Dehumanization of women and men in elective abortion: A preregistered replication in China

Although abortion in China has been legalized for several decades, it is still controversial and the woman and man involved are at risk of being stigmatized. The current research replicated two studies conducted in Italy by investigating how the abortion decision of the woman and man influence received moral outrage, dehumanization, and perceptions of female professional competence. Study 1, which only included female participants, found higher moral outrage toward a woman having an abortion when the pregnancy was depicted as referring to a “child” (vs. “foetus”), and higher dehumanization of the woman in terms of human nature. Study 2, which included both male and female participants, and clarified responsibility for the abortion decision with respect to the woman and the man, revealed higher moral outrage and a reduction in the attribution of human uniqueness to the man, and of human nature to both the woman and the man. Moral outrage mediated dehumanization when participants had low positive attitudes toward abortion in Study 1 and high positive attitudes in Study 2. Both studies showed a negative impact of the decision to have an abortion on the woman's perceived traditional professional competence. The results generally align with the findings from Italy and yield some practical implications on reducing abortion stigma. Future abortion stigma research should consider more gender-related factors.     

Relation between level of food deprivation and rate of schedule-induced attack

The relation between food deprivation and schedule-induced attack was investigated in four White Carneaux pigeons. Attack toward a mirror target was induced by a schedule of reinforcement in which 3-sec food presentations occurred at alternate intervals of 15 and 120 sec (multiple fixed-time 15-sec fixed-time 120-sec schedule). A continuous tone was presented during the 15-sec periods; it was absent during the 120-sec periods. Each pigeon was tested at 65, 80, and 95% of its free-feeding weight in ascending, descending, and ascending orders, respectively. Two relations were apparent; an inverse relation between body weight and rate of attack, and a tendency for rate of attack to increase during the experiment. Reduction or elimination of attack when the mirror was covered with brown paper for some sessions indicated that the results were due neither to changes in activity that might covary with weight nor to habituation to the experimental situation.     

Ronald Dworkin on Abortion and Assisted Suicide

In the first part of this article, I raisequestions about Dworkin's theory of theintrinsic value of life and about the adequacyof his proposal to understand abortion in termsof different ways of valuing life. In thesecond part of the article, I consider hisargument in ``The Philosophers' Brief on AssistedSuicide', which claims that the distinctionbetween killing and letting die is morallyirrelevant, the distinction between intendingand foreseeing death can be morally relevantbut is not always so. I argue that thekilling/letting die distinction can be relevantin the context of assisted suicide, but alsoshow when it is not. Then I consider why theintention/foresight distinction can be morallyirrelevant and conclude by presenting analternative argument for physician-assistedsuicide.     

Abortion, Intimacy, and the Duty to Gestate

In this article, I urge that mainstream discussions of abortion are dissatisfying in large part because they proceed in polite abstraction from the distinctive circumstances and meanings of gestation. Such discussions, in fact, apply to abortion conceptual tools that were designed on the premiss that people are physically demarcated, even as gestation is marked by a thorough-going intertwinement. We cannot fully appreciate what is normatively at stake with legally forcing continued gestation, or again how to discuss moral responsibilities to continue gestating, until we appreciate in their own terms the goods and evils distinctive of gestational connection. To underscore the need to explore further the meanings of gestation, I provide two examples of the difference it might make to legal and moral discussions of abortion if we appreciate more fully that gestation is an intimacy.     

The Uncanny Self in Love: Divorced Catholic Women Remember Abortion in Romania

This essay presents an ethnographic account of two divorced Catholic women's memories of praying to the Virgin Mary while seeking illegal abortions under the Romanian socialist regime. These women's stories focused on troubling memories of being in love, reflections that were retrospectively shaped by divorce. Drawing on Sigmund Freud's notion of the uncanny, I call these recollections uncanny memories of the self in love. Uncannily remembering one's self in love combines experiential self‐examination and ethical assessment of actions. The notion of the uncanny self in love thus helps bridge the divide between experience‐ and action‐oriented approaches to lived ethics. I argue that the ethical significance of the Virgin Mary's actions depended on my acquaintances’ approach to love. For one woman seeking to stay estranged from her ex‐husband, the Virgin Mary's actions accentuated his ethical immaturity. My other acquaintance harbored more ambivalent feelings toward her ex‐husband; for her, talking about the Virgin Mary helped her relativize feelings of ethical indignation. As a core implication of this argument, I urge greater awareness of the problematic tendency to include the need for greater awareness of tendencies in theories of lived ethics to reify socially situated perspectives on love.     

