Political Ideology Outdoes Personal Experience in Predicting Support for Gender Equality

Indices of gender equality provide an inconsistent picture of current gender inequality in countries with relatively high equality. We examined women's and men's subjectively perceived gender inequality and their support for gender equality in the general population and in politicians, respectively, in three countries with relatively high gender equality: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany (total N = 1,612). In both women's and men's perceptions, women were treated more unequally than men. However, the inequality that women perceived was larger than the inequality men perceived. Additionally, women reported they personally experience less inequality than women as a group (person-group discrepancy). Finally, women's and men's left/liberal (vs. right/conservative) political ideology turned out to be a relatively more powerful predictor of support for gender equality than perceived personal and societal inequality. We discuss reasons for why political ideology emerged as the strongest predictor of equality support and sketch out implications for policy efforts toward promoting gender equality.     

Ordinance influences individuals' perceptions towards prospects of social circumstance but not the status quo: An experimental field study on sexual minorities issues in Japan

Scientific evidence shows that institutional decisions can change individuals' private attitudes towards relevant issues. However, little is known about their effect on individuals' perceptions of social norms. This intriguing question has gained the attention of scholars. Nonetheless, the findings are primarily observed only in samples of the Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic countries, leading to doubts about their generalisability. This study experimentally tested residents' (N = 411) reactions to the new Tokyo ordinance prohibiting discrimination against sexual minorities enacted on October 5, 2018, and tested whether it dispelled self–other discrepancies regarding tolerance towards sexual minorities (i.e., pluralistic ignorance). The results showed that exposure to information about enactment increased future perceptions of support and understanding of sexual minorities. By contrast, private attitudes, perceptions of current social norms, and willingness to speak out did not change. Willingness to speak out was indirectly enhanced through increased perceptions of gaining future support. Furthermore, Tokyo residents overestimated other residents' negative attitudes towards sexual minorities. However, even when informed of the new ordinance, this self–other discrepancy in intolerance towards sexual minorities was not corrected. These findings suggest that institutional decisions can shape the perception of social norm change in the future beyond Western countries.     

When ignorance excuses

An ingenious argument – we may call it the Argument from Excuse – purports to show that the Standard View of Ignorance is false and the New View of Ignorance is true. On the former, ignorance is lack of knowledge; on the latter, ignorance is lack of true belief. I defend the Standard View by arguing that the Argument from Excuse is unsound. I also argue that an implication of my case is that Factual Ignorance Thesis (FIT) is false. According to FIT, whenever an agent A acts from factual ignorance, A is morally blameworthy (culpable) for the act only if A is morally blameworthy (culpable) for the ignorance from which A acts.     

群际接触理论介评

群际接触理论是关于群际关系的一个重要理论,其核心是过失无知现象,该理论认为通过在最佳情境中进行接触能减少群体间的偏见。该文阐述了Allport的接触假说,从四个方面论述了其他研究者对Allport接触假说的质疑及其对理论的完善,最后对Pettigrew提出的理论模型进行了介绍。     

《周易·蒙卦》的童蒙道德养成教育观

在<周易·蒙卦>中,反映了西周初期的有价值的童蒙道德养成教育观.它经后代学者的继承和阐发,逐渐形成了一个童蒙道德养成教育的思想体系.诸如"亨行时中"的价值目标,至诚求道而顺教的为学态度以及包容挚诚、严格得当的师道原则,等等,朴实而辩证,值得我们今天在未成年人道德养成教育中加以借鉴.     

Philosophy: What is to be done?––Bleak prospects

Culturally, America is well overdue for a Second Enlightenment, but since the dominant majority of its citizens are regrettably both symbol-minded and star-craving mad, and since the mass media are generally inaccessible to us, the chance that contemporary philosophers could contribute to such a thing, much less help instigate it, is near vanishingly small. As educators, in contrast, we can perhaps make ourselves useful by beginning to clear the extensive muck out of at least some of our students’ minds. In any event, the discipline of philosophy as such is in serious need of renewal, but that, should it unexpectedly happen, will be matter of luck rather than a result of deliberate action.     

Do Third-Person Perceptions of Media Influence Contribute to Pluralistic Ignorance on the Norm of Ideal Female Thinness?

This study investigated the pluralistic ignorance on the norm of ideal female thinness and also the presumed influence of thin idealized media images as the cause of the misperception. A survey of 111 female and 109 male US undergraduate students revealed that both women and men overestimated the thinness of body type preferred by others. In addition, men reported that others would be more affected by the media than self while women considered themselves to be as vulnerable as others. Subsequent regression analyses demonstrated that the difference in the perceived media influence on self and others was a significant predictor of the norm of ideal female thinness. Similar misperceptions were also found between men and women in dating relationships.     

Socialising epistemic risk: On the risks of epistemic injustice

Epistemic risk is of central importance to epistemology nowadays: one common way in which a belief can fail to be knowledge is by being formed in an epistemically risky way, that is, a way that makes it true by luck. Recently, epistemologists have been expanding this rather narrow conception of risk in every direction, except arguably the most obvious one—to enable it to accommodate the increasingly commonplace thought that knowledge has an irreducibly social dimension. This paper fills this lacuna by bringing issues of epistemic injustice to bear on epistemic risk. In particular, it draws on the phenomenon of white ignorance, to sketch a more social notion of epistemic risk, on which the interests of one's epistemic community partly determine whether a belief-forming procedure is epistemically risky.     

Don’t Know,Don’t Kill: Moral Ignorance,Culpability, and Caution

This paper takes on several distinct but related tasks. First, I present and discuss what I will call the “Ignorance Thesis,” which states that whenever an agent acts from ignorance, whether factual or moral, she is culpable for the act only if she is culpable for the ignorance from which she acts. Second, I offer a counterexample to the Ignorance Thesis, an example that applies most directly to the part I call the “Moral Ignorance Thesis.” Third, I argue for a principle—Don’t Know, Don’t Kill—that supports the view that the purported counterexample actually is a counterexample. Finally, I suggest that my arguments in this direction can supply a novel sort of argument against many instances of killing and eating certain sorts of animals.

Varieties of Epistemic Freedom

When we deliberate about what to do, we appear to be free to decide on different options. Three accounts use ordinary beliefs to explain this apparent freedom—appealing to different types of ‘epistemic freedom’. When an agent has epistemic freedom, her evidence while deliberating does not determine what decision she makes. This ‘epistemic gap’ between her evidence and decision explains why her decision appears free. The varieties of epistemic freedom appealed to might look similar. But there is an important difference. Two rely on an agent's ability to justifiably form beliefs unconstrained by evidence, and identify decisions as beliefs—either beliefs about acts (Velleman) or about decisions (Joyce and Ismael). But, when used to explain apparent freedom, these accounts face serious problems: they imply that agents have epistemic freedom over evidence-based beliefs, and rely on a faulty notion of justification. Underlying these troubles, it turns out that these accounts presuppose an unexplained apparent ability to form different beliefs. A third variety of epistemic freedom uses ignorance conditions instead (Levi and Kapitan). We appear free partly because we're ignorant of what we'll decide. Ignorance-based accounts avoid the above problems, and remain a promising alternative.