Well I May Be Exaggerating But Self-Qualifying Clauses in Negotiation of Opinions Among Japanese Speakers

The present study investigates the ways in which Japanese speakers negotiate their opinions in conversational interaction. On the one hand, speakers are apt to exaggerate a particular aspect of a given issue in asserting their opinion, on the other hand, they may also incorporate a self-qualification admitting a potential problem in their claim. By expressing their awareness of the problem before it is pointed out by the co-participants, the speakers seem to get license to proffer an exaggerated or overgeneralized claim and to increase their chance of receiving an affiliative response. This study explicates the mechanism through which such a self-qualifying clause emerges in the development of opinion-negotiation sequences. Further, as a contribution to a growing body of research on "interaction and grammar" (Ochs, Schegloff, and Thompson, 1996), this study explores the use of "contrastive" markers, -kedo and demo, in constructing turns and sequences in opinion-negotiation. The data demonstrate these two structurally different types of markers play distinct roles in differentiating and yet conjoining the speakers' assertion and self-qualification.     

Perceived Disagreement and Heterogeneity in Social Networks: Distinct Effects on Political Participation

ABSTRACT

Although the coexistence of conflicting opinions in society is the very core of democracy, people’s tendency to avoid conflict could keep them away from political discussion and participation. On the other hand, being exposed to diverse political views could motivate citizens to participate. We conducted secondary analyses on two 2013 ITANES (Italian National Election Studies) probability samples in order to test the hypotheses that perceived network disagreement (between an individual and her/his discussion partners) and heterogeneity (among discussants holding different political opinions) exert independent and opposite effects on political participation through motivation and knowledge. Results converged in showing that disagreement dampened, while heterogeneity encouraged, political participation (voting, propensity to abstain in future, offline and online activism, and timing of vote decision) by decreasing or increasing, respectively, political interest and, in turn, knowledge.     

Understanding and disagreement in belief ascription

It seems uncontroversial that Dalton wrongly believed that atoms are indivisible. However, the correct analysis of Dalton’s belief and the way it relates to contemporary beliefs about atoms is, on closer inspection, far from straightforward. In this paper, I introduce four features that any candidate analysis is plausibly bound to respect. I argue that theories that individuate concepts at the level of understanding are doomed to fail in this endeavor. I formally sketch an alternative and suggest that cases such as the one presented provide support for the claim that the genuine source for concept individuation is public sharable thought.     

Individual differences in emotional intelligence and incidental memory of words1

Participants were required to complete the Japanese version of the Emotional Skills and Competence Questionnaire ( Toyota, Morita, & Tak?i?, 2007 ) to assess their level of emotional intelligence. Then they were asked to rate the pleasantness of an episode that each target reminded them of, followed by unexpected free recall tests. Participants with high emotional intelligence recalled targets with pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant episodes equally. However, for participants with low emotional intelligence, targets with neutral episodes were recalled less than those with pleasant or unpleasant ones. These results were interpreted as showing that the level of emotional intelligence determined the effectiveness of neutral episodes on targets as retrieval cues.     

The psychology of meta-ethics: exploring objectivism

How do lay individuals think about the objectivity of their ethical beliefs? Do they regard them as factual and objective, or as more subjective and opinion-based, and what might predict such differences? In three experiments, we set out a methodology for assessing the perceived objectivity of ethical beliefs, and use it to document several novel findings. Experiment 1 showed that individuals tend to regard ethical statements as clearly more objective than social conventions and tastes, and almost as objective as scientific facts. Yet, there was considerable variation in objectivism, both across different ethical statements, and across individuals. The extent to which individuals treat ethical beliefs as objective was predicted by the way they grounded their ethical systems. Groundings which emphasize the religious, pragmatic, and self-identity underpinnings of ethical belief each independently predicted greater ethical objectivity. Experiment 2 replicated and extended these findings with a refined measure of ethical objectivism. Experiment 3 demonstrated the robustness of the religious grounding of ethics, and differentiates it from mere religious belief and from political orientation. The results shed light on the nature of ethical belief, and have implications for the resolution of ethical disputes.     

Informant Discrepancies in Assessing Child Dysfunction Relate to Dysfunction Within Mother-Child Interactions

We examined whether mother-child discrepancies in perceived child behavior problems relate to dysfunctional interactions between mother and child and stress in the mother. Participants included 239 children (6–16 years old; 58 girls, 181 boys) referred for oppositional, aggressive, and antisocial behavior, and their mothers. Mother-child discrepancies in perceived child behavior problems were related to mother-child conflict. Moreover, maternal stress mediated this relationship. The findings suggest that discrepancies among mother and child evaluations of child functioning are not merely reflections of different perspectives or artifacts of the assessment process, but can form components of conceptual models that can be developed and tested to examine the interrelations among critical domains of child, parent, and family functioning.     

The Philosophical Scandal of the Wrong Kind of Religious Disagreement

I argue for the following four theses: (1) The Dread Thesis: human beings should fear having false religious beliefs concerning some religious doctrines; (2) The Radical Uncertainty Thesis: we, namely most human beings in our culture at our time, are in a situation where we have to commit ourselves on the truth or falsity of some propositions of ultimate importance; (3) The Radical Choice Thesis: considerations of expected loss or gain do not always provide guidance as to how to commit ourselves on matters of religious doctrine that are both radically uncertain and of ultimate importance; (4) The Scandal Thesis: radical choice on matters of ultimate importance is neither good nor inevitable, but due to the collective failure of philosophers of religion. Then I consider some inadequate responses: playing the faith card; contra-Pascalian decision theory; spiritual chauvinism; that faith presupposes uncertainty; the older pachyderm; irony, subjectivity, relativism and non-cognitivism; tainted truth; and muddling through. Finally I submit that the way forward is quite simply to become better philosophers.

Are There Any Rules?

The ``model of rules' that Ronald Dworkin attacks is an absurdmodel of law, if rules are taken to be standards that have nounspecified counterinstances, and whose application isalways uncontroversial. Dworkin gives good reason to thinkthat there are no such standards or virtually none in (e.g.)English law. But the model of rules is not misconceived, asDworkin claims. Rather, it needs a better understanding of the idea of a rule. I argue that the view that the law of a community is a system of rules needs to meet an importantchallenge that Dworkin has raised for jurisprudence: to accountfor the fact that legal rights and duties are frequentlycontroversial. I give an account of social rules thatexplains why controversy over their application in particularcases is common, and can be deep. So controversy gives noreason to reject the model of rules.