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1.
Jennifer A. Herdt 《The Journal of religious ethics》2019,47(1):68-93
Eudaimonism is often regarded as egoistic. If it recommends that agents pursue their own good because it is their own good, it is guilty as charged. But excellence‐prior eudaimonism offers a non‐egoistic alternative to this welfare‐prior eudaimonism. Excellence‐prior eudaimonism recommends that an agent live in a way that is in fact good for the agent, but it does not regard the agent’s own good as necessarily that for the sake of which the agent acts, nor does it regard living well as justified by the fact that it is good for the agent, but simply because it is good. The Christian eudaimonisms of Augustine and Aquinas are best understood as deepened forms of excellence‐prior eudaimonism. 相似文献
2.
溃疡性结肠炎的诊断标准与诊断思维 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
杨国利 《医学与哲学(人文社会医学版)》2008,29(5):7-9
溃疡性结肠炎的诊断条件包括临床表现、结肠镜改变、钡灌肠与肠黏膜组织学等,诊断标准应根据上述条件的不同组合分为疑诊与确诊,结肠镜与黏膜活检最为重要。强调在排除诊断基础上正确应用诊断标准。诊断成立后,应全面评估病情,特别是病变范围、严重度与活动性,以便合理地临床决策与预后判断,提高诊断水平。 相似文献
3.
Yong Huang 《The Journal of religious ethics》2008,36(2):321-353
In this article, I present a neo‐Confucian answer, by Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, to the question, “Why should I be moral?” I argue that this answer is better than some representative answers in the Western philosophical tradition. According to the Chengs, one should be moral because it is a joy to perform moral actions. Sometimes one finds it a pain, instead of a joy, to perform moral actions only because one lacks the necessary genuine moral knowledge—knowledge that is accessible to every common person as long as one makes the effort to learn. One should make the effort to learn such knowledge—to seek joy in performing moral actions—because to be moral is a distinguishing mark of being human. This neo‐Confucian answer seems to be egoistic, as its conception of motivation for morality is based on self‐interest: to seek one's own joy. However, since it emphasizes that one's true self‐interest is to seek joy in things uniquely human, which is to be moral, self‐interest and morality become identical; the more a person seeks one's self‐interest, the more moral the person is, and vice versa. 相似文献
4.
Those who subscribe to aprudential conception of practical reason do not believe that there is a conflict between other-regarding and self-regarding norms as the former are held to be founded on the latter. Moral conduct, they maintain, is always rationally justifiable. The reasons we should fulfil the demands of other-regarding norms are the same as those we have for fulfilling self-regarding norms. David Brink has put forth an interesting and novel account of this approach to practical reason which he calls‘metaphysical egoism’. Metaphysical egoism requires that we modify our pre-theoretical understandings of self-interest on metaphysical grounds. I critically assess Brink’s argument and claim that metaphysical egoism does not adequately function as a motive or guide for action. It is susceptible to many of the same problems which strategic egoism faces. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
5.
Michael Slote 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2015,10(3):430
Spinoza conceived human freedom as a matter solely of rationality, but an understanding of the role emotion plays in moral virtue can lead one toward viewing emotionality as also essential to human freedom. A large part of human freedom consists in our tendency to give intrinsic importance to people or things outside ourselves and take them into our lives; this sense of importance, in rich and various ways, brings emotion into the center of our lives and our freedom as individuals. 相似文献
6.
Don Adams 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(4):395-417
Because the moral philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas is egoistic while modern consequentialism is impartialistic, it might at first appear that the former cannot, while the latter can, provide a common value on the basis of which inter‐personal conflicts may be settled morally. On the contrary, in this paper I intend to argue not only that Aquinas’ theory does provide just such a common value, but that it is more true to say of modern consequentialism than of Thomism that it gives in to the partiality of different interests and fails to provide a robust common value on the basis of which disagreements may be settled morally. This is so primarily because the egoism of Aquinas represents a fundamental commitment to personal moral development which is absent from modern teleological theories. 相似文献
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Egoism is a personality trait that is associated with self‐enriching and self‐centred behaviours. Research has suggested that egoism lies beyond the Big Five personality factors. Recently, the HEXACO model of personality has been proposed as an alternative to the Big Five model. In three studies, the relation between the HEXACO Personality Inventory and egoism, conceptualized using three different questionnaires (DPQ Egoism, SPI Egotism and the Egoism Scale), is investigated. In all three studies, the HEXACO Honesty–Humility factor scale was the most important predictor of egoism. Additionally, in two studies in which FFM measures were used, the HEXACO Personality Inventory explained more variance in egoism than did the FFPI (Study 2) and the NEO‐PI‐R (Study 3). Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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David M. Holley 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2002,5(1):45-65
Henry Sidgwick regarded his failure to reconcile the claims of rational egoism with those of utilitarianism to reveal a fundamental contradiction within practical reason. However, the conflict that concerns him arises only in relation to a particular kind of agent. While Sidgwick construes his version of the problem to be a systematic formulation of a conflict that arises within the practical reasoning of ordinary people, it is actually an example of a worst-case scenario that reflects the common philosophical tendency to deal with issues in their most challenging form. But such a transformation of ordinary conflicts between self-interest and morality into an insoluble philosophical problem obscures the nature of the more typical practical conflict. 相似文献
10.
Jonathan Harrison 《Argumentation》1995,9(4):595-609
In this paper I shall consider the difficulty for Ethical Egoism, Act Utilitarianism and later what I shall call Cumulative Effect Utilitarianism, that they both commit the fallacy of pragmatic inconsistency. I shall distinguish various forms of the fallacy of pragmatic inconsistency; in particular I shall distinguish between the fallacy of direct and indirect pragmatic inconsistency, and shall argue that though both Ethical Egoism and Act Utilitarianism probably commit both, Cumulative Effect Utilitarianism does not.How art thou out of breath when thou hast breath To say to me that thou art out of breath?William Shakespeare,Romeo and Juliet.
But when I tell him he hates flatterers, He says he does, being then most flattered.William Shakespeare,Julius Caesar. 相似文献