想象空间心理旋转的角色效应

第一人称角色心理旋转和第三人称角色心理旋转是人类视觉系统通常采用的两种不同的空间表征动力转换策略。该研究采用实验方法,对违背物理移动规律的两种角色水平面心理旋转进行对比性研究。实验结果表明,想象空间两种角色水平面心理旋转存在显著差异,第三人称角色心理旋转的优势可概括化于旋转轴物理方向与重力方向不一致的水平面心理旋转中。     

Spiritual Development: Han F. De Wit's and Stanislav Grof's Differing Approaches

For both Han F. de Wit and Stanislav Grof, spirituality constitutes an essential part of humaneness; a life built on materialism is deemed an impoverished life. For de Wit, spirituality yields courage, compassion, joy, clarity of mind, and consequently wisdom. For Grof, personal spiritual experiences gained during altered states of consciousness are of central interest. After defining spirituality, these views, built on long-term personal experiences of the authors and those of others, are explicated in detail. Both authors describe their respective approaches to spiritual development. In either approach, third-person knowledge and judgments (e.g., on humanness) have to be supplemented by first-person knowledge and judgments arrived at appropriately (e.g., on humaneness).     

A Developmental Approach to Social Science: A Model for Analyzing Charles Alexander's Scientific Contributions

A seven-paradigm developmental model of social science is presented (behaviorism, gestalt sociologism, empirical positivism, multi-method eclecticism, postmodern interpretivism, cooperative ecological inquiry, and developmental action inquiry). Charles Alexander's research is interpreted as bridging aspects of several paradigms, using third-person empirical positivist experiments to demonstrate the effects of a first-person research/practice called Transcendental Meditiation. The author suggests the possibility of complementing current research on TM with explicit double- and triple-loop research on the second- and third-person practices within the TM movement.     

Pain and Bodily Care: Whose Body Matters?

Pain is unpleasant. It is something that one avoids as much as possible. One might then claim that one wants to avoid pain because one cares about one's body. On this view, individuals who do not experience pain as unpleasant and to be avoided, like patients with pain asymbolia, do not care about their body. This conception of pain has been recently defended by Bain [2014 Bain, D. 2014. Pains That Don't Hurt, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92/2: 305–20.[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]] and Klein [forthcoming Klein, C. forthcoming. What Pain Asymbolia Really Shows, Mind. [Google Scholar]]. In their view, one needs to care about one's body for pain to have motivational force. But does one need to care about one's body qua one's own? Or does one merely need to care about the body that happens to be one's own? In this paper, I will consider various interpretations of the notion of bodily care, in light of a series of pathological cases in which patients report pain in a body part that they do not experience as their own. These cases are problematic if one adopts a first-personal interpretation of bodily care, according to which pain requires one to care about what is represented as one's own body. The objection can run as follows. If the patients experience the body part as alien, then they should not care about it. Therefore, they should be similar to patients with pain asymbolia. But they are not. Hence, bodily care is not necessary to pain. To resist this conclusion, one can try to revise the interpretation of the notion of bodily care and to offer alternative interpretations that are not first-personal. However, I will show that that those alternatives also fail to account for these borderline cases of pain.     

Embodied agents,narrative selves

Recent work on diachronic agency has challenged the predominantly structural or synchronic approach to agency that is characteristic of much of the literature in contemporary philosophical moral psychology. However, the embodied dimensions of diachronic agency continue to be neglected in the literature. This article draws on phenomenological perspectives on embodiment and narrative conceptions of the self to argue that diachronic agency and selfhood are anchored in embodiment. In doing so, the article also responds to Diana Meyers' recent work on corporeal selfhood.     

Two Objections to Moran’s Transparency Account

Abstract

Gareth Evans and others have argued that our intentional attitudes are transparent to facts in the world. This suggests we can know them by looking outwards to the world rather than inwards to our minds. Richard Moran uses this idea of transparency in his account of self-knowledge. Critics have objected to his account on several counts. For example, Jonathan Way has argued that irrational attitudes can give ordinary self-knowledge when they are not transparent and that there are rational attitudes that are not transparent. I argue here that these objections fail because Way does not fully consider the two different kinds of self-knowledge, ‘ordinary’ and evidence-based, that differentiate the two stances that Moran claims a subject can have towards his attitudes. It is the differences between these two stances and the implications of these that motivate Moran’s account, rather than whether the formed attitude is rational or irrational, as long as the subject avows it from the deliberative stance, focuses on the attitude’s object and conforms to the transparency condition as Moran sets this out.     

One’s own reasoning

Abstract

Responding to Cappelen and Dever’s claim that there is no distinctive role for perspectivality in epistemology, I argue that facts about the outcomes of one’s own reasoning processes may have a different evidential significance than facts about the outcomes of others’.     

角色方式对心理旋转的影响

人类视觉系统通常以第一人称角色和第三人称角色形式建构客体的空间表征,也运用这两种角色方式进行空间表征的动力转换。本研究采用实验方法,对这两种角色方式的心理旋转进行对比性研究。结果发现:空间表征转换的角色方式对心理旋转产生显著影响,第三人称角色心理旋转易于第一人称角色心理旋转,即存在心理旋转的角色效应。     

Enhancing the effects of a narrative message through experiential information processing: An experimental study

First-person narratives are becoming a popular means to communicate health risk information. Although studies show they can increase risk perception and motivate health behaviours compared to statistical messages, more research on the conditions in which they are particularly likely to have effects is needed. In this study, we tested a moderator related to how information is processed. Specifically, we hypothesised that thinking in terms of emotions and personal experiences – known as experiential information processing – would increase people’s responsiveness to a narrative. Female college students (N = 138) who reported indoor tanning were randomly assigned to read a first-person narrative message or a statistical message about the risks of skin cancer. Prior to reading the message, the women received instructions that would activate either experiential or rational information processing. Participants then reported their risk perceptions of skin cancer, worry about skin cancer and behaviour intentions related to skin cancer. Analyses showed that message type and information processing interacted to influence risk perceptions and worry. Consistent with hypotheses, participants reported the highest risk perception and worry when they used an experiential information system prior to reading the narrative message. There were no effects on behaviour intentions. Implications of these findings are discussed.