Feeling differently together: The It Gets Better Project as an unlikely intimate public of LGBT peers

This article examines peer participation in the It Gets Better Project, a YouTube-based platform which addresses precarious LGBT youth by offering moral support. The paper asks who engages with the project, and why particularly peers participate by recording and uploading a personal video. Contrary to this prevalence of peers, the article first shows how the project's architecture actually diverts attention from peer participation to a few featured videos, thereby shifting the focus onto celebrity participation. The article then proposes the project as an “intimate public” (Berlant, 2008) of shared feelings of difference, which connects the individual and dispersed private, amateur spaces with an indefinite affective space of public intimacy, grounded materially in and mediated by the space of the internet. Building on queer critique, the article argues that the project's success amongst peers can be understood in its capacity to circulate and share emotional knowledge of feeling differently together with others, even despite its internal dominant structural and normative orientation.     

创伤后应激障碍对震后青少年自杀意念的影响：安全感的调节作用

为探讨创伤后应激障碍（PTSD）及其各个症状簇对震后青少年自杀意念的影响,并检验安全感在其中的调节作用,研究采用创伤暴露程度问卷、流调中心抑郁量表儿童版、DSM-5的PTSD症状核查表、安全感量表和儿童行为问题核查表对汶川地震8.5年后的1136名中学生进行调查。结果发现：PTSD、负性认知和情绪改变症状、警觉性增高症状分别正向预测自杀意念,侵入性症状和回避性症状对自杀意念的预测作用不显著;安全感在侵入性症状、负性认知和情绪改变症状、警觉性增高症状、PTSD与自杀意念之间起负向调节作用,在回避性症状与自杀意念之间不起调节作用。这表明PTSD各症状簇对震后青少年自杀意念的预测作用不同,且安全感在其中发挥的调节作用也不同。     

Changes in values cognition after rating values-associated feelings

This study investigated values change as an outcome of assessing feelings elicited by contemplating the actualization of the same values. The subjects were divided into an experimental and a control group. They completed three tests in a single session. In the pretest, all subjects were asked to rate the importance of 20 values items on a 4-point scale. Subjects in the experimental group were then asked to rate the degree of pleasure they would feel in actualizing each of the values, while those in the control group rated the degree of inequality they considered women suffer in the actualization of each of the values. The post-test consisted of the same items as the pretest. The subjects in the experimental group completed a second post-test 3 months later. It was found that the experimental procedure produced significant change in the ratings of 15 values at the post-test, whereas the control procedure produced change in only five. The results suggest that rating one's emotional response to a value-related situation can change one's cognition of that value. At the post-test 3 months later, only 3-value ratings remained changed.     

From affect to feelings and thoughts: from abuse to care and understanding

The capacity of the infant to bear affect relies on the capacity of the caregiver until it has achieved enough strength to perform this task itself. In the case of neglect the necessary strength to contain, metabolize and think about affect so that it may be converted into differentiated feelings cannot develop because of the absence of a caregiver capable of sustaining the infant in its emotional development. Instead a system of defence against affect arises in which the affect itself is perceived as intrusive and abusive. Because of neglect a confusion between abuse and affect is to be observed, with catastrophic consequences for the growing up child. Furthermore neglected children can be seduced by external abuse in the hope of being protected from affect that threatens to feel abusive from within. Paradoxically these children are drawn toward abusive situations in the hope of finding some ongoing shelter from unmanageable affect. A corollary of this is that actual containment comes to feel abusive to them: if they are made to feel affect, they perceive the other, who put them in touch with affect, as abusive: thus affect, abuse and containment are confused. Clinical material will support this thesis.     

