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1.
Derek Ball 《Ratio》2020,33(4):206-219
The idea that experts (especially scientific experts) play a privileged role in determining the meanings of our words and the contents of our concepts has become commonplace since the work of Hilary Putnam, Tyler Burge, and others in the 1970s. But if experts have the power to determine what our words mean, they can do so responsibly or irresponsibly, from good motivations or bad, justly or unjustly, with good or bad effects. This paper distinguishes three families of metasemantic views based on their attitudes towards bad behaviour by meaning-fixing experts, and draws a series of distinctions relevant for the normative evaluation of meaning-determining actions. 相似文献
2.
Julia Jorati 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(4):748-766
Moral rationalists and sentimentalists traditionally disagree on at least two counts, namely regarding the source of moral knowledge or moral judgements and regarding the source of moral motivation. I will argue that even though Leibniz's moral epistemology is very much in line with that of mainstream moral rationalists, his account of moral motivation is better characterized as sentimentalist. Just like Hume, Leibniz denies that there is a necessary connection between knowing that something is right and the motivation to act accordingly. Instead, he believes that certain affections are necessary for moral motivation. On my interpretation, then, Leibniz is an externalist about judgements and motivation: he is committed to a gap between the judgement that something is morally right and the motivation to act accordingly. As a matter of fact, I will argue that there are two gaps. The first and less controversial one has to do with the fact that Leibniz reconciles his psychological egoism with ethical altruism through his account of love. The second gap between moral judgements and motivation is a more fundamental one: Leibniz denies that there are any necessary connections between beliefs and motivation, or even more generally, between perceptions and appetitions. 相似文献
3.
Andrew Sneddon 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(1):41-53
Internalists argue that there is a necessary connection between motivation and moral judgment. The examination of cases plays an important role in philosophical debate about internalism. This debate has focused on cases concerning the failure to act in accordance with a moral judgment, for one reason or another. I call these failure cases. I argue that a different sort of case is also relevant to this debate. This sort of case is characterized by (1) moral judgment and (2) behavior that accords with the content of the moral judgment but that has been performed not because of the moral judgment. Instead it is due to some other source of motivation. I call these alternative motivation cases. I distinguish two sorts of alternative motivation cases, and I argue that externalists have natural explanations of these cases. By contrast, extant internalist accounts of failure cases are inadequate when applied to alternative motivation cases. 相似文献
4.
Ginger A. Hoffman 《Philosophical Psychology》2016,29(8):1160-1174
The thesis that mental states extend beyond the skull, otherwise known as the extended mind thesis (ExM), has attracted considerable philosophical attention and support. It has also been accused of lacking practical import. At the same time, the field of psychiatry has remained largely unacquainted with ExM, tending to rely instead upon what ExM proponents would consider to be outdated models of the mind. ExM and psychiatry, therefore, have much to offer one another, but the connection between the two has remained largely unexplored. Here, I consider what implications ExM may have for psychiatry and, in so doing, reveal how psychiatry may lend practical import to ExM. First, I detail the possibility of the extension of one mental state relevant to psychiatry. I augment this example by surveying other possibilities for extension in the context of psychiatric diagnoses. I then consider ways in which such extensions might alter psychiatric diagnosis and treatment. Overall, I argue that recognition of the truth of ExM could alter the diagnostic status of certain individuals by correcting both false positives and false negatives, re-conceptualize certain aspects of treatment, help us re-envision psychiatric research, and potentially increase empathy towards those individuals considered to be mentally disordered or mentally different. 相似文献
5.
Matthew S. Bedke 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(1):85-111
There are a number of proposals as to exactly how reasons, ends and rationality are related. It is often thought that practical
reasons can be analyzed in terms of practical rationality, which, in turn, has something to do with the pursuit of ends. I
want to argue against the conceptual priority of rationality and the pursuit of ends, and in favor of the conceptual priority
of reasons. This case comes in two parts. I first argue for a new conception of ends by which all ends are had under the guise
of reasons. I then articulate a sense of rationality, procedural rationality, that is connected with the pursuit of ends so
conceived, where one is rational to the extent that one is motivated to act in accordance with reasons as they appear to be.
