The decision to check in multialternative choices and limited sensitivity to default

Given the rapid proliferation of smartphone applications and data aggregation websites, in many situations people can use decision aids to guide their choices. For example, they may consider whether to use a navigation device to check the fastest route or whether to use a price comparison website to find the cheapest deal. In what circumstances will subjects use a costly comparison decision aid (which I refer to as “checking”) to choose for them? In six studies, I investigate the impact of the number of available alternatives and checking's attractiveness on the decision to check. While at first increasing the attractiveness of checking led to higher checking rates, a further increase in the number of available alternatives (and thus checking's attractiveness) did not increase the checking rate. Surprisingly, even when checking had a 40% higher expected value compared with not checking, the observed checking rate was below 45%, contrary to risk and ambiguity aversion predictions. Furthermore, labeling the checking alternative as the default had no impact on its choice rate. I find large individual differences in decisions to check. Surprisingly, subjects' initial decisions had high predictive power over their subsequent checking rates, even after 100 trials with full feedback. I propose two simple learning models that capture well the aggregated results.     

Peer review: Selecting the best science

The major challenge facing today’s biomedical researchers is the increasing competition for available funds. The competitive review process, through which the National Institutes of Health (NIH) awards grants, is built upon review by a committee of expert scientists. The NIH is firmly committed to ensuring that its peer review system is fair and objective. Wendy Baldwin, Ph.D., is Deputy Director for Extramural Research, National Institutes of Health. This paper is based on a presentation at a workshop, “Advances in Peer Review Research”, American Association for the Advancement of Science Meeting, Baltimore, MD, February 9, 1996.     

Psychological determinants of decision attitude

Decision attitude — an analog of risk attitude — is the propensity to make (or avoid making) a decision: in decision aversion, a person finds it more desirable to receive through fiat the better of two options than to have a choice between them; in decision seeking, the choice is more desirable, even though it can lead to nothing better than the best option. Both decision aversion and decision seeking were found in hypothetical scenarios. Experimental manipulations and subjects' justifications point to anticipated regret, fear of blame for poor outcomes, and desire for equitable distributions as sources of decision aversion. One source of decision seeking (for self) and decision aversion (when deciding for others) appears to be the desire for the self-determination of the affected parties. We consider the implications of our results for personal choice and public policy decisions.     

A compensatory approach to optimal selection with mastery scores

A Bayesian approach for simultaneous optimization of test-based decisions is presented using the example of a selection decision for a treatment followed by a mastery decision. A distinction is made between weak and strong rules where, as opposed to strong rules, weak rules use prior test scores as collateral data. Conditions for monotonicity of optimal weak and strong rules are presented. It is shown that under mild conditions on the test score distributions and utility functions, weak rules are always compensatory by nature. The authors are indebted to Wilbert Kallenberg for his valuable comments and to Jan Gulmans for providing the data for the empirical example. The names of the authors are alphabetical; they are equally responsible for the contents of this paper.     

FI SCHEDULES AND PERSISTENCE AT GAMBLING IN THE U.K. BETTING OFFICE

This study reports on the direct observations of customers in two U.K. betting offices gambling on horse and dog races. These observations revealed that bets were more frequently placed in the last minutes just prior to the start (the OFF), and that this was caused by high-frequency gamblers (customers who had eight or more bets in a session) consistently placing their bets in the last two minutes prior to the OFF. Low-frequency gamblers (three or fewer bets/session) avoided this time period placing their bets earlier, or after the OFF, i.e., on a later race. It was argued that the betting behavior of the “gamblers” could not be explained either in terms of “skillful betting” or solely in terms of variable ratio schedules but was more adequately accounted for in terms of an interval schedule. It was further suggested that time-based schedules might be of heuristic value in generally understanding persistence at gambling while losing.     

New assessment systems for residential treatment,management, research,and evaluation: A symposium

An introduction and overview are presented to new observational assessment systems for ongoing assessment and monitoring of both staff and resident (client or patient) functioning in residential treatment programs for emotionally disturbed and mentally retarded adults.Preparation of articles and the research and development on which the articles are based was supported, in part, by Public Health Service Grants MH-15553 and MH-25464 from the National Institute of Mental Health, and by grants from the Joyce Foundation and the Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities.A symposium presented at the 87th Annual Meetings of the American Psychological Association, New York City, September 1979.     

Systems use to objectify program evaluation,clinical, and management decisions

The utility of the observational assessment systems at different levels — from local clinical to systemwide management — is outlined. An overview is provided of TSBC information applied to individualized problem identification and programming/monitoring, discharge and competency determinations, and both absolute and comparative program evaluation. The utility of SRIC information for prgoramming/monitoring and for staff training and evaluation is outlined in addition to the applied uses of the information of the assessment systems in combination. Once implemented, the continuous data from the systems allow for empirically based self-corrective improvements in the quality of mental health services while automatically providing a basis for legal documentation and accurate cost/effectiveness comparisons of mental health programs.Preparation of this article and the research and development on which the article is based were supported, in part, by Public Health Service Grants MH-15553 and MH-25464 from the National Institute of Mental Health, and by grants from The Joyce Foundation and the Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities.Presented at the 87th Annual Meetings of the American Psychological Association, New York City, September 1979, as part of a symposium on New assessment systems for residential treatment, management, research, and evaluation.     

自身得失对朋友博弈结果评价的影响：来自ERPs的证据

本研究通过经典的金钱博弈任务, 以FRN和P300为反应指标, 探讨了自身获益或损失对朋友结果评价分别会产生何种影响, 以及这种影响模式是如何受到个体自我建构方式调节的。结果发现, 在自身获益条件下, 观看朋友损益之间的FRN和P300差异不再存在; 在自身损失条件下, 虽然观看朋友输赢之间的P300差异消失了, 但FRN差异依然显著。不仅如此, 无论自身得失, 独立型自我建构启动组在观看朋友损益上的FRN差异均不再显著, 但在自身获益后看到朋友损失能激发更强的P300波幅。本研究结果表明：(1) 对朋友的结果评价模式并非固定不变, 而是会随个体自身所处得失境遇的不同而有所区别; (2) 相对于互依型自我建构启动组, 独立型自我建构启动组在面对朋友的得失时表现得更为冷漠并更具竞争性。     

The variable influence of confession inconsistencies: How factual errors (but not contradictions) reduce belief in suspect guilt

Wrongful conviction statistics suggest that jurors pay little heed to the quality of confession evidence when making verdict decisions. However, recent research indicates that confession inconsistencies may sometimes reduce perception of suspect guilt. Drawing on theoretical frameworks of attribution theory, correspondence bias, and the story model of juror decision‐making, we investigated how judgments about likely guilt are affected by different types of inconsistencies: self‐contradictions (Experiment 1) and factual errors (Experiment 2). Crucially, judgments of likely guilt of the suspect were reduced by factual errors in confession evidence, but not by contradictions. Mediation analyses suggest that this effect of factual errors on judgments of guilt is underpinned by the extent to which mock‐jurors generated a plausible, alternative explanation for why the suspect confessed. These results indicate that not all confession inconsistencies are treated equally; factual errors might cause suspicion about the veracity of the confession, but contradictions do not.