Jung in the academy: devotions and resistances

Jung's position in the contemporary mainstream English-speaking university is problematical indeed. For various historical and ideological reasons, Jung is generally not included in the courses in academic psychology, and in the humanities and social sciences his reception is lukewarm to say the least. He has only a marginal place in religious studies. This notorious academic resistance to Jung is compensated, some would say overcompensated, by student interest and enthusiasm, which sometimes seeks to make a religious dogma out of Jung's psychology. In a sense, cynical resistance to Jung and fanatical devotion to Jung can be seen to generate each other in a sort of binary opposition. This situation is unfortunate because neither extreme presents a fair or balanced view of Jung's thought or of his contribution to intellectual history. These and other problems associated with the teaching of Jung in a university setting are briefly outlined in this paper.     

Do looks constitute our perceptual evidence?

Many philosophers take experience to be an essential aspect of perceptual justification. I argue against a specific variety of such an experientialist view, namely, the Looks View of perceptual justification, according to which our visual beliefs are mediately justified by beliefs about the way things look. I describe three types of cases that put pressure on the idea that perceptual justification is always related to looks‐related reasons: unsophisticated cognizers, multimodal identification, and amodal completion. I then provide a tentative diagnosis of what goes wrong in the Looks View: it ascribes a specific epistemic role to beliefs about looks that is actually fulfilled by subpersonal perceptual processes.     

Social Traditionalism and Economic Conservatism: Two Conservative Political Ideologies in the United States

Abstract

The authors surveyed by telephone a random sample of voters in the 1996 presidential election from the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area of Muncie, IN (“Middletown”; R. Lynd & H. Lynd, 1929) to test a model describing the nature of 2 conservative political ideologies–social traditionalism and economic conservatism. The model, based on functions of attitudes theory, predicted (a) that the 2 political ideologies would appeal to 2 rather distinct constituency groups–the former, to conservative Protestants; the latter, to people of higher incomes–and (b) that social traditionalists would be more dogmatic and economic conservatives would be more open-minded in their respective views. The findings were consistent with those predictions.     

Transcendental Arguments and the Problem of Dogmatism

Abstract

Transcendental arguments have been described as undogmatic or non‐dogmatic arguments. This paper examines this contention critically and addresses the question of what is required from an argument for which the characterization is valid. I shall argue that although transcendental arguments do in certain respects meet what one should require from non‐dogmatic arguments, they – or more specifically, what I shall call ‘general transcendental arguments’ – involve an assumption about conceptual unity that constitutes a reason for not attributing to them the status of non‐dogmatic arguments. As a solution to this problem I distinguish general transcendental arguments from what I shall call ‘specific transcendental arguments’ and seek to explain how by limiting the use of transcendental arguments to the latter type it would be possible to avoid dogmatism. This methodological adjustment also opens up a possibility of re‐interpreting transcendental arguments from the past in a novel non‐dogmatic fashion.     

Experiences,Seemings, and Perceptual Justification

Several philosophers have distinguished between three distinct mental states that play a role in visual recognition: experiences, propositional seemings, and beliefs. I clarify and offer some reasons for drawing this three-fold distinction, and I consider its epistemological implications. Some philosophers have held that propositional seemings always confer prima facie justification, regardless of a particular seeming's relation to experience. I add to criticisms of this view in the literature by arguing that it fails to solve a version of the ‘problem of the speckled hen’. A more promising view holds that propositional seemings confer justification only when appropriately related to experiences. I offer advice for developing such an account.     

Belief, hope and faith

A case of hysteria is presented in order to create a frame of reference for the author's approach to the concepts of hope, belief and faith. A difference between hope as a 'sad passion' (which is here called regressive hope) and hope as a principle of mental functioning is established. The concept of hope will at fi rst always be based on beliefs-either beliefs organised in the paranoid-schizoid position (called here fragmented and delusional beliefs)-or those organised from the depressive position (complex systems of beliefs, which end up being dogmatic); the latter typically occur in neurotics. It is suggested here that there is another possibility for hope, which is based on faith. The meaning of faith is considered here externally to the religious sense. The solid establishment of hope as a principle-based on faith-can be viewed as responsible for the opening up of creative potentials and as one of the main aims of analysis. Such an aim, however, requires the establishment of a deep relationship, both in theory and in clinical practice, between the Kleinian question of the depressive position and the Freudian question of the Oedipus complex.     

Dogmatism,Religion, and Psychological Type

A sample of 422 female undergraduate students, attending a university-sector college in Wales specialising in teacher education and liberal arts subjects, completed the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator together with the Troldahl-Powell Dogmatism Scale. The data demonstrated that higher dogmatism scores are most clearly associated with sensing rather than intuition. Higher dogmatism scores are also associated with extraversion rather than introversion, and with judging rather than perceiving. No significant difference in dogmatism scores were found between thinking and feeling.     

Dogmatic Behavior Among Students: Testing a New Measure of Dogmatism

Abstract

The study tested the validity of a new measure of dogmatism by examining university students' evaluations of the Bible. Those who believed that every word in the Bible came directly from God and that the Bible is free of any error, contradiction, or inconsistency scored much higher on this dogmatism measure than students who thought otherwise. Such “true believers” then read the 4 highly varying Gospel accounts of the resurrection of Jesus. The most dogmatic of them still insisted there were no contradictions or inconsistencies in the Bible. The less dogmatic acknowledged that contradictions and inconsistencies exist. These results reinforce those of 4 earlier studies that indicated that the new measure of dogmatism has empirical validity.     

Moral realism and program explanation

Alexander Miller has recently considered an ingenious extension of Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit's account of ‘program explanation’ as a way of defending non-reductive naturalist versions of moral realism against Harman's explanatory criticism. Despite the ingenuity of this extension, Miller concludes that program explanation cannot help such moral realists in their attempt to defend moral properties. Specifically, he argues that such moral program explanations are dispensable from an epistemically unlimited point of view. I show that Miller's argument for this negative claim is inadequate, and that he has, in spite of himself, identified a promising defence of moral realism.     

How to be Conservative: a Partial Defence of Epistemic Conservatism

Conservatism about perceptual justification tells us that we cannot have perceptual justification to believe p unless we also have justification to believe that perceptual experiences are reliable. There are many ways to maintain this thesis, ways that have not been sufficiently appreciated. Most of these ways lead to at least one of two problems: the first is an over-intellectualization problem, whereas the second concerns the satisfaction of the epistemic basing requirement on justified belief. I argue that there is at least one Conservative view that survives both difficulties, a view which has the further ability to undercut a crucial consideration that has supported Dogmatist views about perceptual justification. The final section explores a tension between Conservatism and the prospect of having a completely general account of propositional justification. Ironically, the problem is that Conservatives seem committed to making the acquisition of propositional justification too easy. My partial defence of Conservatism concludes by suggesting possible solutions to this problem.