Children's understanding of mental states as causes of emotions

Theory of mind studies of emotion usually focus on children's ability to predict other people's feelings. This study examined children's spontaneous references to mental states in explaining others' emotions. Children (4‐, 6‐ and 10‐year‐olds, n = 122) were told stories and asked to explain both typical and atypical emotional reactions of characters. Because atypical emotional reactions are unexpected, we hypothesized that children would be more likely to refer to mental states, such as desires and beliefs, in explaining them than when explaining typical emotions. From the development of lay theories of emotion, derived the prediction that older children would refer more often to mental states than younger children. The developmental shift from a desire‐psychology to a belief‐psychology led to the expectation that references to desires would increase at an earlier age than references to beliefs. Our findings confirmed these expectations only partly, because the nature of the emotion (happiness, anger, sadness or fear) interacted with these factors. Whereas anger, happiness and sadness mainly evoked desire references, fear evoked more belief references, even in 4‐year‐olds. The fact that other factors besides age can also play an influential role in children's mental state reasoning is discussed. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility

The author argued elsewhere that a necessary condition that John Fischer and Mark Ravizza offer for moral responsibility is too strong and that the sufficient conditions they offer are too weak. This article is a critical examination of their reply. Topics discussed include blameworthiness, irresistible desires, moral responsibility, reactive attitudes, and reasons responsiveness.     

Plato's Criticism of the ``Democratic Man' in the Republic

The article discusses two puzzles about Plato's account of the democratic person: (1) unlike his account of the democratic city, his characterization of a democratic person is markedly incorrect. (2) His criticism of a person so characterized is criticism of a straw man. The article argues that the first puzzle is resolved if we see it as a result of Plato's assumption that a democratic person is a person whose soul is isomorphic to a democratic constitution. Such a person has a desire satisfaction theory of good and adopts liberty and equality of desires as a basis for action. The article then argues that Plato's criticism brings up two problems endemic to desire satisfaction theories of good, the problem of bad desires and the problem of conflicts of desires. The criticism is that the democratic person's way of dealing with these problems, by applying the social principles of liberty and equality to his desires, is irrational.     

On Being One's Own Person

The aim of the paper is to provide a philosophical account of our sense that some people are more their own person than others. I begin by exposing the weaknesses in three possible accounts, which I label the "interventionist", the "existentialist" and the "ideal" accounts. I then go on to argue that the distinguishing feature of those who are their own person is that their natural inclinations are accurately expressed in their behaviour.     

康有为人性论思想研究

康有为的人性论思想包含三个部分：（１）自然人性论,它是康有为人性论思想的核心;（２）情欲合理论,它是康有为人性论思想中重要的和颇具特色的组０成部分;（３）变化气质论,它是康有为人性论思想中具有实践意义的内容,也是康有为的自然人性论与中国古代的自然人性论的区别所在。康有为的人性论思想汲取了我国古代人性论思想的精华,并有新的发展,批判地继承康有为的人性论思想,对于我国心理学思想的发展和当前的教育实践具有重要意义。     

The Sixteen Strivings for God

Abstract. A psychological theory of religious experiences, sensitivity theory, is proposed. Whereas other theories maintain that religious motivation is about a few overarching desires, sensitivity theory provides a multifaceted analysis consistent with the diversity, richness, and individuality of religious experiences. Sixteen basic desires show the psychological foundations of meaningful experience. Each basic desire is embraced by every person, but to different extents. How we prioritize the basic desires expresses our individuality and influences our attraction to various religious images and activities. Each basic desire is associated with a basic goal and a unique joy, such as love, self‐worth, relaxation, or strength. We do not seek to experience joys infinitely; we regulate joys, in accordance with our core values, to sixteen balance points (sensitivities) that vary based on individuality. Religions help persons of faith regulate the sixteen basic joys by providing some images that strengthen joyful experiences and others that weaken them. We can strengthen our experience of self‐ worth, for example, by contemplating God in the image of savior; we can weaken our experience of self‐worth by contemplating original sin. The theory of sixteen basic desires is testable scientifically and suggests such philosophical concepts as value‐based happiness.     

幸福是什么

幸福概念深刻而复杂,我们可以在且个层次上把握幸福概念。首先,幸福是人生重大的快乐;进一步说,是人生重大需要和欲望得到满足的心理体验,是人生重大目的得到实现的心理体验;最终是达到生存和发展的某种完满的心理体验。     

吴澄理学视野下的易学天人之学

吴澄是光显于元代的著名理学家、经学家和易学家.他在易学的象数之学方面整合汉宋而创辟己见,而在义理之学方面则以全新理学视野解读<周易>经传,开显出<周易>吴氏学--一种理学视野下的独特易学天人之学.其基本内容是:天道为人道的终极价值根据,人宜推天遭以明人事,法天道以开人文;天道性命相贯通,由理气所造化出的天人万象相互内在,息息相通,一体无隔,构成一无限宏大的一本而万殊的有机宇宙生存共同体与生命共同体;万象如此而相连一体、动态流转着的这个世界,亦遂成为人的整个生活的世界;人应透过自觉的德性涵养修为工夫,变化气质,最大限度地彰显出与天地之理一而不二的本然正性,豁醒自足之整体人文生命理性意识,令生命最终达致成为天地之理圆满化身与自觉而圆融体现者的天地境界,进而挺立自己生命的主体性,确立应然的正大宇宙人生担当,促成天理沛然流行、和谐有序而通泰的有机人的生活世界的建立.     

From the dreams of a generation to the theory of dreams: Freud's Roman dreams

In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud's interpretation of oedipal desires does not occur at the expense of historical and personal desires, which are always there as a backdrop. In the relentless examination of his own dreams that Freud makes in order to show the mechanisms inherent in all oneiric deformation, we are also led to another, specifically historical, aspect of the issue of Jewish emancipation, which he experiences at first hand. By analysing his own dreams, Freud not only shows us the mechanisms governing dream formation, but also develops a pointed critique of his contemporary society and its prejudices.     

Motivation-encompassing attitudes

Alfred R. Mele defends a broadly ‘Humean’ theory of motivation. One common dispute between Humeans and anti-Humeans has to do with whether or not a desire is required to motivate action. For the most part Mele avoids this dispute. He claims that there are reasons to think that beliefs cannot motivate action, but finally allows that it might be that it is a contingent fact that beliefs can motivate action in human beings. Instead Mele argues for the claim that certain kinds of desires – namely action-desires – are ‘paradigmatic motivational attitudes’, similar in an essential way to intentions, and that beliefs are not. Hence it is a necessary truth that action-desires encompass motivation to act; if beliefs encompass motivation to act, it is not a necessary truth that they do. In this way Mele preserves some of what is intuitively right about the Humean account, while admitting that the arguments normally offered in support of the standard Humean claims are open to objections. I argue that Mele's account is implausible. His argument against the claim that state-desires are essentially motivation-encompassing attitudes is convincing, but the same argument proves that action-desires are not essentially motivation-encompassing either. If this difference between desires and beliefs cannot be maintained, however, then Mele fails to defend any motivationally relevant difference between beliefs and desires.