The Embodied Penman: Effector‐Specific Motor–Language Integration During Handwriting

Several studies have illuminated how processing manual action verbs (MaVs) affects the programming or execution of concurrent hand movements. Here, to circumvent key confounds in extant designs, we conducted the first assessment of motor–language integration during handwriting—a task in which linguistic and motoric processes are co‐substantiated. Participants copied MaVs, non‐manual action verbs, and non‐action verbs as we collected measures of motor programming and motor execution. Programming latencies were similar across conditions, but execution was faster for MaVs than for the other categories, regardless of whether word meanings were accessed implicitly or explicitly. In line with the Hand‐Action‐Network Dynamic Language Embodiment (HANDLE) model, such findings suggest that effector‐congruent verbs can prime manual movements even during highly automatized tasks in which motoric and verbal processes are naturally intertwined. Our paradigm opens new avenues for fine‐grained explorations of embodied language processes.     

The impact of informant gender on children’s endorsement of scientific and non-scientific information

By roughly 6 years of age, children acquire the stereotype that men are more competent than women in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), potentially leading to greater trust in scientific information provided by men. This study tested whether 3- to 8-year-old children differentially endorsed conflicting information about science and toys presented by male and female informants depicted as a ‘man’ and ‘woman’ (Exp1) or ‘scientists’ (Exp2). Children were expected to endorse toy testimony from gender-matched informants; thus, the key question concerned endorsement of science testimony. In Exp1 (N = 149), boys and girls showed a same-gender informant preference for toy testimony; however, girls endorsed the male informant's testimony more for science than for toys – but only when tested by a male experimenter. In Exp2 (N = 264), boys and girls showed a same-gender preference, irrespective of content. Findings suggest that STEM-related gender stereotypes might lead girls to trust scientific information presented by men over women in certain contexts.     

Complex Communication Dynamics: Exploring the Structure of an Academic Talk

Communication is a multimodal phenomenon. The cognitive mechanisms supporting it are still understudied. We explored a natural dataset of academic lectures to determine how communication modalities are used and coordinated during the presentation of complex information. Using automated and semi‐automated techniques, we extracted and analyzed, from the videos of 30 speakers, measures capturing the dynamics of their body movement, their slide change rate, and various aspects of their speech (speech rate, articulation rate, fundamental frequency, and intensity). There were consistent but statistically subtle patterns in the use of speech rate, articulation rate, intensity, and body motion across the presentation. Principal component analysis also revealed patterns of system‐like covariation among modalities. These findings, although tentative, do suggest that the cognitive system is integrating body, slides, and speech in a coordinated manner during natural language use. Further research is needed to clarify the specific coordination patterns that occur between the different modalities.     

Above suspicion: Cognitive and intentional aspects of the ability to lie

This paper looks at the attribution of the ability to lie and not at lying or lies. It also departs from more familiar approaches by focussing on the appraisal of an ability and not on the ability in itself. We believe that this attribution perspective is required to bring out the cognitive and intentional basis of the ability to lie.     

Memory deficits in Alzheimer's patients: A comprehensive review

Despite considerable experimental work on Alzheimer's disease (AD), the underlying cognitive mechanisms as well as the precise localization of neuropathological changes critical for memory loss remains undefined. A review of the neuropsychological literature on long-term memory deficits in AD patients suggests that AD patients display (a) a pervasive deficit of explicit memory, (b) a partial deficiency of implicit memory for verbal and visuoperceptual material (as measured by repetition priming procedures), and (c) a substantial sparing of implicit memory for visuomotor skills. The explicit memory loss is likely a result of encoding as well as consolidation difficulties. A faulty lexical-semantic knowledge structure appears responsible for deficient repetition priming effects. Since neuropathological changes diffusely affect the brain of AD patients, establishing a clear relationship between localization of cerebral lesions and memory deficits is particularly difficult. Nevertheless, data suggest that extensive involvement of the hippocampal-amygdala complex plays a major role in explicit memory loss. Damage to associative cortical areas likely is involved in repetition priming deficits. The relative integrity of primary motor and sensory cortical areas and of the basal ganglia likely subsume, by contrast, the normal learning of visuomotor skills.     

