排序方式: 共有4条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
1
1.
Thomas Szasz 《Current psychology (New Brunswick, N.J.)》2008,27(2):79-101
The term “psychiatry” refers to two radically different ideas and practices: curing–healing “souls” and coercing–controlling
persons. It is important that critics of psychiatry clarify whether they object to the former or the latter or both, and why.
Because I believe coerced psychiatric relations are like coerced labor relations called “slavery,” and like coerced sexual
relations called “rape,” I spent the better part of my professional life criticizing involuntary-institutional psychiatry
and the insanity defense. In 1967, my effort to undermine the medical-political legitimacy of the term “mental illness” and
the moral-legal legitimacy of depriving individuals of liberty by means of psychiatric rationalizations suffered a serious
blow: the creation of the antipsychiatry movement. Despite their claims, “antipsychiatrists” rejected neither the idea of
mental illness nor coercion practiced in the name of “treating” mental illness. Sensational claims about managing “schizophrenia”
and pretentious pseudophilosophical pronouncements diverted attention from the crucial role of the psychiatrist as an agent
of the state and as an adversary of the denominated patient. The legacy of the antipsychiatry movement is the creation of
a catchall term used to delegitimize and dismiss critics of psychiatric fraud and force by labeling them “antipsychiatrists.”
相似文献
Thomas SzaszEmail: |
2.
3.
Cameron Boult 《Ratio》2019,32(2):150-158
Distinguishing between excuses and exemptions advances our understanding of a standard range of problem cases in debates about epistemic norms. But it leaves open a problem of accounting for blameless norm violation in ‘prospective agents’. By shifting focus in our theory of excuses from rational excellence to norms governing the dispositions of agents, we can account for a fuller range of normative phenomena at play in debates about epistemic norms. 相似文献
4.
1