The Most Important Election of Our Lifetime: Focalism and Political Participation

This article argues that a psychological bias called “focalism” contributes to an overestimation of the differences between political candidates, which in turn increases participation and polarization. Focalism causes people to confuse the allocation of attention to things with the importance of those things. Because attention to politics typically centers on conflict, the result is an exaggeration of differences across the partisan divide. I test this intuition using an experimental design that provides all respondents with all the information they need to estimate how much Joe Biden and Donald Trump objectively disagreed on policy positions just before the 2020 election. I find that shifting attention—toward either those positions the candidates agreed or disagreed with each other on—influences beliefs about the differences between candidates. The effect exceeds that of identifying as a Democrat or as a Republican. Beyond those perceptions, focalism increases turnout intentions, perceptions of election importance, negative feelings towards the out-candidate, and affective polarization.     

祖辈协同教养与幼儿错误信念理解能力的关系:亲子依恋与祖辈同住的作用

为考察祖辈协同教养与幼儿错误信念理解之间的关系以及幼儿亲子依恋的中介作用,采用方便抽样的方法,调查了某城市三所幼儿园345名小班至大班的祖辈协同教养幼儿及其家庭教养人。对幼儿使用操作任务考察错误信念理解能力,对其家庭教养人利用自陈式问卷收集家庭教养方式和亲子依恋等数据。结果显示：(1)祖辈协同教养类型显著影响幼儿的错误信念理解水平和亲子依恋,“有祖辈同住”协同教养幼儿的错误信念理解水平以及依恋的安全性均显著低于“无祖辈同住”协同教养幼儿;(2)亲子依恋在祖辈协同教养的民主信任和教养冲突两个维度与幼儿错误信念理解能力之间分别存在显著的中介作用;(3)祖辈协同教养类型在教养冲突、亲子依恋、错误信念理解能力的中介模型中起调节作用,在“有祖辈同住”条件下,协同教养冲突显著负向预测幼儿的亲子依恋安全感。     

Bringing critical social psychology to the study of political polarization

The study of political polarization, in both its ideological and its affective expressions, has garnered significantly more interest over the last years. But despite recent research on the conceptualization, measurement, causes, and consequences of this socio-political phenomenon, and some tentative interventions to mitigate it, relevant new avenues remain surprisingly underdeveloped. Indeed, scholarship in the field of political polarization, mainly in the case of affective polarization, frequently uses cognitivist approaches to make sense of the growing antipathy between different social and political groups. However, the bulk of this work seems to overlook valuable insights into the psychology of intergroup conflict, stereotyping, prejudice reduction, and discourse studies. The aim of this paper is to underline the main gaps in the political polarization literature, to subsequently argue how knowledge linked to the tradition of critical social psychology can help in filling them. Ultimately, the article aims to contribute to the psychosocial study of political polarization and to the design, if necessary, of interventions to counter its detrimental consequences.     

Confession evidence,psychological vulnerability and expert testimony

There have been major changes in English Law with regard to confession evidence, which followed the implementation of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) in January 1986. This paper reviews the main legal changes that are relevant to the admissibility and reliability of confessions and their psychological importance within the context of both research and expert testimony.     

Screw Those Guys: Polarization,Empathy, and Attitudes About Out-Partisans

Empathic ability is the ability to interpret the emotional state of others. In today's highly partisan and polarized environment, empathic ability may play a key role in determining how partisans respond emotionally to changes in public policy and those helped or harmed by the policy. Utilizing Baron-Cohen et al.'s (Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 42, 241–251, 2001) “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test to measure empathic ability, we conduct a survey experiment where we asked participants to read about a partisan individual who may lose their health insurance if the Affordable Care Act were to be repealed. We show that empathic ability shapes attitudes about people and policies, but that the effects are contingent upon the respondent's partisanship, the target's partisanship, and an interaction of the two. Empathic ability produces more positive affect and policy support among Democrats but reduces positive affect among Republicans. The divergent effects of empathic ability on Democrats and Republicans are further exacerbated when the target is an out-partisan.     

Defensive Partisanship? Evidence that In-Party Scandals Increase Out-Party Hostility

Contemporary U.S. politics is characterized by polarization and interpartisan antipathy. This is accompanied by a media landscape saturated with coverage of political scandals. Applying a social identity perspective, we examined whether exposure to scandals that threaten partisan's moral group image (i.e., in-party scandals), may motivate defensive hostility against opposing partisans. Across three experiments we exposed U.S. partisans to scandals attributed to either in-party or out-party politicians. We then assessed partisan hostility using a variety of operationalizations, including anger at a real outgroup politician (Study 1), judgments about the alleged misdeeds of a fabricated outgroup politician (Study 2), and negative perceptions of opposing party members (Study 3). Strength of partisan identity was assessed as a predicted moderator (Study 3). As expected in- (vs. out-) party scandals, were perceived as group-image threats and elicited greater hostility towards opposing partisans, independent of partisans' ideological extremity or prior affective polarization.     

The COVID-19–Social Identity–Digital Media Nexus in India: Polarization and Blame

Drawing on social identity theory and research on digital media and polarization, this study uses a quasi-experimental design with a random sample (n = 3304) to provide causal evidence on perceptions of who is to blame for the initial spread of COVID-19 in India. According blame to three different social and political entities—Tablighi Jamaat (a Muslim group), the Modi government, and migrant workers (a heterogeneous group)—are the dependent variables in three OLS regression models testing the effect of the no-blame treatment, controlling for Facebook use, social identity (religion), vote in the 2019 national election, and other demographics. Results show respondents in the treatment group were more likely to allay blame, affective polarization (dislike for outgroup members) was social identity based, not partisan based, and Facebook/Instagram use was not significant. Congress and United Progressive Alliance voters in 2019 were less likely to blame the Modi government for the initial spread. Unlike extant research in western contexts, affective and political polarization appear to be distinct concepts in India where social identity complexity is important. This study of the first wave informs perceptions of blame in future waves, which are discussed in conclusion along with questions for future research.     

激活水平和呈现方式对错误记忆的影响

随机抽取80名大学生参与实验,采用DRM(Deese-Roediger-Mcdermott)范式,探讨了激活水平和呈现方式对错误记忆的影响。结果发现:(1)在随机呈现条件下,关键诱饵的错误再认率显著低于分组呈现条件,但学过项目的正确再认率在两种条件下无差异。(2)在高激活水平条件下,学过项目的正确再认率明显低于低激活水平条件,但关键诱饵的错误再认率在两种激活条件下的差异不够明显。这表明,呈现方式对关键诱饵的错误再认率有显著影响,而激活水平的影响则不显著。由此可知,人们的记忆可以在没有任何外界信息干扰的情况下因内在联想过程而自发地发生改变。     

Memory distortions: When suggestions cannot be easily ignored

In the present study, the persistence of personal false memories (FMs) after social feedback that denies their truth was assessed. Participants imitated actions performed by the experimenter (Session 1) and watched a doctored video with performed and critical “fake” actions (Session 2), followed by a memory rating and a recognition task. A few days later (Session 3), participants were clearly told that some memories were false and received daily reminders of the correct list of objects/actions before testing their memory again in Session 4. Results of both memory ratings and recognition indicated effective FM implantation. Interestingly, response times for correct rejections were longer for fake than true objects, suggesting participants struggled to ignore false suggestions. Crucial for our aim, Session 4 showed that FM persisted also after the debriefing and repeated presentations of correct list of objects/actions, suggesting that FMs for actions are rather difficult to discard.