Rationality ideals and mentality

Mackenzie, this journal, this issue, convincingly shows that in certain dialogue games (commitment games) there are procedural restrictions similar to those that I impose on rationality idealizations. But, whereas my rationality analysis is set in the context of belief games, commitment games do not postulate beliefs. Is this significant? I suggest that mackenzie thinks that it is. There follow discussions of Psychologism and Behaviourism.     

How serious a fallacy is inconsistency?

Consistency is often pictured as an indispensable requisite for rationality. The paper argues that this is overly rigoristic. Inconsistency can be treated as a matter of isolable singularities rather than an all-destructive disaster. The paper, supports and illustrates a perspective on which consistency can be seen as a desideratum rather than a totaly non-negotiable demand. The argumentation of the paper casts consistency in the role of a cognitive ideal rather than a sine qua non condition of rational process.     

Coalescent argumentation

Coalescent argumentation is a normative ideal that involves the joining together of two disparate claims through recognition and exploration of opposing positions. By uncovering the crucial connection between a claim and the attitudes, beliefs, feelings, values and needs to which it is connected dispute partners are able to identify points of agreement and disagreement. These points can then be utilized to effect coalescence, a joining or merging of divergent positions, by forming the basis for a mutual investigation of non-conflictual options that might otherwise have remained unconsidered. The essay proceeds by defining and discussing argument, position and understanding. These notions are then brought together to outline the concept of coalescent reasoning.     

From dialectic to organization: Bogdanov’s contribution to social theory

This paper situates Bogdanov in the context of social theory generally and socialist theory in particular. It outlines briefly the principal characteristics of his mature system, and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of his approach to the fundamental problems of social thought. The paper devotes particular attention to the problem of just how systems develop from less complex to more complex forms of organization, and evaluates Bogdanov’s solution to this problem against the background of populist, social democratic, and Leninist alternatives.     

Pierre de La Ramée et le déclin de la rhétorique

This article provides a basic general introduction to Ramus, and evaluates his role in the history of logic and rhetoric, especially with relation to the study of argumentation. The author agrees with Ong and other historians of logic that Ramus is not to be taken seriously as a logician, and that his undoubted importance in the history of ideas is to be found elsewhere.Ramus advocates a belief in nature, experience and reason, and rejects the reliance on the authority of ancient philosophers, above all Aristotle, though experience does not mean scientific experiment and, paradoxically, includes the example of great philosophers and writers. In the end Ramus is seen as responsible for substituting for ancient classical rhetoric an entirely ornamental rhetoric of figures which was to take over education (with the exception of the Jesuit schools) almost until our own day. This curtailing and diminishing of rhetoric is seen as a degeneration. Ancient five-part rhetoric had been concerned with convincing and persuading: Aristotle distinguished the analytic, scientific reasoning of logic, from dialectic which was based on opinion and probability and had close links with rhetoric; by the time of Cicero and Quintilian, who addressed themselves to jurists and politicians, logic has given way to dialectic. In the Middle Ages and the Renaissance the two become assimilated; the evolution of this is traced here through the thirteenth-century Summulae logicales of Peter of Spain to the fifteenth-century German humanist logician Rudolph Agricola, who influenced Ramus partly through the intermediary of Johann Sturm. Ramus took over their topical theories but restricted them to logic/dialectic, and left rhetoric with little more than tropes and figures. He believed that there was only one method for teaching all the arts, and one dialectic common to them all. The distinction between analytical and dialectical has disappeared, with far-reaching consequences for the study of argumentation. Over the centuries logic has lost its connection with controversy and persuasion. With the development of the post-Cartesian, post-Baconian emphasis on the clarity of scientific discourse, and the mid-nineteenth-century interest in mathematical and formal logic, the process was complete. Argumentation, or the new rhetoric, aims to fill the gap thus created.

     

忘我问卷的编制及其信效度检验

通过文献分析和访谈,阐明忘我的概念与结构,并编制了忘我问卷。采用现场发放和网络问卷的方式对607名被试进行忘我问卷的初测。接着,对357名被试施测正式问卷,进行信度、效度检验。探索性因素分析显示,忘我问卷由3个因子构成; 验证性因素分析表明该量表拟合良好(RMSEA=0.07,NFI=0.95,CFI=0.95,GFI=0.92,AGFI=0.89)。问卷总体一致性系数为0.89,3个因子的内部一致性系数在0.84-0.88之间。问卷总体得分与效标问卷特质焦虑得分呈负相关(-0.51),与安适幸福感、正念觉知的得分呈正相关(分别为0.36、0.31)。忘我问卷具有良好的信度和效度,可在后续的相关研究和实践中作为测量问卷或评估工具使用。     

基于文化的心理复原力研究

随着对个体心理复原力研究不断深入,文化作为影响个体心理复原力的重要因素日益受到关注,研究者在厘清文化与复原力之间的关系后,尝试以积极心理学的视角,将中国传统文化中"天人合一"、"以人为本"、"自强不息"、"厚德载物"等文化精神引入到个体心理复原力发展的过程中,为个体心理复原力的研究贡献价值。     

弗洛姆人本主义精神分析的启蒙价值

弗洛姆人本主义精神分析综合了欧洲文化传统的理性主义、人本主义、批判精神和救世情怀这些基本要素, 他试图用理性主义和人本主义的标准和精神分析心理学的工具来剖析他所处的社会和身边的人, 并探索实现理想社会和人的发展的途径。这一事业的价值实际上是启蒙。他从现代人的不安全感处境出发, 深刻分析了威权主义、民族主义、消费主义的病理机制, 进而提出了基于人本主义原则的社会改革方案。弗洛姆人本主义精神分析的理论和实践对于21世纪人类发展问题的解决仍然具有启发意义。     

Adorno,Hegel, and Dialectic

This article explores critical theory's relations to German idealism by clarifying how Adorno's thought relates to Hegel's. Adorno's apparently mixed responses to Hegel centre on the dialectic and actually form a coherent whole. In his Logic, Hegel outlines the dialectical process by which categories – fundamental forms of thought and reality – necessarily follow one another in three stages: abstraction, dialectic proper, and the speculative (famously simplified as ‘thesis, antithesis, synthesis’). Adorno's allegiance to Hegel's dialectic emerges when he traces the dialectical process whereby enlightenment reverts to myth and human domination over nature reverts into our domination by nature. However, Adorno criticizes Hegel's dialectic as the ultimate form of ‘identity thinking’, subsuming unique, material objects under universal concepts by using dialectical reason to expand those concepts to cover objects utterly. These two responses cohere because Adorno shares Hegel's view that dialectical contradictions require reconciliation, but differs from Hegel on the nature of reconciliation. For Hegel, reconciliation unites differences into a whole; for Adorno, reconciled differences co-exist as differences. Finally, against Habermas who holds that Adorno cannot consistently criticize the enlightenment practice of critique, I show that Adorno can do so consistently because of how he reshapes Hegelian dialectic.