Unfortunately, these conceptions of ends and procedural rationality are inadequate for building an account of practical reasons,
though I try to explain why it is that the rational pursuit of ends generates intuitive but misleading accounts of genuine
normative reasons. The crux of the problem is an insensitivity to an is-seems distinction, where procedural rationality concerns
reasons as they appear, and what we are after is a substantive sense of rationality that concerns reasons as they are. Based
on these distinct senses of rationality, and some disambiguation of what it is to have a reason, I offer a critique of internalist
analyses of one’s reasons in terms of the motivational states of one’s ideal, procedurally rational self, and I offer an alternative
analysis of one’s practical reasons in terms of practical wisdom that overcomes objections to related reasons externalist
views. The resulting theory is roughly Humean about procedural rationality and roughly Aristotelian about reasons, capturing
the core truths of both camps.
相似文献
Matthew S. BedkeEmail: |
6.
JAMES LINDEMANN NELSON 《Metaphilosophy》2009,40(3-4):462-474
Abstract: The leading accounts of the ethics of proxy decision making implicitly draw on internalist conceptions of the philosophy of mind, or so this essay tries to demonstrate. Using the views of Ronald Dworkin as its jumping-off point, the essay argues that accepting the sort of externalism associated with writers such as Putnam and Burge would alter Dworkin's conclusions concerning how we should respond to the current or precedent decisions of people suffering from dementia. Building on the views of Agnieszka Jawarska, it argues that accepting "active" externalism à la Clark and Chambers would provide currently competent people with new resources for establishing the authority of their present values over inconsistent values they might come to entertain should they become demented. 相似文献
7.
Matthias Adam 《Synthese》2007,158(1):93-108
Scientific claims can be assessed epistemically in either of two ways: according to scientific standards, or by means of philosophical
arguments such as the no-miracle argument in favor of scientific realism. This paper investigates the basis of this duality
of epistemic assessments. It is claimed that the duality rests on two different notions of epistemic justification that are
well-known from the debate on internalism and externalism in general epistemology: a deontological and an alethic notion.
By discussing the conditions for the scientific acceptability of empirical results, it is argued that intrascientific justification
employs the deontological notion. Philosophical disputes such as those on scientific realism can by contrast be shown to rest
on the alethic notion. The implications of these findings both for the nature of the respective epistemic projects and for
their interrelation are explored. 相似文献
8.
P. S. Greenspan 《The Journal of Ethics》1998,2(2):103-122
The paper outlines a view called social (or two-level) response-dependency as an addition to standard alternatives in metaethics that allows for a position intermediate between standard versions of internalism and externalism on the question of motivational force. Instead of taking psychological responses as either directly supplying the content of ethics (as on emotivist or sentimentalist accounts) or as irrelevant to its content (as in classical versions of Kantian or utilitarian ethics), the view allows them an indirect role, as motivational props to moral teaching and thus to the general institution of moral discourse. However, they are not implied by any particular moral judgment (or speaker), so that amoralism comes out as possible. The response that defines the distinctively moral notion of wrong on this account is the second-level (social) response of forbidding some behavior; but this is ultimately to be understood in terms of (variable) individual reactions. Natural human emotion tendencies thereby constrain the content of ethics, while allowing for some degree of social variation in moral codes. 相似文献
9.
Andrew Cullison 《Philosophical Studies》2007,136(3):305-318
By exploiting a concept called ways of believing, I offer a plausible reformulation of the doctrine of privileged access.
This reformulation will provide us with a defense of compatibilism, the view that content externalism and privileged access
are compatible. 相似文献
10.
Patrice Philie 《Philosophical Studies》2007,134(2):183-210
On an internalist account of logical inference, we are warranted in drawing conclusions from accepted premises on the basis
of our knowledge of logical laws. Lewis Carroll’s regress challenges internalism by purporting to show that this kind of warrant
cannot ground the move from premises to conclusion. Carroll’s regress vindicates a repudiation of internalism and leads to
the espousal of a standpoint that regards our inferential practice as not being grounded on our knowledge of logical laws.
Such a standpoint can take two forms. One can adopt either a broadly externalist model of inference or a sceptical stance.
I will attempt, in what follows, to defend a version of internalism which is not affected by the regress. The main strategy
will be to show that externalism and scepticism are not satisfying standpoints to adopt with regard to our inferential practice,
and then to suggest an internalist alternative. 相似文献