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William L. Rowe 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2009,65(2):87-92
By taking ‘existence in reality’ to be a great-making property and ‘God’ to be the greatest possible being, Plantinga skillfully
presents Anselm’s ontological argument. However, since he proves God’s existence by virtue of a premise, “God (a maximally
great being) is a possible being”, that is true only if God actually exists; his argument begs the question of the existence
of God. 相似文献
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An Ancient Virtue and Its Heirs: The Reception of Greatness of Soul in the Arabic Tradition
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Sophia Vasalou 《The Journal of religious ethics》2017,45(4):688-731
This essay examines the reception of the ancient virtue of greatness of soul (or magnanimity) in the Arabic tradition, touching on a range of figures but focusing especially on Miskawayh and even more concertedly on al‐Ghazālī. Influenced by a number of Greek ethical texts available in Arabic translation, both of these thinkers incorporate greatness of soul into their classifications of the virtues and the vices. Yet a closer scrutiny raises questions about this amicable inclusion, and suggests that this virtue stands in an uneasy relationship to the larger ethical schemes of both thinkers. This is substantiated by a careful probing of these thinkers’ considered views on the value of honor and the ethics of self‐evaluation. Yet if the values embedded in the virtue of greatness of soul conflict with these thinkers’ ethical standpoints, there is then an interesting question to ask as to why this conflict should be obscured from view. 相似文献
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