Good or Bad,We Want it Now: Fixed‐cost Present Bias for Gains and Losses Explains Magnitude Asymmetries in Intertemporal Choice

Intertemporal tradeoffs are ubiquitous in decision making, yet preferences for current versus future losses are rarely explored in empirical research. Whereas rational‐economic theory posits that neither outcome sign (gains vs. losses) nor outcome magnitude (small vs. large) should affect delay discount rates, both do, and moreover, they interact: in three studies, we show that whereas large gains are discounted less than small gains, large losses are discounted more than small losses. This interaction can be understood through a reconceptualization of fixed‐cost present bias, which has traditionally described a psychological preference for immediate rewards. First, our results establish present bias for losses—a psychological preference to have losses over with now. Present bias thus predicts increased discounting of future gains but decreased (or even negative) discounting of future losses. Second, because present bias preferences do not scale with the magnitude of possible gains or losses, they play a larger role, relative to other motivations for discounting, for small magnitude intertemporal decisions than for large magnitude intertemporal decisions. Present bias thus predicts less discounting of large gains than small gains but more discounting of large losses than small losses. The present research is the first to demonstrate that the effect of outcome magnitude on discount rates may be opposite for gains and losses and also the first to offer a theory (an extension of present bias) and process data to explain this interaction. The results suggest that policy efforts to encourage future‐oriented choices should frame outcomes as large gains or small losses. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Farting as a defence against unspeakable dread

This paper describes some features of the behaviour of a severely disturbed adopted latency boy. Peter was born premature, suffered several early hospitalizations and surgical operations, and at 2 months of age was removed from his mother's care by Social Services for neglect and abandonment.
Although his subsequent development has been clouded by a series of losses and sudden changes of caregivers, Peter has maintained an unexpected desire to relate, showing considerable innate resilience. When feeling endangered, Peter had developed a defensive olfactive container using his bodily smell and farts to envelop himself in a protective cloud of familiarity against the dread of falling apart, and to hold his personality together.
In the paper Fordham's views of development and Anzieu's concept of psychic envelopes constitute the theoretical underpinning. Bion's concepts of beta- and alpha-elements are discussed in relation to Jung's views on symbolic development and psychological containment.     

THE VALUE OF UNCERTAINTY

The author discusses some of the characteristics of Roy Schafer's contributions to psychoanalysis that he finds most valuable, such as his openness to uncertainty, his anti‐reductive view of analytic constructions, his unique formulation of the analyst's role, and his close attention to how the patient engenders particular emotional reactions in the analyst. The author also presents a clinical vignette illustrating the value of the analyst's tolerance of uncertainty in the face of the patient's push for interpretations, explanations, and reassurance.     

Feelings of dread and intertemporal choice

It frequently has been observed that people discount future rewards relative to present rewards. However, the literature on intertemporal choices involving emotional upsets and losses is fraught with inconsistencies, with some studies finding similar discounting of gains and losses, and others reporting that participants elect to undergo negative experiences sooner rather than later. To help resolve these contradictions, time preferences for different types of aversive experiences (social rejection, embarrassment, pain, monetary and property loss) were examined in five studies. Most participants preferred to postpone monetary and property losses, but intertemporal choices for other unpleasant experiences showed highly variable responses, with some participants deferring them as long as possible, and many electing to experience them immediately. Time preferences for these negative experiences were correlated, but were independent of time preference for rewards. It is argued (following Loewenstein, 1987 ) that anticipation of dread plays a key role in many people's choices about timing of aversive experiences. This interpretation was supported by choices about when to learn of a very unpleasant event whose timing was fixed (Study 3), and by a novel preference reversal (Study 4). Study 5 examined how actual and hypothetical experiences of dread unfolded over time; the results were consistent with a dread‐based interpretation of choices in the preceding studies. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

BETWEEN KNOWING AND BELIEVING: SALVAGING ILLUSION'S RIGHTFUL PLACE IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

Illusion has historically received insufficient psychoanalytic attention, even though it plays an indispensable and adaptive role that helps protect individuals from becoming traumatized by the most psychically noxious aspects of reality. Trauma is mitigated by an individual's knowing about the existence of such realities yet simultaneously believing them non‐existent, with neither position granted exclusivity. Psychoanalytic theory is surprisingly predicated on the employment of illusions that picture an individual capable of controlling the potentially traumatic actions of others, just so long as the individual effectively manages his own intrapsychic processes (wishes, fantasies, impulses, etc.). The role of illusion in everyday life is highlighted.     

Heidegger's Brightness as a Responsibility of the Therapist in Existential Family Therapy

The author reflects upon the Heideggerian concepts of thrown-ness, death imagery, arrogance and brightness and their usefulness in existential family therapy. The article describes and illustrates with clinical material the process of helping a couple or family to move from an arrogance response to thrownness and death imagery to the response of brightness as attendants of Being. The responsibilities of the therapist in facilitating such a process are also described.Director of the Worthington Logotherapy Institute, co-director of Lantz and Lantz Counseling Associates, and a professor at The Ohio State University. College of Social Work     

跨期决策中的负折扣现象及其机制

主流跨期决策模型认为, 跨期决策存在一个时间折扣过程。时间折扣是指人们会根据将来获益或损失的延迟时间对其效用进行折扣, 折扣后的效用小于原来的效用, 而负折扣现象违背了时间折扣过程。负折扣现象出现在金钱、非金钱的获益与损失领域, 其可能的解释机制为预期情绪。目前关于负折扣现象的研究, 较少验证其影响机制, 未来的研究可以结合眼动追踪和fMRI技术探讨其机制, 并丰富对负折扣现象的影响因素研究。     

Dreading the pain of others? Altruistic responses to others' pain underestimate dread

A dislike of waiting for pain, aptly termed ‘dread’, is so great that people will increase pain to avoid delaying it. However, despite many accounts of altruistic responses to pain in others, no previous studies have tested whether people take delay into account when attempting to ameliorate others' pain. We examined the impact of delay in 2 experiments where participants (total N = 130) specified the intensity and delay of pain either for themselves or another person. Participants were willing to increase the experimental pain of another participant to avoid delaying it, indicative of dread, though did so to a lesser extent than was the case for their own pain. We observed a similar attenuation in dread when participants chose the timing of a hypothetical painful medical treatment for a close friend or relative, but no such attenuation when participants chose for a more distant acquaintance. A model in which altruism is biased to privilege pain intensity over the dread of pain parsimoniously accounts for these findings. We refer to this underestimation of others' dread as a ‘Dread Empathy Gap’.     

Social discounting of pain

Impatience can be formalized as a delay discount rate, describing how the subjective value of reward decreases as it is delayed. By analogy, selfishness can be formalized as a social discount rate, representing how the subjective value of rewarding another person decreases with increasing social distance. Delay and social discount rates for reward are correlated across individuals. However no previous work has examined whether this relationship also holds for aversive outcomes. Neither has previous work described a functional form for social discounting of pain in humans. This is a pertinent question, since preferences over aversive outcomes formally diverge from those for reward. We addressed this issue in an experiment in which healthy adult participants (N = 67) chose the timing and intensity of hypothetical pain for themselves and others. In keeping with previous studies, participants showed a strong preference for immediate over delayed pain. Participants showed greater concern for pain in close others than for their own pain, though this hyperaltruism was steeply discounted with increasing social distance. Impatience for pain and social discounting of pain were weakly correlated across individuals. Our results extend a link between impatience and selfishness to the aversive domain.