You were always on my mind: The importance of “significant others” in the attenuation of retrieval‐induced forgetting in Japan

Research on memory has demonstrated that remembering material can cause forgetting of related information, which is known as retrieval‐induced forgetting (RIF). Macrae and Roseveare identified “self” as one of the boundary conditions of this effect in the Western cultural context, showing that RIF was eliminated when material was encoded to be related to the self (known as self‐referential effect), but not to significant others. In this study, we predicted and found that significant others could be another boundary condition in Japanese cultural contexts in which self and agency are more interdependent or conjoint; RIF was observed neither under best‐friend‐related encoding nor under family‐related encoding in Japan. The effect of significant others is found uniquely in Japanese cultural contexts, suggesting that the cultural model of self has significant power in the spontaneous system of memory.     

Effects of analytical (abstract) versus experiential (concrete) induced rumination of negative self defining memories on schizotypic symptoms

Repetitive thought may have adaptive and functional consequences, depending on, among other things, the interpretation of the content: analytical or abstract (general and decontextualized) and experiential or concrete (specific, contextual and incidental). Studies experimentally manipulating repetitive thought have shown both the constructive consequences of the experiential mode and the dysfunctional consequences of the analytical mode. The aim of the current study is to observe the effect of analytical and experiential rumination of negative self‐defining memories on schizotypic symptoms. A sample of 111 university students were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental conditions of induced rumination, “analytical” or “experimental.” The participants completed a series of questionnaires (anomalous perception of reality, preoccupation and depression) and a negative self‐defining memory was obtained to be used as the content of the induced rumination. Following the rumination induction, participants in the experiential condition significantly decreased their scores on anomalous perception of reality compared with those in the analytical condition. We also observed that post‐induction scores on self‐reported sadness significantly increased in both experimental conditions while scores on self‐reported happiness decreased. Our results show that the concrete/experiential rumination, focused here on negative self‐defining memories, have positive consequences on schizotypic symptoms, such as decreased anomalous perception of reality.     

“More on Respect for Embryos and Potentiality: Does Respect for Embryos Entail Respect for In Vitro Embryos?”

It is commonly assumed that persons who hold abortions to be generally impermissible must, for the same reasons, be opposed to embryonic stem cell research [ESR]. Yet a settled position against abortion does not necessarily direct one to reject that research. The difference in potentiality between the embryos used in ESR and embryos discussed in the abortion debate can make ESR acceptable even if one holds that abortion is impermissible. With regard to their potentiality, in vitro embryos are here argued to be more morally similar to clonable somatic cells than they are to in vivo embryos. This creates an important moral distinction between embryos in vivo and in vitro. Attempts to refute this moral distinction, raised in the recent debate in this journal between Alfonso Gómez-Lobo and Mary Mahowald, are also addressed.     

Why We Should Avoid the use of the Term “Post-Abortion Syndrome”: Commentary on Boulind and Edwards (2008)

Boulind and Edwards (2008) present a case study of Grace, a women suffering, in their words, from post-abortion syndrome (PAS). In this commentary I argue that while Boulind and Edwards' (2008) report is useful in terms of documenting the therapeutic processes engaged in, they would have been better served in not hanging the distress experienced by Grace on the diagnostic category of post-abortion syndrome. Reasons for this are that: PAS is not a recognised category of diagnosis, despite having been initially proposed in 1981; applying a PTSD framework to abortion is questionable; PAS focuses attention on the abortion itself in isolation from the fact that abortion occurs in the context of severely problematic pregnancies and other important socio-cultural stressors; PAS, in the very manner in which it is formulated, invokes to a very complex politics of the foetus. Boulind and Edwards (2008) are careful in their documentation of the complexities of the case, and thus their use of PAS is unfortunate.