The child verbal competence effect in court: a comparative study of field investigative interviews of children in child sexual abuse cases

The purpose of this study is to compare field investigative interviews of children (FIIC) with three different legal outcomes in child sexual abuse cases: (i) insufficient evidence to proceed (IEP); (ii) convictions; or (iii) acquittals by the court. One hundred FIIC were divided into one of the three outcome possibilities. Amongst the female interviewees older than 10 years, there were no cases of acquittals and the convicted cases were over-represented. The children's response to open questions was found to be the main difference between the three FIIC outcomes. The responses to these open questions were 1.9 and 2.3 times longer in the convicted cases compared to acquittals and IEP. Possible explanations for the result are discussed. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The rhetorical foundation of philosophical argumentation

The rejection of rhetoric has been a constant theme in Western thought since Plato. The presupposition of such a debasement lies at the foundation of a certain view of Reason that I have called propositionalism, and which is analyzed in this article. The basic tenets of propositionalism are that truth is exclusive, i.e. it does not allow for any alternative, and that there is always only one proposition which must be true, the opposite one being false. Necessity and uniqueness are the ideals of propositionalism. But the question of the necessity of such a necessity is bound to arise. Foundationalism and propositionalism are intrinsically related. Since necessity excludes alternatives, rhetoric, which is based on the possibility of opposite standpoints, is unavoidably devalued as the crippled child of Reason, identical to sophistry or eristic. But propositionalism cannot justify itself and provide a justification for its own foundation without circle or contraditction. Since it responds to the problem of eradicating problems and alternatives through propositional entities, propositionalism is ultimately based on questioning to which it replies in the mode of denial. The unavowed foundation of Reason is therefore the question of questioning, even though this very question is suppressed as propositionalism. The trace of such a question is not only historical, but can also be seen, for instance, in the role played by the principle of contradiction in the constitution of propositional Reason (Artitotle): opposite propositions are not the expression of a problematic situation, they are either possible or successively unique propositions.We want to replace propositionalism by problematology which allows for the conceptualization of alternatives, thereby rendering a true rhetoric possible. Argumentation cannot then be equated with eristic any more, as propositionalism maintained.Rationality must be seen as having questioning as its true starting-point. Reason must be rhetorical if it is to survive the death of propositionalism which took place after the radical criticisms of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. Even if it is still hard ffor philosophers and rhetoricians to think within another framework and even though they prefer endlessly to deconstauct the old one instead of changing it, problematology is bound to impose itself as the new voice for rationality, because Reason has always endeavored to solve problems. Propositionalism has been only one way of conceiving problems, based on the view that solutions could be but the suppression of questioning.     

Commentary on “Can a good philosophical contribution be made just by asking a question?”

This paper explains some of the reasoning behind “Can a Good Philosophical Contribution Be Made Just by Asking a Question?,” a paper which consists solely in its title and which is published in the same issue of the journal as the present paper. The method for explaining that reasoning consists in making available a lightly edited version of a letter the authors sent to the editors when submitting the title-only paper. The editors permitted publication of that paper on the condition that the authors also separately publish a version of that letter; the present paper aims to fulfil that condition.     

Logical Pluralism from a Pragmatic Perspective

This paper presents a new view of logical pluralism. This pluralism takes into account how the logical connectives shift, depending on the context in which they occur. Using the Question-Under-Discussion Framework as formulated by Craige Roberts, I identify the contextual factor that is responsible for this shift. I then provide an account of the meanings of the logical connectives which can accommodate this factor. Finally, I suggest that this new pluralism has a certain Carnapian flavour. Questions about the meanings of the connectives or the best logic outside of a specified context are not legitimate questions.     

“Oh Events” for the Professor: Studies and Stories of Religious Studies Abroad

This response explains three ways in which the preceding essays are a significant contribution to the study of study abroad, explores three additional issues, and makes three suggestions for future work on religious studies and study abroad. This response is published alongside of six other essays, comprising a special section of the journal (see Teaching Theology and Religion 18:1, January 2015).     

Toward an Alliance Between the Issue-Processing Approach and Pragma-Dialectical Analysis

On the approach to discussions of policy choices that treats such discussions as instances of issue-processing, the joint use of the logic of questions and the logic of rules gives precise formulation to two sorts of issues. To one sort of issue belong issue-circumscribing questions; to another sort, issues-simplicter, which consist of disjunctions of policy proposals – so many proposed social rules – that are answers, in the case of each disjunction, to a given issue-circumscribing question. Work in pragma-dialectics can take over the issue-processing approach; and by doing so add to the pragma-dialectical repertory further dimensions in the analysis of issues and in protocol-narratives of discussion. The analysis and narratives would now include accounts of how issue-circumscribing questions generate initial standpoints and how discussions sometimes end with compromises between standpoints. Further research questions follow about transformations of issues and the comparison of successive rounds of discussion. A narrative of one period of discussion during `the War on Drugs' in the United States illustrates these points.     

关于哲学的问题研究

“恰当地提出问题”对于哲学甚至比对于科学更为重要,它体现出哲学活动的特殊性质。提问开放新的视域。使我们超出习见,进入思考和对话。着重于提出问题而非构造理论,在今天可以被视为一种研究哲学的方式。当今时代给我们提出了大量需要研究的课题,也要求我们能够提出自己的问题。另一方面,20世纪哲学的自我批判,不仅使哲学的一些基本范畴被重新审视,它的探索方式乃至其功能与合法性根据也受到质询。对问题的研究已成为把握时代和探索哲学发展途径的入手处。     

The pitch of “real” and “rhetorical” questions directed by a father to his daughter: A longitudinal case study

A longitudinal study of a father and his daughter examined pitch-variation of “real” and “rhetorical” questions. Although the father asked “real” and “rhetorical” questions from the start of the recordings, he did not distinguish them through differential pitch height until the baby was 15 months old.     

The differential effects of solution-focused and problem-focused coaching questions on the affect,attentional control and cognitive flexibility of undergraduate students experiencing study-related stress

Previous research has demonstrated that Solution-Focused (SF) coaching can help individuals to attain positive outcomes. However, not much is known about the processes through which these positive outcomes are achieved. In two experiments, we subjected undergraduate students to either SF or Problem-Focused (PF) questions about their study-related problems. In Experiment 1, we hypothesized and found that SF questioning (as compared to PF questioning) leads to higher positive affect (H1a) and lower negative affect (H1b). Contrary to our expectations, SF questions did not lead to higher attentional control (H2). In Experiment 2, we aimed to replicate the hypotheses for positive and negative affect and additionally hypothesized that SF questioning leads to higher cognitive flexibility (H3a). The results supported these hypotheses. However, our hypothesis that the differential effects of SF and PF questioning on cognitive flexibility are mediated by positive affect (H3b) was not supported. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.