Eternity in an hour: experiences of time related to psychotherapy sessions

In this paper I consider the individual nature of the way a person develops senses of time. I suggest that something of a patient's early, unvoiced, experience is revealed through the temporal rhythms of interaction with the therapist. I refer to development, cycles of experience, metabolism, transgenerational emotions, experiences of beginnings and endings, early interactions with (m)other, together with narrative and its relation to unconscious processes. Experiences of time within the session indicate the nature of the feelings that are being lived, or refused life. I consider the paradox of living in the present and its relation to chronology. Lastly I give an example of the difficulty of timing comments when there is no flow of feeling, which is, itself, a communication.     

Drop the Small Talk When Establishing Baseline Behaviour in Interviews

The present experiment investigated the behavioural patterns of interviewees when comparing their baseline behaviour, prior to the interview, with their behaviour during the investigative interview. Similar to what has been advised in the police literature, the truthful baseline behaviour was established prior to the interview through non‐threatening questions. The investigative part of the interview then followed in which the interviewee was aware that they would be assessed on whether they were lying. During the investigative part, interviewees either discussed the job that they had (truth tellers, n = 128) or pretended to have (liars, n = 115). Findings revealed that both liars and truth tellers' behavioural patterns differed between the baseline behaviour and the investigative part of the interview. The findings suggest small talk should not be used as a baseline comparison with the investigative part of the interview when determining if the interviewee is being deceitful. An alternative way of using a baseline lie detection method, the comparable truth method, is discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The earth is the Lord's: the biblical view of the environment

The Church needs a characteristically Christian voice in environment discourse. The Bible offers this in the form of symbols and stories. Familiar terms such as righteousness, covenant and atonement originated in the biblical teaching about creation, and the liturgy of the Temple was to maintain the creation. Angels and their music described the powers of creation and cosmic harmony, and Adam lost all this when he chose secular knowledge rather than Wisdom from the Tree of Life.     

Heidegger’s Nietzsche

ABSTRACT

Heidegger maintained that Nietzsche was a metaphysical thinker. What did he mean by that? Not that Nietzsche advanced purely theoretical doctrines that might be perfected or refuted by rational argument. Instead, he meant that Nietzsche’s thinking is a ‘representational thinking’ (vorstellendes Denken) that preserves a commitment to a conception of truth as correctness (Richtigkeit). Nietzsche’s apparent denials of the intelligibility of truth, Heidegger argues, are in fact expressions of our growing insensitivity to truth understood as unconcealment (Unverborgenheit). Nietzsche’s thinking is thus deeply attuned to metaphysics as Heidegger came to understand it in the late 1930s, namely as a forgetting of being (Seinsvergessnheit), beginning with Plato. His interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought, particularly the idea of eternal recurrence, changed less because he changed his mind about Nietzsche than because he reconceived the philosophical tradition since Plato as metaphysical, and so reframed his own project as an attempt to think beyond metaphysics.     

Descartes and More on the infinity of the world

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I address the controversy between Henry More and René Descartes on the indefinite extension of the world. I provide a new reading of Descartes’ famous final answer of 15 April 1649. I read the entire debate in the terms of a disagreement concerning the epistemological status of the necessity of our judgement about the extension of the universe. Accordingly, the disagreement on the infinity of the world constitutes a case of a more general disagreement on the nature of the necessity of the theorems of Cartesian Physics. In particular, as concerns Descartes’ last reply, I argue that his assertion that a finite world is contradictory should be interpreted as a reply to More’s claim that the thesis of the infinity of the world, in so far as it cannot be grounded on the identity between matter and extension, does not express a logical necessity. Descartes’ assertion of the logical impossibility of a finite world, far from being, as it has always been read, a concession he made under the pressure of More’s objections, expresses the more radical element of the entire debate about the extension of the universe.     

Science and Religion: Some Demarcation Criteria

Discussions on the congruence, compatibility, and contradictions between science and religion have been going on since the rise of modern science. In our own times, there are many efforts to build bridges of harmony between the two. Most of these are anchored to particular religious traditions or denominations and also (often) to specific disciplines, notably cosmology, physics, and biology. Though these discussions serve commendable purposes for members of specific faiths and/or disciplines, they are also, for precisely this reason, of restricted appeal. There are not too many discussions of the topic that consider science and religion from a global perspective. It will therefore be useful to define science and religion in terms of their unique characteristics, draw the line of demarcation between them, and show where they overlap. This is what this paper attempts to do.     

