Estimation of indifference points with an adjusting-delay procedure.

In a series of conditions, pigeons chose between 1.5 s and 3 s of access to grain, each preceded by some delay. The delay that preceded the small reinforcer was constant throughout a condition. The delay that preceded the large reinforcer was increased or decreased a number of times each session in order to estimate an "indifference point," a delay at which the subject chose each alternative about equally often. The experiment was designed to determine whether variations in any of four features of this adjusting-delay procedure would systematically alter the estimated indifference points. The four features were the total trial duration, the number of center-key responses necessary to begin a trial, the number of choice trials that preceded each change in the adjusting delay, and step size--the size of each increment and decrement in the delay. Manipulation of the first three features had no systematic effects on the indifference points. As step size was increased from 0.5 s to 6 s, within-session variability of the adjusting delay steadily increased, and the 6-s step size produced larger indifference-point estimates for some subjects. The results suggest that, within certain limits, these procedural features can be altered without affecting the indifference-point estimates, but that the use of a large step size can distort the estimates. Some theoretical implications of the relative constancy of indifference points across these procedural variations are discussed.     

Rationality ideals and mentality

Mackenzie, this journal, this issue, convincingly shows that in certain dialogue games (commitment games) there are procedural restrictions similar to those that I impose on rationality idealizations. But, whereas my rationality analysis is set in the context of belief games, commitment games do not postulate beliefs. Is this significant? I suggest that mackenzie thinks that it is. There follow discussions of Psychologism and Behaviourism.     

Subjects' inferential performance and the interaction of data and hypotheses in probabilistic inference tasks

In a recent paper, Knez (1991) showed an interaction of data and hypotheses in probabilistic inference tasks. The results illustrated two, earlier not obtained, significant main effects on subjects' hypothesis sampling , viz. the effect of different forms of data presentation and subjects' execution of cognitive control over their hypothesis pool throughout the series of trials. The present paper followed up these results in that the subjects' hypothesis testing , in Knez (1991) was subjected to an analysis. Hence, to see if the effects mentioned above significantly influenced the subjects' hypothesis testing, as they did for subjects' hypothesis sampling. The results showed a consistency with Knez (1991), i.e. the results emphasize the interaction of data and hypothesis in probabilistic inference tasks, as well as the subjects' execution of cognitive control over their hypothesis pool concerning both the subjects' hypothesis sampling and testing.     

Premissary relevance

Premissary relevance is a property of arguments understood as speech act complexes. It is explicable in terms of the idea of a premise's lending support to a conclusion. Premissary relevance is a function of premises belonging to a set which authoritatively warrants an inference to a conclusion. An authoritative inference warrant will have associated with it a conditional proposition which is true— that is to say, which can be justified. The study of the Aristotelian doctrine of topoi or argument schemes may contribute to the task of identifying authoritative warrants.     

The pragmatic aspects of linguistic negation: Speech act,argumentation and pragmatic inference

This paper is an attempt to give a general explanation of pragmatic aspects of linguistic negation. After a brief survey of classical accounts of negation within pragmatic theories (as speech act theory, argumentation theory and polyphonic theory), the main pragmatic uses of negation (illocutionary negation, external negation, lowering and majoring negation) are discussed within relevance theory. The question of the relevance of negative utterance is raised, and a general inferential schema (based on the so-called invited inference) is proposed and tested for the main uses of negation discussed in the paper.Translated from French by Anne Reboul and Lyne DaSylva.     

On the limits of the matching concept in monkeys (Cebus apella).

Two cebus monkeys, with many years of experience matching a variety of static visual stimuli (forms and colors) within a standard matching-to-sample paradigm, were trained to press a left lever when a pair of displayed static stimuli were the same and to press a right lever when they were different. After learning the same/different task, the monkeys were tested for transfer to dynamic visual stimuli (flashing versus steady green disks), with which they had no previous experience. Both failed to transfer to the dynamic stimuli. A third monkey, also with massive past experience matching static visual stimuli, was tested for transfer to the dynamic stimuli within our standard matching paradigm, and it, too, failed. All 3 subjects were unable to reach a moderate acquisition criterion despite as many as 52 sessions of training with the dynamic stimuli. These results provide further evidence that, in monkeys, the matching (or identity) concept has a very limited reach; they consequently do not support the view held by some theorists that an abstract matching concept based on physical similarity is a general endowment of animals.     

