Ideals of rationality in dialogic

Needed for such dialogue games as dialectic are appropriate standards of fairness and rationality. The rules of procedure of dialectic must describe a game playable by actual human participants. The present paper centers on certain idealizations of the dialectician that are not allowable.     

THE PUZZLE OF FALLIBLE KNOWLEDGE

Abstract: Although the fallible/infallible distinction in the theory of knowledge has traditionally been upheld by most epistemologists, almost all contemporary theories of knowledge claim to be fallibilist. Fallibilists have, however, been forced to accommodate knowledge of necessary truths. This has proved to be a daunting task, not least because there is as yet no consensus on how the fallible/infallible divide is to be understood. In this article, after examining and rejecting a number of representative accounts of the notion of fallible knowledge, I argue that the main problems with these accounts actually stem from the very coherence of that notion. I then claim that the distinction is best understood in terms of the externalist/internalist conceptions of knowledge. Finally, I seek to garner some independent support for the proposal by highlighting some of its consequences, including its surprising bearing on certain recent and seemingly distant controversies involving issues in epistemology and philosophy of mind.     

A bayesian procedure for mastery decisions based on multivariate normal test data

A Bayesian framework for making mastery/nonmastery decisions based on multivariate test data is described in this study. Overall, mastery is granted (or denied) if the posterior expected loss associated with such action is smaller than the one incurred by the denial (or grant) of mastery. An explicit form for the cutting contour which separates mastery and nonmastery states in the test score space is given for multivariate normal test scores and for a constant loss ratio. For multiple cutting scores in the true ability space, the test score cutting contour will resemble the boundary defined by multiple test cutting scores when the test reliabilities are reasonably close to unity. For tests with low reliabilities, decisions may very well be based simply on a suitably chosen composite score.This work was performed pursuant to Grant NIE-G-78-0087 with the National Institute of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Huynh Huynh, Principal Investigator. Points of view or opinions stated do not necessarily reflect NIE positions or policy and no official endorsement should be inferred. The assistance of Joseph C. Saunders is gratefully acknowledged. The author is indebted to an anonymous referee who pointed out several computational errors in the earlier versions of the paper.     

Lgbt Catholics: a paradigmatic case of intra-confessional pluralism

ABSTRACT

I will reflect on the reconciliation between “subjective” life and “objective” doctrine experienced by Catholic lgbt couples. Even though their particular experience cannot be considered as universal it can nevertheless constitute a case study for theological reflection. I will propose a theological model for the integration of lgbt Catholics into Christian communities. The case of lgbt Catholics also helps us address the theoretical difficulties of religious pluralism. Their experience of faith is an example of “lived pluralism”. In the lexicon of religious pluralism, this experience is an intra-system or intra-theistic diversity, but it also touches upon the meta-theological issue of the model of reason that is to be applied to every system. I believe that every possible case of pluralism is worth considering if we want to theorize this concept. This may lead us to consider pluralism as a premise from which to start, articulated at different levels.     

Tyler Burge on disjunctivism (II)

In McDowell (2010), I responded to Burge's attack (2005) on disjunctivism. In Burge (2011) Burge rejects my response. He stands by his main claim that disjunctivism is incompatible with the science of perception, and in a supplementary spirit he argues against the detail of my attempt to defend disjunctivism. Here I explain how disjunctivism is compatible with the science, and I respond to some of Burge's supplementary arguments.