A review of the animate-inanimate distinction in infancy: Implications for models of social and cognitive knowing

The ability to distinguish people from things sheds light on an important theoretical question: how is the development of social cognition related to the development of physical cognition? According to Piaget (1954), cognition is unitary and the processes used in dealing with the physical world are the same as those employed in the social world. This statement should be questioned. Although people and objects share certain fundamental properties (size, shape, etc.), only people can communicate, act independently and have feelings and intentions. Thus, people seem much more complex to deal with than things. If all cognitive development derives from the growth of a unitary system, then knowledge about animate objects should lag behind that of inanimate objects. The present paper explores this idea by examining what infants know about the attributes that distinguish people from things. It is concluded that the onset of this distinction begins early in life. Even 2-month-old infants treat people and objects differently when confounding variables of the stimuli are controlled. Rather than lagging behind, the infants' understanding of people appears precocious. The infants' recognition of the crucial distinction between the two classes suggests that a conceptual system is beginning to be formed soon after birth. This conceptual system appears different for social and non-social objects and serves as a foundation from which infants might come to understand the distinctive properties of animate and inanimate objects.     

An infrared system for the detection of a pigeon''s pecks at alphanumeric characters on a TV screen: the dependency of letter detection on the predictability of one letter by another.

Three pigeons pecked at letters of the alphabet and at the symbol "?" displayed on a computer-driven cathode ray screen. A 4 by 4 matrix of infrared emitting and detecting diodes and associated circuitry identified the location of a pigeon''s responses to the screen. Responses at the target letter T were probabilistically reinforced with food whenever T appeared in a string of three letters in the middle of the screen. Responses at the symbol "?" appearing below this string were probabilistically reinforced whenever T did not appear. The letter F anywhere in the three-character string either strongly predicted the occurrence of the target letter T, in two conditions, or predicted its nonoccurrence, in a third. This manipulation of the frequency with which the familiar letter F predicted T was shown to change the function relating probability of a correct peck at the symbol "?" to the number of Fs in the string. This effect may be interpreted as an instance of the phenomenon where an organism''s acquired knowledge changes what it sees.     

Philosophy as a thief?

This is a performative piece of writing in the presence of and inspired by Richard Shusterman's Philosophy and the Art of Writing. It tries to show that the relationship between the act of writing and the formation of our human consciousness (philosophical and, more deeply, poietic) is a developing and growing process through history, and before it. The dominance of an image consciousness was slowly challenged and then replaced by a linguistic consciousness with the advent of writing, and accelerated by the invention of printing and mass literacy. Shusterman teaches us an embodied kind of philosophizing that uses the word but isn't limited by it. This paper suggests that a return to image consciousness has already occurred and that the old book consciousness is disappearing. Lessons from the book consciousness are offered.     

SPIRITUAL INTELLIGENCE: PROCESSING DIFFERENT INFORMATION OR PROCESSING INFORMATION DIFFERENTLY?

This article introduces the concept of spiritual intelligence in terms of a natural human ability to take a different perspective on reality rather than an extraordinary ability to engage with a different/supernatural reality. From a cognitive perspective, spiritual intelligence entails a re-balancing of the two main modes of human cognition, with a prioritization of the holistic-intuitive mind over the conceptual one. From the psychological and phenomenological perspectives, it involves a different kind of engagement with information: slower, more participatory, less objectifying, and not focused entirely on problem solving. The article ends with a reflection on the theological implications of the proposed model and how such an account of spiritual intelligence as knowing differently might relate to theological anthropology and the theology of the spirit and the spiritual.     

An evaluation of the convergent validity of a face-to-face and virtual neuropsychological assessment counter balanced

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the need for further research evaluating the validity of conducting a battery of neuropsychological assessments virtually compared with face-to-face administration. Previous research has suggested that some neuropsychological assessments yield valid results when administered virtually, however, much of the previous research focused on older adults. To determine the validity of virtually administered neuropsychological tests, 28 healthy participants were assessed using a within-subjects, counter-balanced design. Participants completed a neuropsychological assessment battery covering tests of general intellectual functioning, memory and attention, executive functioning, language and information processing speed, as well as effort. There was no significant difference between face-to-face administration of the neuropsychological battery compared with virtual administration for the majority of the tests used. However, there were significant differences in the Colour Naming Task, with participants making fewer errors on the colour naming task and inhibition/switching task when administered virtually compared with face-to-face administration. There was also a significant age cohort effect in the inhibition/switching task. There was also a trending significant difference in mode of administration for the Verbal Fluency Task. Virtually administered neuropsychological assessments largely provide a valid alternative to face-to-face assessments; however, consideration must be given to test selection as well as the population of participants that are being assessed. Other important considerations must focus on preserving the security and integrity of test materials, as well as administration in a medico-legal setting. Future research should focus on validating assessments with specific patient populations and developing a neuropsychological assessment battery using information technology.