialogue between moral philosophy and ontology, in particular, the ontology of relations. The latter copes with the question of how relations relate, whereas moral philosophy often ignores the ontological implications of such crucial relations as love and interpersonality. The paper proceeds as follows. First, the ontology of relations is discussed. Second, various examples are analysed. From this, a conception of relation instantiation emerges, according to which to determine which relation actually obtains, one has to take into account (a) the context, (b) the specific content or meaning of the relation, and (c) some action or decision or mode of existence of the relata. This conception suggests that relation instantiation cannot be explained by a single formula. By the help of this conception, Hume's thesis of the identity of killing relations between human and nonhuman beings is questioned. Then, the relation of love is analysed. It is shown that love as a moral relation is perfectly explicable in terms of ontology. Moreover, its essence is best captured by the interrelation of the particulars, the relation of love as a universal, and by the relating action of the particulars. Finally, the alleged relation of universal fraternity (interpersonality as such), linking up each human being to all other human beings, is discussed.     

不同分类水平自然类概念的实例效应

采用Heit和Barsalou的实验范式,以不同分类水平的中文语义自然类概念为实验材料验证实例效应。研究包括2个实验,被试为180名全日制在校大学生。实验1为无修饰词概念的典型性研究．结果表明人们不仅在抽象的水平上表征概念,也在具体的实例水平上表征概念。实验2用不同分类水平的自然类概念检验了在更广泛的概念范围内的实例效应,结果表明,不同分类水平的下位概念和下位概念实例在上位概念中的平均典型性大多显著相关,而且下位概念的实例在不同分类水平上位概念中（如：动物、小动物）的变化趋势和下位概念在不同分类水平上位概念中的变化趋势一致。实验1和实验2的结果均支持了Heit和Barsalou提出的实例效应。     

Individual differences in logical intuitions on reasoning problems presented under two-response paradigm

ABSTRACT

Studies on individual differences in susceptibility to cognitive biases have identified several cognitive dispositions which were thought to predict reasoning by contributing to the efficiency of analytic thought. However, hybrid models suggest that differences between reasoners may arise already in the intuitive stages of the reasoning process. To address this possibility, we examined standard individual difference measures, mindware instantiation, and conflict detection efficiency as predictors of the accuracy on conflict problems presented under a two-response paradigm. We found that almost half of conflict reasoning problems were solved correctly already at the initial response stage and that the individual differences in initial reasoning performance were predicted by participants’ cognitive reflection, mindware instantiation, and detection efficiency. The findings advance the specification of hybrid dual-process models and provide corroborating evidence that a part of the link between bias susceptibility and cognitive dispositions is due to differences in intuitive processing.