ON THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN FREEDOM

Abstract. The age–old dilemma of free will and determinism is attacked by proving that both sides are flawed with contingencies, that the notion of eternal law is a theologically tainted projection rather than a reality of the real world that is understood to be evolutionary. Determinism is dissolved into conditionalism. This excludes materialistic scientific explanation of the deterministic style. As it brings forth freedom, evolutionary reality transcends essentially the explanatory possibilities of statistically structured natural laws. The dilemma of determinism and free will based on a logic of contradiction is replaced by an ontology of polarity.     

On the difficult case of loving life: Plato's Symposium and Nietzsche's eternal recurrence

A simple but significant historical fact has been overlooked in interpretations of Nietzsche's eternal recurrence. In making eternal recurrence the standard for the affirmation and love of life, Nietzsche accepts an understanding of love developed in Plato's Symposium: love means ‘wanting to possess the good forever’. I argue that Plato develops two distinct types of love, which remain in tension with one another. I then show that a corresponding tension arises in Nietzsche's work when we consider eternal recurrence as the love of life. By making love central in the phrase ‘love of life’, and by allowing Plato's thoughts on love to inform the love of life that Nietzsche expresses in the thought of eternal recurrence, I show that Nietzsche's dramatic presentations of the eternal recurrence do not present us with a test, but in revealing an incompatibility between loving something in life and loving life in its entirety, they present the tragic conflict in the task of life affirmation.     

Different ways of looking at unpleasant truths: How construal levels influence information search

When not knowing the negative outcome of past decision, people search for more information even when it confirms their negative suspicion. What drives this information search is the hope that the unpleasant state of “not knowing” ends when one faces the truth [Shani, Y., Tykocinski, O. E., &; Zeelenberg, M. (2008). When ignorance is not bliss: How distressing uncertainty drives the search of negative information. Journal of Economic Psychology, 29, 643–653; Shani, Y., &; Zeelenberg, M. (2007). When and why do we want to know? How experienced regret promotes post-decision information search. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 20, 207–222]. Previous research suggests that adopting high- or low-level construals of a situation can increase or decrease the affective value of experiences [Metcalfe, J., &; Mischel, W. (1999). A hot/cool-system analysis of delay of gratification: Dynamics of willpower. Psychological Review, 106, 3–19, Mischel, W., Ayduk, O., &; Mendoza-Denton, R. (2003). Sustaining delay of gratification over time: A hot–cool systems perspective. In G. Loewenstein &; D. Read (Eds.), Time and decision: Economic and psychological perspectives on intertemporal choice (pp. 175–200). New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation; Trope, Y., Gervey, B., &; Bolger, N. (2003). The role of perceived control in overcoming defensive self-evaluation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 407–419]. We propose that the need to know the potentially hurtful truths about one’s own decision increases when people adopt a low-level construal, but it decreases when people adopt a high-level construal. In five experiments, we manipulated construal levels and assessed the effects on information search and the underlying psychological process.     

Negative truths and truthmaker principles

This paper argues that a consideration of the problem of providing truthmakers for negative truths undermines truthmaker theory. Truthmaker theorists are presented with an uncomfortable dilemma. Either they must take up the challenge of providing truthmakers for negative truths, or else they must explain why negative truths are exceptions to the principle that every truth must have a truthmaker. The first horn is unattractive since the prospects of providing truthmakers for negative truths do not look good neither absences, nor totality states of affairs, nor Graham Priest and J.C. Beall’s ‘polarities’ (Beall, 2000; Priest, 2000) are up to the job. The second horn, meanwhile, is problematic because restricting the truthmaker principle to atomic truths, or weakening it to the thesis that truth supervenes on being, undercuts truthmaker theory’s original motivation. The paper ends by arguing that truthmaker theory is, in any case, an under-motivated doctrine because the groundedness of truth can be explained without appeal to the truthmaker principle. This leaves us free to give the ommonsensical and deflationary explanation of negative truths that common-sense suggests.