BIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON FALL AND ORIGINAL SIN

Abstract. The paper consists of an argument that goes as follows. Symbols and their elaboration into myths constitute Homo sapiens 's most primitive reading of the world and the relation of humans to that world. They are, in other words, primordial units of cultural information, emerging very early in human history, representing a significant achievement in the evolution of human self-consciousness and reflection. The classic myths of Fall and Original Sin, as well as the doctrines to which they gave rise, are further interpretations of this primordial information. The doctrinal traditions of the first four centuries of Christianity are surveyed. Three sets of data as interpreted by the biological sciences are offered as resources for understanding the biogenetic grounds of the experience that the symbols, myths, and doctrines of Fall and Original Sin seek to interpret. The conclusions to be drawn are that (1) the symbolic material is indeed commensurate with the scientific understandings, and (2) the scientific interpretations deepen our understanding of the symbols, while (3) the conversation between the symbols and the science once again raises certain perennial questions about human existence.     

Is a Finite Life Such a Bad Idea? Transhumanism and Theological Anthropology

Creaturely life is finite life. Transhumanism suggests that human life will be better and even fulfilled in a new way, if humans can overcome some of the finite conditions now given. I argue that there are theological, ethical, and biological points to be taken into consideration that may challenge the transhuman vision of a good life. The finite conditions of human life are what makes human life human, and these conditions are also part of why the deeper meaning of human life is realized in love for others, and not in the quest for making one's own life go on (almost) endlessly. In addition to looking at some material from popular culture and the philosopher Hans Jonas, the article also draws on recent discussions on transhumanism present in contemporary theology.     

Puzzles of Discourse in Being and Time: Minding Gaps in Understanding

Abstract

This paper takes issue with Heidegger’s claim that discourse and understanding are equally basic in the constitution of our making sense of the world. I argue that Heidegger cannot consistently establish this claim, and that discourse can be thought of as being more basic than understanding. The proposed line of thinking has the advantage of shedding light on both the finitude and the normativity of our making sense of the world. Thus, by setting up an exchange with the later Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule‐following makes it possible to develop an approach to the normativity of meaning which was not readily available on Heidegger’s account. Further, the paper offers an inquiry into a certain aspect of our finite sense of the world which, in spite of Heidegger’s marked attention to finitude, was obscured by his approach to discourse. The implications of the argument might be far‐reaching. The view of a basic role of discourse can put into question Heidegger’s guiding vision according to which time alone is ultimately the fundamental constituent of our sense of what there is. The engagement with Wittgenstein indicates, in conjunction with other themes of the paper, that there are certain perspectives and issues in phenomenology which are much closer to aspects of the analytic tradition than is usually granted.     

从"历史先天"来看福柯的知识考古学

该文试图考察福柯的自律的话语理论并反思考古学的症结。文章从“历史先天”这一关键词出发,阐述福柯的知识考古学如何将对话语的实证描述和探索话语构成的先天规则结合起来,从而保证其在对话语的形式分析的同时,超越传统哲学深陷其中的三对矛盾：“经验-先验”、“我思-未思”、“本源的隐退-回归”。围绕着“陈述”的三个特性,我们可以看到福柯为此所做的努力,即打通共时与历时之隔,经验与先验之分,实现结构主义和实证主义的联姻。文章最后指出这种自律的话语理论的症结所在,认为福柯并没有如愿以偿地跳出“有限性解析”的窠臼。     

Ideals of rationality in dialogic

Needed for such dialogue games as dialectic are appropriate standards of fairness and rationality. The rules of procedure of dialectic must describe a game playable by actual human participants. The present paper centers on certain idealizations of the dialectician that are not allowable.     

Jung and Kabbalah: imaginal and noetic aspects

Jung made use of kabbalistic images and motifs in various parts of his opus, including in his alchemical studies, in Aion, and extensively in Mysterium Coniunctionis. He also recorded an important dream after his heart attack which made use of kabbalistic symbolism in Memories, Dreams, Reflections. In this paper I explore Jung's ideas in relation to Kabbalah, first, by differentiating between Jung's imaginal approach to kabbalistic symbolism and the noetic intention of the Kabbalah itself in its use of imaginal material. Second, I present a number of typical examples of how Jung understands (and sometimes misunderstands) kabbalistic material that he cites. Third, I briefly survey the development of the Kabbalah as an imaginal noetic system, and present a core self-understanding of kabbalists--as engaged in inner 'self-work' which intends to 'sweeten the harsh judgments of existence in their very roots'. Finally, I differentiate Jung's understanding of the psychical living symbol from the kabbalistic understanding of the mystical symbol. In this fourth section of the paper, I conclude by presenting a basic Hasidic/kabbalistic teaching on the nature and function of verbal contemplative prayer--as an illustration of the difference between the two understandings of symbolism. The four sections of the paper are framed by a 'Prelude' and a 'Coda'.     

Temporal Finitude and Finitude of Possibility: The Double Meaning of Death in Being and Time

Abstract

The confusion surrounding Heidegger’s account of death in Being and Time has led to severe criticisms, some of which dismiss his analysis as incoherent and obtuse. I argue that Heidegger’s critics err by equating Heidegger’s concept of death with our ordinary concept. As I show, Heidegger’s concept of death is not the same as the ordinary meaning of the term, namely, the event that ends life. But nor does this concept merely denote the finitude of Dasein’s possibilities or the groundlessness of existence, as William Blattner and Hubert Dreyfus have suggested. Rather, I argue, the concept of death has to be understood both as temporal finitude and as finitude of possibility. I show how this reading addresses the criticisms directed at Heidegger’s death analysis as well as solving textual problems generated by more limited interpretations of the concept.     

Forever is Always Finite: Reflections on Radical Life Extension

This essay reflects on the Radical Life Extension movement from six critical perspectives: RLE (1) ignores the benefits of finitude; (2) perpetuates the denial of death by seeking to vanquish it; (3) disregards the paradoxical nature of death as problem and mystery; (4) turns death and the Bronze Dream into idols; (5) overlooks a plethora of ethical dilemmas; and (6) fails to ask the central life question: “how well can we live?.” RLE is not only problematic: it is redundant. Being kept in the love of God forever is a different kind of ‘radical life extension’ that includes finitude and death.     

Technology and Human Becoming

Technology is a mirror that reflects human nature and intentions: (1) we want certain things done and we want tools to do those things; (2) we are finite, frail, and mortal; (3) we create technology in order to bring alternative worlds into being; (4) we do not know why we create or what values should guide us. Imagination is central to technology. Human nature and human freedom are brought into focus when we reflect on the central role of imagination in technology.