Timing multimodal events in pigeons

The peak procedure was used in two experiments to study pigeons' ability to time multimodal events. In the first experiment, birds were trained to time a single event consisting of a 9-s tone or light followed by a 21-s fixed interval associated with a signal of light or tone (signal of the other modality). On occasional empty trials, different lengths of the first signal were followed by a long period of the second signal. Peak response times as a function of the duration of the first signal were linear and had a slope of close to one in all birds. This indicates that the birds were timing only the second signal. In a second experiment, two complex events were used in training. One consisted of a 9-s tone or light followed by a 21-s fixed interval associated with a light or tone. The other consisted of a 21-s tone or light followed by a 9-s fixed interval associated with a light or tone. Different durations of the first signal were again used on empty trials. Peak response times as a function of the duration of the first signal were again linear in all birds. The slope of the function was less than one but greater than zero for 3 birds. This indicates that these birds were partly timing the entire complex event of 30-s duration and partly timing only the second signal of the event. A model is proposed in which the bird takes as a criterion for timing a weighted average of different target criteria. Comparisons with the performance of rats are made.     

The operant conditioning of response variability: Free-operant versus discrete-response procedures

The operant conditioning of response variability under free-operant and discrete-response procedures was investigated. Two pigeons received food only if their pattern of four pecks on two response keys differed from the patterns emitted on the two immediately preceding trials. Under the free-operant procedure, the keys remained illuminated and operative throughout each trial. There was little variability in the response patterns that resulted, and the pigeons received fewer than one third of the available reinforcers. Under the discrete-response procedure, a brief timeout period followed each response. Variability increased under this procedure, and the pigeons obtained three fourths of the available reinforcers. Previous successes and failures to produce response variability may have been due to the use or failure to use, respectively, a discrete-response procedure. Respondent effects inherent in the free-operant procedure may encourage the development of response stereotypy and, in turn, prevent the development of response variability.     

Competitive fixed-interval performance in humans

Two persons responded in the same session in separate cubicles, but under a single schedule of reinforcement. Each time reinforcement was programmed, only the first response to occur, that is, the response of only one of the subjects, was reinforced. “Competitive” behavior that developed under these conditions was examined in three experiments. In Experiment 1 subjects responded under fixed-interval (FI) 30-s, 60-s, and 90-s schedules of reinforcement. Under the competition condition, relative to baseline conditions, the response rates were higher and the pattern was “break-and-run.” In Experiment 2, subjects were exposed first to a conventional FI schedule and then to an FI competition schedule. Next, they were trained to respond under either a differential-reinforcement-of-low-rate (DRL) or fixed-ratio (FR) schedule, and finally, the initial FI competition condition was reinstated. In this second exposure to the FI competition procedure, DRL subjects responded at lower rates than were emitted during the initial exposure to that condition and FR subjects responded at higher rates. For all subjects, however, responding gradually returned to the break-and-run pattern that had occurred during the first FI competition condition. Experiment 3 assessed potential variables contributing to the effects of the competitive FI contingencies during Experiments 1 and 2. Subjects were exposed to FI schedules where (a) probability of reinforcement at completion of each fixed interval was varied, or (b) a limited hold was in effect for reinforcement. Only under the limited hold was responding similar to that observed in previous experiments.     

Choice between delayed reinforcers and fixed-ratio schedules requiring forceful responding.

This experiment measured pigeons' choices between delayed reinforcers and fixed-ratio schedules in which a force of approximately 0.48 N was needed to operate the response key. In ratio-delay conditions, subjects chose between a fixed-ratio schedule and an adjusting delay. The delay was increased or decreased several times a session in order to estimate an indifference point--a delay duration at which the two alternatives were chosen about equally often. Each ratio-delay condition was followed by a delay-delay condition in which subjects chose between the adjusting delay and a variable-time schedule, with the components of this schedule selected to match the ratio completion times of the preceding ratio-delay condition. The adjusting delays at the indifference point were longer when the alternative was a fixed-ratio schedule than when it was a matched variable-time schedule, which indicated a preference for the matched variable-time schedules over the fixed-ratio schedules. This preference increased in a nonlinear manner with increasing ratio size. This nonlinearity was inconsistent with a theory that states that indifference points for both time and ratio schedules can be predicted by multiplying the choice response-reinforcer intervals of the two types of schedules by different multiplicative constants. Two other theories, which predict nonlinear increases in preference for the matched variable-time schedules, are discussed.