How Different Guilt Feelings Can Affect Social Competence Development in Childhood

The authors examined how the two different dimensions of guilt feelings, needed for reparation and fear of punishment, could influence social conduct, such as prosocial and aggressive behaviors, and how they are linked to popularity in childhood. The authors hypothesized a theoretical model that they tested, fitting it with empirical data obtained from a sample of 242 Italian children 9–11 years old. Both dimensions of guilt predict prosocial and aggressive behaviors. Specifically, the feeling of guilt linked to the need for reparation tends to negatively predict aggressive behaviors, and positively predict prosocial behaviors. The feeling of guilt linked to the fear of punishment, on the contrary, tends to positively affect aggressive and negatively affect prosocial conducts in children. These results highlight that the different feelings of guilt can represent a relevant risk or protective factor for the development of social competence in childhood. Limitations, strengths, and further development of the present study are discussed.     

LOVING THE PATIENT AS THE BASIS FOR TREATMENT

The author’s conviction is that a successful treatment is based on feelings of love by the therapist/analyst toward his or her patients. One should differentiate between love that is based on biological erotic-sexual drives and emotional love without erotic biological drive. The treatment process, especially for severely disturbed personalities, should be regarded as a process of new birth and new kind of development. Thus what the patient needs most is a kind of parental “primary love” (according to Balint). This paper presents a full report of a session through which the basic love to the patient is illustrated as enabling the treatment.Yecheskiel Cohen, Ph.D., is a member of the Israeli Psychoanalytic Society and the International Psychoanalytic Association.A version of this paper was presented at a conference of the Israel Psychoanalytic Society, May 2004.     

Examining direct and indirect pathways to health behaviour: The influence of cognitive and affective probability beliefs

This study aimed to extricate the influence of rational (e.g. ‘I think …’) and intuitive (e.g. ‘I feel …’) probability beliefs in the behavioural decision-making process regarding skin cancer prevention practices. Structural equation modelling was used in two longitudinal surveys (sun protection during winter sports [N?=?491]; sun protection during summer [N?=?277]) to examine direct and indirect behavioural effects of affective and cognitive likelihood (i.e. unmediated or mediated by intention), controlled for attitude, social influence and self-efficacy. Affective likelihood was directly related to sun protection in both studies, whereas no direct effects were found for cognitive likelihood. After accounting for past sun protective behaviour, affective likelihood was only directly related to sun protection in Study 1. No support was found for the indirect effects of affective and cognitive likelihood through intention. The findings underscore the importance of feelings of (cancer) risk in the decision-making process and should be acknowledged by health behaviour theories and risk communication practices. Suggestions for future research are discussed.     

CONSIDERATIONS ON DEPRESSIVE CONFLICT AND ITS DIFFERENT LEVELS OF INTENSITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR TECHNIQUE

This article considers the problem of depressive conflict (DC) and the difficulties that arise in integrating aggression towards the object of libidinal cathexis. This conflict results, in particular, from the destructive omnipotence that infantile fantasies attribute to the aggression. In order to better clarify Klein's very broad concept of the depressive position, three levels of severity of depressive conflict are proposed, depending on the type of fantasies concerning the loss of the object that predominate in the individual. These are: fantasies of catastrophic and irreparable destruction of the object ('parapsychotic' DC); fantasies of death and serious damage of the object ('para-depressive' DC); and fantasies of rejection and loss of the love of the object ('para-neurotic' DC). Having looked at these theoretical hypotheses, their implications for technique will then be considered, particularly the importance of focusing the interpretation on guilt feelings rather than on drives in the transferential relationship. A clinical example drawn from the work of Klein and a clinical vignette of a particularly difficult analysis illustrate this technical hypothesis.     

Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings

Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it.     

Can Collective Responsibility for Perpetrated Evil Persist over Generations?

In the first part of the paper an argument is developed to the effect that (1) there is no moral ground for individual persons to feel responsible for or guilty about crimes of their group to which they have in no way contributed; and (2) since there is no irreducibly collective responsibility nor guilt at any time, there is no question of them persisting over time. In the second part it is argued that there is nevertheless sufficient reason for innocent individual members of a group (that persists over time) to take on responsibility and guilt for the evil other (earlier) members have committed. The reason depends on the acceptability of a particular psychological theory of personal identity.