Getting scarred and winning lotteries: effects of exemplar cuing and statistical format on imagining low‐probability events

Three experiments tested the exemplar cuing and frequency format accounts of how the ‘imaginability’ of low‐probability events is enhanced. The experiments manipulated imaginability by varying the statistics used to describe negative (e.g. being scarred as a result of laser surgery) and positive (e.g. winning a lottery) low‐probability events. The results strongly supported the frequency format account, whereby imaginability is enhanced through the use of frequency formats for conveying statistical information (e.g. 20 out of 2000 as opposed to 0.01%). However, only limited support was found for exemplar cuing (EC) theory. Overall the results support the claim that the imaginability of outcomes plays a key role in thinking about low‐probability events, but question the mechanisms specified by EC theory for mediating such effects. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Comments on “Getting scarred and winning lotteries: Effects of exemplar cuing and statistical format on imagining low‐probability events,” By Newell,Mitchell, and Hayes (2008)

Newell, Mitchell, and Hayes (NMH) conduct three experiments designed to test whether exemplar cuing (EC) theory or a statistical format theory provides a more accurate account for how people make judgments about low‐probability events. They report finding support for the statistical format theory and little or no support for EC. However, NMH misstate the requirements for the production of exemplars in EC theory. As a result, they confuse non‐exemplar conditions with exemplar conditions in their experiments, and find results that are virtually irrelevant to EC theory. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Missing the target: A reply to Koehler & Macchi (2009)

Koehler and Macchi 2009 criticize the experiments presented in Newell, Mitchell, and Hayes 2008 as being “virtually irrelevant” to exemplar cuing theory. This reply addresses that interpretation and argues that the experiments dealt with issues at the heart of the theory and provided evidence highly relevant to understand how people think about low‐probability events. The role of the ‘target’ in probabilistic statements is examined, highlighting the need for further theoretical and empirical clarification of the concept. The remaining specific criticisms raised in the commentary are discussed as well. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.