Being undone by research: an ethical obligation to togethering

I interviewed 24 women who participated in self-defense and handgun training classes who revealed lives that had been intentionally hidden, sharing the unspeakable experiences of incest, rape, child abuse, and domestic violence through stories of survival and resistance. In a poem to my participants, I reflect on my role as researcher and my desire to fulfill a commitment to my participants.

Hearing women’s stories of sexual and other violent assault, I not only experienced secondary trauma, but I have been charged with a mission of developing research products that will change policy. I wrote this poem as a way to communicate the complicated ethical issues that arise when conducting research with participants who reveal traumatic stories.     

Situating Moral Justification: Rethinking the Mission of Moral Epistemology

This is the first of two companion articles drawn from a larger project, provisionally entitled Undisciplining Moral Epistemology. The overall goal is to understand how moral claims may be rationally justified in a world characterized by cultural diversity and social inequality. To show why a new approach to moral justification is needed, it is argued that several currently influential philosophical accounts of moral justification lend themselves to rationalizing the moral claims of those with more social power. The present article explains how discourse ethics is flawed just in this way. The article begins by identifying several conditions of adequacy for assessing reasoning practices designed to achieve moral justification and shows that, when used in contexts of cultural diversity and social inequality, discourse ethics fails these conditions. It goes on to argue that the failure of discourse ethics is rooted in its reliance on a broader conception of moral epistemology that is invidiously idealized. It concludes by pointing to the need to rethink both the mission and the method of moral epistemology.     

On the archetypes in information systems development: An exploration

In this paper I examine possible archetypes that embody the role that systems analyst play in different models of systems development and briefly review attendant epistemological and ontological assumptions.     

REALISM AND OPENNESS IN SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY

Abstract. Intrinsic to rigorous knowledge of God is the recognition that positive theological concepts and statements about God arising under the compelling claims of God's reality upon the human mind must have an open revisable structure. A similar combination of critical realism and ontological openness is apparent in the profound change that has taken place in the rational structure of rigorous science from the radical dualism and closed causal system of classical mechanics to the unifying world view and open dynamic field-theories of modern physics. It is argued that the intersection of theological and natural science in their epis-temological foundations can enhance their ontological commitment and heuristic thrust.     

Epistemological controversies in the analytic field elucidated by the theological realm

This article proposes to address certain epistemological controversies in psychoanalysis by elucidating them through the religious field. The theological field serves the author as the repressed, which indicates the latent stakes that continue to do work at the heart of these debates. The goal is to show how debates that take place on the epistemological level bring into confrontation different anthropological concepts and discursive traditions that have their roots in religious discourses. The principal hypothesis of the author is that the dissident theories of psychoanalysis can be understood as a return to a pre‐monotheistic theological conception or to an idolatrous practice that aims, primarily, to undo castration. This hypothesis will be used to elucidate the debates with two authors: Adler and Rank. The author shows how these theorists, by leaving analytical ground, connect their theories to pre‐monotheistic conceptions and highlight conceptual tools that are characteristic to them.     

Accidentally True Beliefs and the Williamsonian Mental State of Knowing

In this paper, I will explore some philosophical implications of Williamson’s thesis that knowing is a state of mind (KSM). Using the fake barn case, I will introduce a way to evaluate Williamson’s KSM thesis and determine whether the Williamsonian mental state of knowing can be plausibly distinguished from certain other similar but epistemologically distinctive states of mind (i.e., accidentally true beliefs). Then, some tentative externalist accounts of the supposed differences between the Williamsonian mental state of knowing and accidentally true beliefs will be critically assessed, implying that the evaluated traditional versions of externalism in semantics and epistemology do not fit well with Williamson’s KSM thesis. Ultimately, I suggest that the extended-mind or extended-knower approach may be more promising, which indicates that active externalism would be called for by Williamson’s KSM thesis.     

Epistemological Development and Judgments and Reasoning About Teaching Methods

Children's, adolescents’, and adults’ (N = 96 7–8, 10–11, and 13–14-year-olds and university students) epistemological development and its relation to judgments and reasoning about teaching methods was examined. The domain (scientific or moral), nature of the topic (controversial or noncontroversial), and teaching method (direct instruction by lectures versus class discussions) were systematically varied. Epistemological development was assessed in the aesthetics, values, and physical truth domains. All participants took the domain, nature of the topic, and teaching method into consideration in ways that showed age-related variations. Epistemological development in the value domain alone was predictive of preferences for class discussions and a critical perspective on teacher-centered direct instruction, even when age was controlled in the analysis.     

Caught in the crossfire: A case of mistaken identity among religious revivalists and secularists

The discussion of Islamic and Protestant revivalisms inflames not only believers but secularists as well. This paper is about standpoint and perceived standpoint in relation to carrying out feminist research about why some women in a liberal democracy join revivalist movements. The article also discusses the variegated nature of power relations within the research process. Situated within a Women's Studies Centre the author found herself in the crossfire between secular feminists and religious revivalists—some members of each group insisting she represented the position of the opposing view. This paper explores the conflictual situation and resulting ‘epistemological vertigo’ in circumstances where revivalists and secularists each believed in the stereotype of the other and assumed the researcher embodied it.     

初二学生的科学观及其与科学发现学习的关系

该研究旨在通过问卷法和实验法考察初二学生在自然科学领域中的认识论观念及其对学习过程和策略的影响.研究一发现,在科学的动态性、有限性、客观性、理论价值取向、公众性以及对科学的态度兴趣等六种基本观念上,初二学生总体上持有较混合的看法;对科学的积极态度与学习者的物理学习成绩相关显著.研究二考察了科学观对科学发现学习的影响.科学的公众性观念与灵活应用测验成绩相关显著,科学的客观性观念及智力水平对科学发现学习中的控制性实验策略有重要影响.     

Overcoming obstacles to a truly global psychological theory,research, and praxis in Africa

In African countries, psychology as it is taught, researched, and practised contributes to epistemic injustice and epistemological violence while depriving Africans of epistemic agency. This is largely because psychology has remained and continues to remain Eurocentric. However, the continual Eurocentric hegemony is not entirely imposed but internalised. This has made this Eurocentric hegemony self-perpetuating with African involvement. In this paper, the sources of this hegemony are explored with a view to identifying how Africans themselves contribute to the persistence of these academic “ills”. Furthermore, processes are examined through which African psychologists can disentangle themselves from this vicious cycle in order to make accurate and innovative contributions to the global understanding of human nature. Nsamenang’s pioneering role in confronting the wrongs is discussed, paving the way for the next generation of African psychologists to make contributions that are similar to, or surpass, Nsamenang’s lifetime contributions. I conclude by making some recommendations as to the way forward in the post-Nsamenang era.